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Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) was one of the leading figures of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, an influential eighteenth-century moral and political philosopher, as 
well as a professor of ethics at the University of Edinburgh from 1764 to 1785.  
There has been a wealth of scholarship on Ferguson in which central themes include 
his role as a political theorist, sociologist, moral philosopher, and as an 
Enlightenment thinker.  One of the most frequent topics addressed by scholars is his 
relationship to ancient philosophy, particularly Stoicism.  The ease with which 
scholars identify Ferguson as a Stoic, however, is problematic because of the 
significant differences between Ferguson‟s ideas and those of the „schools‟ of 
classical antiquity, especially Stoicism.  Some scholars interpret Ferguson‟s 
philosophy as a derivative, unsystematic „patchwork‟ because he drew on various 
ancient sources, but, it is argued, did not adhere to any particular system. 
 The aim of my thesis is to suggest an alternative interpretation of Ferguson‟s 
relationship to ancient philosophy, particularly to Stoicism, by placing Ferguson in 
the context of the intellectual history of the eighteenth century.  The first section of 
this thesis is an examination of Ferguson‟s response to the Quarrel between the 
Ancients and the Moderns, modern eclecticism and the experimental method to 
demonstrate how Ferguson‟s approach to and engagement with ancient philosophy 
is informed by these intellectual contexts.  The second section is a close analysis of 
the role that ancient schools play in his discussion of the history of philosophy as 
well as the didactic purpose found in his lectures and published works thereby 
determining the function of ancient thought in his philosophy.  The third section is a 
re-examination of Ferguson‟s concept of Stoicism and his engagement with Stoic 
ethics in his moral philosophy re-interpreting his relationship to the ancient school.  
With a combination of a new understanding of Ferguson‟s methodology and new 
assessment of his engagement with ancient thought, a new interpretation of 
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1.1 Introductory Remarks 
 





 met only once at a dinner party in honour of Robert Burns held in a 
small house in a suburb of Edinburgh in 1787.  It was an intimate gathering whose 
guests included James Hutton, Joseph Black, Dugald Stewart, and „the famous 
aeronaut Lunardi‟,
3
 all of whom were excited to meet Burns.  Walter Scott was a 
youth at the time and friend of young Adam, the son of Professor Adam Ferguson,
4
 
lecturer in moral philosophy at Edinburgh, host of the party.  This fortunate meeting 
of two eminent literary figures
5
 connected representations of two generations of the 
Scottish Enlightenment and brought together champions of the old and new styles.  
This meeting can be viewed as summarizing the philosophical works of Adam 
Ferguson himself because his career in a similar fashion brought together different 
traditions and consciously bridged the gap between the old and the new, the ancient 
and the modern.   
Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) was a central and unique figure of the Scottish 
Enlightenment.  Writing from the mid-eighteenth-century to the early nineteenth 
century, he not only outlived many of his contemporaries, but experienced the very 
changes and events that shaped the development of the Scottish Enlightenment: the 
Jacobite risings and their aftermath, the American and French Revolutions, the 
growth of the British empire, the discovery and exploration of new locations and 
                                                 
1
 Robert Crawford, „Burns, Robert (1759–1796)‟, ODNB,  
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/4093 (accessed 26 Oct 2010). 
2
 David Hewitt, „Scott, Sir Walter (1771–1832)‟, ODNB,  
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/24928 (accessed 26 Oct 2010). 
3
 John Small, Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson, LL.D., F.R.S.E. (Edinburgh: Neill and 
Company, 1864), 49.  Vincenzo Lunardi (1759-1806) was an Italian pioneer of hot air balloons and 
successfully demonstrated the launching of a hydrogen balloon in London in 1784, thus rising in 
popularity in the United Kingdom, having balloon motif skirts named after him as well as a bonnet, 
which is referred to in Robert Burn‟s 1789 poem „To a Louse‟.  Elizabeth Baigent, „Lunardi, 
Vincenzo (1759–1806)‟. ODNB, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/17189 (accessed 9 Sep 
2009). 
4
 Fania Oz-Salzberger, „Ferguson, Adam (1723–1816)‟,  ODNB, 
 http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/9315 (accessed 26 Oct 2010). 
5
 Walter Scott had little conversation with Burns, but what did transpire was cherished by Scott for 
the rest of his life.  Small, Biographical Sketch, 49-50. 
 2 
cultures, revolutions in science and technology, advances in theories of law and 
theology, and the ferocious debates that occupied thinkers in the Enlightenment, 
both in Scotland specifically and Europe in general.  This wide-ranging experience 
gave him a unique and original perspective as an eighteenth-century thinker.  His 
long life resulted in his participation in debates from the mid-eighteenth century to 
the later controversies of the early nineteenth century. 
Ferguson also maintained a close connection to the works of classical 
antiquity.  Many scholars note Ferguson‟s debt to ancient authors, particularly the 
Stoics, and Ferguson himself commented on his strong ties to the Stoic school.  In 
Ferguson‟s works, this appreciation for antiquity is often paired with discussions of 
modern topics, issues and sources.  It is this blending of the ancient and the modern 
which is one of the unique characteristics of Ferguson‟s thought.  Certainly 
Ferguson is not alone in drawing on ancient philosophy.  The tradition of classical 
scholarship and the publication of ancient texts in Europe and Scotland had been 
established from, at the latest, the Renaissance to the eighteenth century.  Many of 
Ferguson‟s contemporaries also incorporated discussions of classical literature into 
their writing as well, but in modern scholarship it is Ferguson who is most often 
identified as having a recurrent dependence on antiquity.   
The history of the study of and engagement with the classical tradition of 
ancient philosophy and literature in the eighteenth century is considered essential for 
wider studies of the European and the Scottish Enlightenment.  In books about the 
Enlightenment the use of classical ideas by modern thinkers is inescapable.
6
  The 
influence of ancient philosophy on modern thought is a vast and rich topic and has 
been a crucial element of eighteenth-century studies.  The Enlightenment has been 
defined as encompassing the „long eighteenth century‟, but has its origins remain in 
the intellectual developments of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  Thinkers in 
the eighteenth century reacted to earlier intellectual trends, particularly in their 
response to ancient literature.  Developments in the study of ancient philosophy, 
literature and history were of fundamental importance to those writing after the 
                                                 
6
 For discussions of the importance of classics on the Enlightenment see Peter Gay‟s classic works, 
The Enlightenment: an Interpretation Vol. I: The Rise of Modern Paganism (New York: Knopf, 
1966) and The Enlightenment: an Interpretation Vol. II: The Science of Freedom (New York: Knopf, 
1969).   
 3 
revival of ancient learning in the Renaissance
7
 because the reaction of different 
thinkers through the early modern period shaped modern thought.  Ancient 
philosophy, in particular the schools of the Stoics, Epicureans and Peripatetics, was 
central to early modern discussions of philosophy, although the study of ancient 
literature was not limited to these few subjects, and this scholarship was crucial for 
the origins of the Enlightenment.
8
 
Engagement with ancient philosophy has been studied mainly by two 
methods: the first is to assess the changing response to antiquity in early modern 
intellectual history, and the second is to analyse the specific response of individual 
thinkers to different aspects of ancient literature.  This extensive and rich 
scholarship has provided modern readers with essential insights into the context and 
mindset of early modern philosophy.  Particularly for the study of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, these studies offer modern scholars a picture of the intellectual 
context in which eighteenth-century thinkers wrote.  As has been clearly 
demonstrated by such scholars as John Robertson and David Allan, the relationship 
between Stoicism, Epicureanism, Augustinianism and Aristotelianism is crucial for 
Scottish Enlightenment thinkers.  
In Philosophy and Politics in Later Stuart Scotland David Allan has traced 
the growth of what he terms Neo-Stoicism in the sixteenth century as a result of 
thinkers reinterpreting ancient Stoic sources.
9
  Allan traces the development of 
Stoicism from the ancient authors to the early modern thinkers.  He has looked at 
how ancient texts and ideas were received in the seventeenth century and proved the 
importance of neo-classical thought in Scotland: „What can be inferred about 
reading tastes in the period also suggests that individual Scots possessed a keen 
interest in both classical and neo-classical literature which would have exposed them 
immediately to new European currents in philosophical thinking‟.
10
  He notes the 
                                                 
7
 Rudolf Pfeiffer, The History of Classical Scholarship from 1300 to 1850 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1976), 3.  Pfeiffer identifies the poet Francis Petrarca (Petrarch) as being the impetus for the revival 
of classical scholarship. 
8
 See Dan Edelstein, The Enlightenment: A Genealogy (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 2010). 
9
 David Allan, Philosophy and Politics in Later Stuart Scotland, (East Lothian: Tuckwell Press, 
2000), 2.   
10
 David Allan, Philosophy and Politics in Later Stuart Scotland, 24, 30-34.  See also David Allan, 
Virtue, Learning, and the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993). 
 4 
development of Stoicism from the Renaissance through the seventeenth century 
when Stoicism became notably important in European politics and natural law.  He 
claims that one theory for the survival and importance of Stoicism in the modern 
world is that it is on the one hand practical and applicable to later political discourse 
while on the other hand the teachings of later Stoics had a strong and lasting 
connection to Christianity.
11
  He goes on to note that in more recent scholarship the 
actual relationship between Christianity and Stoicism has been clearly shown.  Stoic 
ideas were so important in the late Roman Empire that the early Christian writers 
incorporated Stoic ideas into their theology.
12
  The connection between Christianity 
and Stoicism is both well understood generally and for the modern period it is 
essential.   
John Robertson in The Case for the Enlightenment (2005)
13
 writes an in-
depth discussion of the interplay between the modern proponents of Stoicism and 
Epicureanism and the Augustinians noting that Enlightenment thinkers followed the 
evolution of these schools in the seventeenth century, but this evolution was not 
limited to these origins.
14
  Due to the influence of seventeenth-century authors,
15
 
members of the Scottish Enlightenment were familiar with earlier continental neo-
Stoic authors like the highly influential Justus Lipsius (1547-1606), who was 
instrumental in founding the eighteenth-century concept of Christian Stoicism.
16
  
This process of Christianising pagan philosophy was not limited to Stoic thought 
and scholars such as the Cambridge Platonists who found similarities between 
Christian dogma and platonic thought.
17
  Robertson further demonstrates the 
importance of the interaction between modern interpretations of ancient schools, 
particularly the Augustinian and neo-Stoic reaction to Epicureanism.  Epicureanism 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries took on particular connotations related to 
                                                 
11
 Allan, Philosophy and Politics in Later Stuart Scotland, 7. 
12
 Allan, Philosophy and Politics in Later Stuart Scotland, 7-8. 
13
 John Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
14
 Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment, 32. 
15
 Ibid., 110-127. 
16
 Jonathan Israel, Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 
1650-1752 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 417.  See also Mark Morford, Stoics and Neo-
Stoics: Rubens and the Circle of Lipsius (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 
17
 Ibid. See also Sarah Hutton, „The Cambridge Platonists‟ in Blackwell‟s Companion to Early 
Modern Philosophy, edited by Steven Nadler (Malden and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002, 
2008), 308-319. 
 5 
atomism, atheism and moral corruption and was ascribed to modern thinkers such as 
Gassendi and Thomas Hobbes.
18
  The opposition to Epicureanism and the resulting 
formulations of different moral theories, either of Aristotelian or Stoic origin, had a 
great influence in shaping philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment.
19
  Several 
prominent figures of the early Scottish Enlightenment, Francis Hutcheson in 
particular, used a form of Christian Stoicism to combat what were perceived as the 




The importance of classical scholarship and the present role of ancient 
philosophy within modern philosophy are a crucial theme in eighteenth-century 
studies.  The engagement with antiquity defines, to a degree, much of eighteenth-
century thought and the broad effects of this must be understood in order to 
accurately assess Enlightenment philosophy.  Of course, not all eighteenth-century 
thinkers took the same position regarding ancient philosophy and their views on 
classical literature varied depending on specific background, education and personal 
preference.  The standard curriculum would have exposed the educated elite to most 
of the same authors, and therefore they would have recognised and understood the 
allusions to ancient literature, and would have a common conception of the ancient 
world.  The classics provided the received tradition and cultural background for 
people living in the eighteenth century.
21
  The classical tradition was inescapable for 
anyone educated during the early modern period and created a base-line of 
understanding and recognition.  Therefore, even if not all thinkers responded to 
classical literature uniformly, one example of a thinker‟s relationship to the classics 
is representative of many of the opinions of antiquity in the eighteenth century as 
grounded on this general understanding of ancient literature.   
Adam Ferguson provides the perfect case study to better understand the 
relationship between ancient and modern thought in the Scottish Enlightenment 
                                                 
18
 For recent studies on Epicureanism in the eighteenth century see Eric Baker, „Lucretius in the 
European Enlightenment‟, in The Cambridge Companion to Lucretius, edited by Stuart Gillespie and 
Philip Hardie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Catherine Wilson, Epicureanism at 
the Origins of Modernity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008); Epicurus in the Enlightenment, ed. Neven 
Leddy and Avi S. Lifschitz (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2009).  
19
 Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment, 136-143. 
20
 Ibid., 284-285. 
21
 Gloria Vivenza, Adam Smith and the Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 41. 
 6 
because he was a thinker who consciously engaged with ancient philosophy and was 
involved in contemporary intellectual debates.  Ferguson‟s work cannot be divorced 
from either ancient or modern intellectual traditions and therefore his philosophy 
can be seen as representative of current opinions about ancient philosophy and the 
relationship that plays with modern trends of thought.  While it is not the aim of this 
thesis to assess Ferguson‟s connections to Neo-Stoicism or Epicureanism, an 
understanding of his relationship to Stoicism is of the most importance to better 
understand his thought.  An examination of Ferguson‟s personal and intellectual life 
will further demonstrate the influence of ancient and modern ideas on this central 
and important figure of the Scottish Enlightenment.  
 
 
1.2 Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) 
 
A study of Ferguson‟s intellectual career would be incomplete without an 
exploration into his personal intellectual history.  Ferguson‟s life and education had 
a profound impact on his ideas and methods.  An exploration into Ferguson‟s 
education, his professional life and his publications demonstrates the central role 
which ancient philosophy and literature played throughout his life.  Ferguson, 
however, is more than one educated in and influenced by antiquity and an 
examination of his life also highlights the important role which Ferguson played in 
the Scottish and European Enlightenments.  Ferguson‟s biography reveals a man 
who was a central and influential member of the Scottish literati as well as a 
European figure.  Ferguson‟s intellectual connections to eighteenth-century thinkers 
in Europe demonstrate that he engaged with his contemporaries as much as with his 
ancient sources.  In Ferguson‟s life, these two trends, this strong connection to his 
education in and his lifelong relationship to ancient thought, as well as his 






Early Life and Education 
 
Adam Ferguson was born in Logierait, Perthshire on 20 June 1723 to Mary and 
Adam Fergusson, a Gaelic-speaking minister in the Church of Scotland.
22
  His 
childhood spent on the borders of the Scottish Highlands and Lowlands and his 
knowledge of Gaelic both influenced his career and his thought and set him apart 
from many of his English-speaking, Lowland counterparts in the Scottish 
Enlightenment.
23
  Ferguson‟s intellectual talents were recognised at an early age.  
His father, who was once a school teacher, first taught him basic reading and 
writing.  Ferguson then attended the local parish school in Logierait, where he was 
taught by John Conacher
24
 who recognised Ferguson‟s abilities and sent Adam to 
the Perth Grammar School, headed by the Rector James Martin
25
 and Alexander 
Cornfute.  From a young age Ferguson was taught from classical texts.  He stood out 
in the study of Greek and Latin texts, writing compositions following classical 
models; and as is the case of many of his contemporaries, this foundation in classical 
education shaped his future works.
26
  Ferguson „excelled in classical literature, and 
especially in the composition of essays‟, his themes were highly praised and were 
„shown with pride by Mr. Martin, who declared that none of his pupils had ever 
surpassed the writer‟.
27
  Ferguson also performed in the Latin play „Cato‟ in 1735 at 
                                                 
22
 For biographical information on Ferguson see John Small, Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson 
(Edinburgh: Neill and Company, 1864);  James Lorimer, „Adam Ferguson‟, in the Edinburgh Review, 
or critical journal, 125:255 (1867:Jan.), pp.48-85; Jane B. Fagg‟s published Ph.D. Thesis, Adam 
Ferguson: Scottish Cato (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, Inc, 1968); Jane B. Fagg „Biographical 
Introduction‟, in The Correspondence of Adam Ferguson (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1995); Fania 
Oz-Salzberger Translating the Enlightenment: Scottish Civic Discourse in Eighteenth-Century 
Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Fania Oz-Salzberger‟s „Introduction‟ to her 
edition of Adam Ferguson‟s 1767 An Essay on the History of Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995); David Kettler,  The Social and Political Thought of Adam Ferguson, 2
nd
 edn. 
(New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1965, 2005); David Allan, Adam Ferguson 
(Aberdeen: AHRC University of Aberdeen, 2006); Lisa Hill, The Passionate Society: The Social, 
Political and Moral Thought of Adam Ferguson (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006). 
23
 Fania Oz-Salzberger, „Ferguson, Adam (1723–1816)‟, ODNB,  
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/9315 (accessed 25 Jan 2011).  
24
 Jane B. Fagg, „Biographical Introduction‟, in The Correspondence of Adam Ferguson, xxi; Jane B. 
Fagg, Adam Ferguson: Scottish Cato, 9. 
25
 James Lorimer, „Adam Ferguson‟, Edinburgh Review, or critical journal, 125:255 (1867:Jan.), 59. 
„The Perth rector long after preserved his boyish essays, and exhibited them with pride; and at college 
he finished his curriculum in Arts with the reputation of being one of the best classical scholars, and 
perhaps the ablest mathematicians and metaphysicians of his time.‟ 
26
 Fania Oz-Salzberger, „Introduction‟, vii; Fagg, Scottish Cato, 9-12. 
27




  Ferguson‟s early education was particularly important to 
his later writings because it gave him a firm and critical foundation in classical 
literature and language that would serve as the basis of his analysis of ancient 
thought in his philosophy.   
The example of Ferguson‟s primary education was typical of the common 
style of teaching in eighteenth-century Scotland.  Most people who had some degree 
of formal education would also have had an experience of classical literature.  In the 
seventeenth century, the parish school curriculum focused on arithmetic, writing in 
English, writing „Latin themes‟ by translating texts from English to Latin, grammar, 
„good manners‟ and occasionally geography.
29
  In the eighteenth century students 
learned mainly by using the Bible and Catechisms, and would only be taught Latin if 
their teacher had been instructed in it himself.
30
  Some of the more advanced 
students would also receive special instruction in Latin, mathematics, bookkeeping, 
land surveying, geometry, algebra and religious instruction depending on their 
ability and the abilities of their instructors.
31
  The education offered in Scottish 
schools varied by location, but many schools had adopted Thomas Ruddiman‟s 
influential Rudiments of the Latin Tongue by the end of the eighteenth century.
32
    
Some of the text books used in these classrooms displayed particular 
assumptions about the usefulness of ancient literature.  For instance, in Edward 
Manwarning‟s Institutes of Learning: Taken from Aristotle, Plutarch, Longinus, 
Dionysius Halicar, Cicero, Quintilian and many other Writers both Ancient and 
Modern, he wrote about „the method of teaching the Classics in their most 
Substantial and Beautiful Parts; The Characters and Affections of Stile; The Art of 
School-Compositions, and all Kinds of Oratory‟ and characterised the work as „a 
system of the Greek and Roman polite Literature‟.
 33
  Extolling the ancient authors 
over the moderns, he claims the: 
                                                 
28
 Fagg, Scottish Cato, 10. 
29
 James Scotland, The History of Scottish Education Vol I, From the Beginning to 1872 (London: 
University of London Press Ltd., 1969), 65.  
30
 Scotland, The History of Scottish Education Vol. I, 66-67. 
31
 For a description of the conditions of schools across Scotland in the early modern period see T.C. 
Smout,  A History of the Scottish People 1560-1830 (London: Fontana Press, 1998; first published by 
William Collins and Sons, 1969), especially 425-433. 
32
 M. L. Clarke, Classical Education in Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 134. 
33
 Ibid., 66.  
 9 
Antient are more solid, more philosophical, and upon Subjects 
much more material and weighty, but of little Use, because seldom 
read, or read superficially.  The moderns have a double advantage 
of the Antients in their own Experience, and that of the Antients; 
yet have never been capable of equalling the Antients in 
Knowledge and Learning.
34
     
 
Manwarning discussed in detail which authors should be read depending on 
the subject matter, and compared their faults and attributes.
35
  Throughout the book 
he employed ancient authors to teach students proper style and rules of grammar, 
citing examples of specific texts and authors to illustrate his general guidelines.  
This category of textbooks represents one way in which opinions about the value of 
classical texts were assimilated into basic education.  The textbooks used in 
eighteenth-century education therefore played a central role in the intellectual 
development of Enlightenment figures, and their later thought and opinions about 
ancient thought would have derived from these early experiences with the texts. 
Ferguson himself maintained a belief in the importance of a classical 
education beginning at a young age.  This is evidenced in an epistolary exchange 
between David Hume and Ferguson in which Hume requested Ferguson‟s assistance 
in organising a supplemental education programme in ancient Greek for his nephew, 
Josey, who was living in Edinburgh.
36
  Ferguson responded by stating that, although 
it was not the fashion to learn Greek before attending university, he had eventually 
found a teacher for Josey who could instruct him in the basics of Greek grammar.
37
  
Ferguson added that Hume‟s nephew, though skilled, was not proficient enough in 
Latin to complete his school exercises and he then proposed to find someone to tutor 
the young man in the evenings in Latin and Greek grammar.
38
  Ferguson‟s close 
attention to the boy‟s classical education demonstrates how important he and Hume 
                                                 
34
 Edward Manwarning, Institutes of Learning (First Edition, London: W. Innys & R. Manby, 1737.  
Facsimile reprint Menston: Scholar Press, 1968), 1. 
35
 For example, Manwarning compared historians by their style and substance as „what Velocity of 
Stile in Sallust; how unaffected and sweet Xenophon and Herodotus; how weighty, vehement and 
clear Livy, and how he moves the milder Affections.‟  Manwarning, Institutes, 13.    
36
 „I am afraid there occurs a difficulty at present about entering him to the Greek.  He is too far 
advanced by his learning for the class in the High School, to which he is put, and yet he is too young 
for the college: For this reason I thought that he might learn something of the Greek before he 
finished his Latin course, as is the practice in England‟. Letter from David Hume, 9 Nov. 1763, The 
Correspondence of Adam Ferguson (London: William Pickering, 1995), 51. 
37
 Letter to David Hume, 26 Nov. 1763, The Correspondence of Adam Ferguson, 55. 
38
 Ibid., 56. 
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thought it was for the young man to have a solid foundation in classical languages 
and literature. 
In Ferguson‟s university career the importance of and his exposure to ancient 
literature continued to play a crucial role in his education and intellectual 
development.  Ferguson attended St. Leonard‟s College at the University of St. 
Andrews beginning in 1738 and studied for the Master of Arts in philosophy, 
receiving a bursary based on his excellent knowledge of Latin.
39
  Ferguson studied 
Greek with Francis Pringle, who was „said to be without rival in Scotland‟,
40
 
devoting particular attention to these studies and to this end Ferguson read 100 lines 
of the Iliad per day over the summer to improve his proficiency.
41
  While at St. 
Andrews, he also studied mathematics with Charles Gray; logic and moral 
philosophy; and natural philosophy with David Young, who used John Keill‟s 
Newtonian Introductio ad veram Physicam.
42
 
Ferguson‟s university education was typical of the curriculum taught at 
Scottish universities, where classical education remained an important component of 
education.
43
  From the beginning of the seventeenth century, most of the universities 
taught theology, ancient languages, philosophy and mathematics.  The main subjects 
attended in the eighteenth century were Latin, Greek, logic, moral philosophy and 
natural philosophy,
44
 while Edinburgh in particular added law, medicine, rhetoric 
and science.
45
  Ferguson‟s university education therefore would have enhanced his 
knowledge of ancient subjects and his contemporaries would have received the same 
exposure to those texts.  Gloria Vivenza identifies Adam Smith‟s education at 
                                                 
39
 Small notes that this award was the result of „his previous excellent training in Latin‟, (John Small, 
Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson, 2).  Small also argues that the examination for the bursary 
included writing and translating Latin.  See also Fagg, Scottish Cato, 12. 
40
 Fagg, Scottish Cato, 12. 
41
 Lorimer, Edinburgh Review, 59, „Ferguson entered the university at fifteen, and … he carried 
neither Greek nor mathematics along with him.‟ 
42
 Fagg, „Biographical Introduction‟, xxi. 
43
 For detailed discussions of the development of the curriculum in Scottish universities in the early 
modern period see: Christine Shepherd, „A National System of University Education in Seventeenth-
Century Scotland?‟, in Scottish Universities: Distinctiveness and Diversity, ed. Jennifer J. Carter and 
Donald J. Witherington (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1992); John M. Fletcher, „The College- 
University: its Development in Aberdeen and Beyond‟, in Scottish Universities: Distinctiveness and 
Diversity, ed. Jennifer J. Carter and Donald J. Witherington (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1992), 19.  
These works trace the influence of classical learning from the Renaissance, through the adoption of 
Aristotelian ideas, and their replacement by Descartes‟ natural philosophy. 
44
 Scotland, The History of Scottish Education Vol. I, 144. 
45
 Smout, 447-448. 
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Glasgow, where he was taught the works of Cicero and specifically learned about 
Stoic philosophy, as important for his knowledge and understanding of the classics.  
She argues „The tenacious (albeit not exclusive) persistence of Stoic philosophy in 
Smith‟s thought could perhaps be ascribed precisely to his systematic, first-hand 
reading of Cicero (and, as has been mentioned, Epictetus); Plato and Aristotle by 
contrast not being studied directly in the original‟.
46
  Vivenza argues that this 
foundation is crucial for understanding Smith‟s thought and the same conclusion can 
be claimed for Ferguson.   
 Upon finishing his Master of Arts degree in 1742, Ferguson had gained a 
„reputation of being one of the best classical scholars, and perhaps the ablest 
mathematician and metaphysician of his time at the University‟.
47
  Following the 
encouragement of his father, Ferguson began his Divinity studies at St. Andrews 
with Professors James Murison and Archibald Campbell.
48
  Ferguson soon after left 
St. Andrews for the University of Edinburgh where he studied Divinity with John 
Gowdie
49
 and Patrick Cuming.
50
  He also dedicated himself to the study of 
philosophy „for which he showed special aptitude‟,
51
 and it is probable that he 
attended the lectures on moral philosophy given by William Cleghorn.
52
  Cleghorn‟s 
lectures have been described as reflective of „the revival of Greek Studies in 
Scotland‟,
53
 making constant reference to ancient schools of philosophy and 
including ancient debates on many of the topics he undertook in his discussion of 
moral philosophy.  For instance, when discussing the question of the materiality or 
immateriality of the human soul, Cleghorn assessed and compared the ideas of 
Empedocles, Zeno and the Stoics, Aristoxenes, Xenocrates, Aristotle and Plato, and 
                                                 
46
 Ibid., 7. 
47
 Small, Biographical Sketch, 2; Kettler, Ferguson, 43-44.   
48
 „Campbell wrote what would be his most important work, An Enquiry into the Original of Moral 
Virtue, after reading Bernard Mandeville's Fable of the Bees, which described vice as essential to 
human nature.‟   Margaret Batty, „Campbell, Archibald (1691–1756)‟, ODNB, 
 http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/4476 (accessed 25 Jan 2011).  
49
 Laurence A. B. Whitley, „Gowdie , John (c.1682–1762)‟, ODNB, 
 http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/64372 (accessed 25 Jan 2011). 
50
 Laurence A. B. Whitley, „Cuming, Patrick, of Relugas (bap. 1695, d. 1776)‟, ODNB,  
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/64368 (accessed 25 Jan 2011). 
51
 Small, Biographical Sketch, 3.  
52
 See Douglas Nobbs, „The Political Ideas of William Cleghorn, David Hume‟s Rival‟, Journal for 
the History of Ideas, Vol. 6,  No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1965), 578. 
 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708501Accessed: 14/10/2010. 
53
 Nobbes, „The Political Ideas of William Cleghorn, Hume‟s Academic Rival‟, 586. 
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finally Democritus as found in Lucretius and Hobbes, before giving his opinion on 
the subject.
54
  Douglas Nobbs has argued that it was from Cleghorn that Ferguson 
„had learned perhaps all that he knew in regard to the critical issues of moral 
philosophy‟,
55
 a statement that both over-emphasises Ferguson‟s reliance on 
Cleghorn and diminishes Ferguson‟s individual contribution.  The importance of 
Cleghorn‟s lectures for Ferguson‟s intellectual development, however, cannot be 
denied.  Thus, Ferguson‟s education, both his primary school and university 
experiences with ancient literature and languages, gave him a broad knowledge of 
these topics that he carried with him through his intellectual life.   
 Another fundamental factor in shaping Ferguson‟s intellectual development 
was the community of scholars and friends he met in Edinburgh in particular, and 
Scotland and elsewhere in Europe.  Ferguson made many lifelong friends with his 
fellow divinity students, many of whom were later important members of the 
Scottish Enlightenment.  These friends include the author John Home; the historian, 
principal of the University of Edinburgh and head of the Moderate party of the 
Scottish Kirk, William Robertson; the minister and professor, Hugh Blair; and the 
minister and memorialist, Alexander Carlyle.  This impressive group went on to 
form a debating club which later became the famous Speculative Society.  In 
Edinburgh, Ferguson also met the architects John and Robert Adam; the philosopher 
and historian, David Hume; the professor, moralist and economist, Adam Smith; the 
geologist, James Hutton; and the chronologist, John Blair.
56
  Ferguson‟s friendship 
with these various scholars left a deep imprint on his life.  Their personal 
interactions and formal discussions in the Speculative Society and other debating 
societies ensured Ferguson‟s engagement with and shaped his thought on current 
issues relating to both Scotland and more varied topics, which can be seen in 




                                                 
54
 William Cleghorn, Lectures of W. Cleghorn, Edinburgh University 1746-1747 (EUL, Dc.3.3-6), 
vol.1,  14-16. 
55
 Nobbes, „The Political Ideas of William Cleghorn, Hume‟s Academic Rival‟, 575. 
56
 Fagg, „Biographical Introduction‟, xxii. 
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Life After University 
 
In 1745, although only two years into his six-year course in divinity, Ferguson was 
given special permission to take up the position of chaplain for the 42 Highland 
Regiment, the famed „Black Watch‟, where his knowledge of Gaelic was essential.
57
  
Ferguson was with this regiment in Flanders during the War of the Austrian 
Succession in 1745.  Walter Scott reported that in the Battle of Fontenoy Ferguson 
lead the soldiers into battle, sword drawn, despite being told by his commanding 
officer to return to the back of the line.  When he was informed that his commission 
did not permit him to fight at the front Ferguson shouted „Damn my commission!‟ 
threw his papers at the officer and continued on to the front of the column.  
Although this story is probably false because Ferguson was still studying divinity in 
Edinburgh at the time of the battle,
58
 the regiment itself was important in the battle 
and the report of this incident is an interesting aspect of Ferguson‟s legacy.  
Ferguson has subsequently been referred to as the „Warlike Chaplain‟ and Jane Bush 
Fagg has noted „his famous bad temper and adventurous spirit made the story easily 
believable‟.
59
  This story and subsequent opinions of Ferguson as „fiery‟ contradicts 
the equally prominent view of his professed Stoicism. 
One of his Gaelic sermons to the Black Watch was published in English in 
1746 titled A Sermon preached in the Ersh Language,
60
 at the request of the 
Dowager Duchess of Atholl.  This sermon criticised the actions of the Jacobites and 
Bonnie Prince Charlie because he did not believe the government in Britain could be 
improved by their return and was suspicious of their connections to the Catholic 
French.  He also advised the soldiers to fight by appealing to the duty of men to 
                                                 
57
 This appointment was organised by the family of the patron of the regiment James 2
nd
 Duke of 
Athol.  The Colonel of the Black watch, the Duke‟s half brother, John Murray wanted a Gaelic 
speaking Chaplin and his mother the Dowager Duchess of Atholl suggested Ferguson.
 
Fagg, 
„Biographical Introduction‟, xxiii. Small, who quoted Alexander Carlyle, claims that the reason the 
Duchess chose Ferguson was so that he could be a tutor and help guide Lord John Murray, especially 
in dealing with the other officers. Biographical Sketch, 3. 
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 Fagg, „Biographical Introduction‟, xxiii; David Allan, Adam Ferguson, 7. 
59
 Fagg, „Biographical Introduction‟ xxiv.  
60
 Ferguson, Adam. A sermon preached in the Ersh language to His Majesty's First Highland 
Regiment of Foot, Commanded by Lord John Murray, at their cantonment at Camberwell, on the 
18th day of December, 1745. Being appointed as a solemn fast. By the Reverend Mr. Adam Ferguson, 
chaplain to the said regiment: and translated by him into English, for the use of a Lady of Quality in 
Scotland, at whose desire it is now published (London,  1746),  ECCO, Accessed on 24 May 2011.  
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defend their country.  More generally, Ferguson‟s sermons, while well crafted, were 
criticised for his frequent references to philosophy rather than the more common 
Presbyterian moralising and religious instruction typical of his time.
61
  A description 
of his sermons preached while serving with the Black Watch was given by „one of 
his countrymen, who, like himself, was bred to the church‟: 
Indeed…the cast of his mind, or, more properly speaking, his 
habits of composition were little fitted for a popular audience.  He 
had early imbibed a great portion of the spirit of the Stoic 
philosophy.  He could not altogether be said to be a Stoic, but was 
and has uniformly been a Peripatetic, with a strong bias to 
Stoicism.  His sermons were profound moral essays, exhibiting a 
philosophy compounded of that of Aristotle and Zeno, and 





Here, even in these early sermons, the influence of the classics on Ferguson‟s 
thought was so prominent that his contemporary found it to be a distinguishing 
characteristic of his work.  Furthermore, it is crucial to point out that this early 
sermon was not a pure form of Stoicism, but one that reviled Peripatetic 
influence which further demonstrates the fluid nature of the ancient schools in 
Ferguson‟s thought.  Ferguson here did not only draw inspiration from one 
school, but from two very distinct systems to sermonise about morality, an 
element of his thought which would be carried through his career. 
 Ferguson decided to leave the army sometime in 1751 after a return visit to 
Scotland, when he realised he wanted to resume his intellectually vibrant life in 
Edinburgh, but he stayed on with his regiment until 1754.  After leaving the army 
and the clergy behind Ferguson spent time without permanent employment.  He 
remained on the continent for one year before returning to Scotland when he was 
employed as a tutor for a Scottish law student referred to only as „Mr. Gordon‟.
63
  
Gordon was studying in the Dutch university of Groningen and then at the 
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 „Although, by his polished manners and his great abilities, he took a prominent part in private 
society, he was deficient in the gift necessary for the popular preacher. His sermons were elaborate 
disquisitions, showing more acquaintance with systems of philosophy than with the wants of the 
common hearers.‟  Small, Biographical Sketch, 5.   
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 John Lee, „Adam Ferguson‟ in Annual Biography and Obituary for 1817 Vol. I (London: 
Longman, 1817), 240.  
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University of Leipzig.  There Ferguson gained first-hand knowledge of the 
intellectual trends and ideas of the European Enlightenment.
64
  This and subsequent 
experiences as a tutor in Europe exposed Ferguson to ideas outside of his Scottish 
intellectual circle, ideas that were being taught in other universities and countries.  
These experiences developed Ferguson‟s academic network and improved his 
connections to the main intellectual currents in contemporary Europe.  These 
international connections were fundamental to Ferguson‟s broader understanding of 
philosophy as a subject and it is through them that Ferguson remained not only a 
Scottish, but a European intellectual.  
Expanding his role as an important member of the Scottish Enlightenment, in 
1756 he joined the Select Society, which was a debating society founded by the 
painter Allan Ramsay in 1754 „to promote philosophical inquiry and improve the art 
of Public Speaking among its members‟ in which any topic could be approached 
„except such as regards revealed religion, or which may give occasion to vent any 
principles of Jacobitism‟.
65
  Members of this society included Hugh Blair, professor 
of rhetoric and belles lettres at Edinburgh; Lord Dundas, president of the Court of 
Session; William Cullen, professor of Chemistry at Edinburgh; William Robertson; 
and Henry Home, later Lord Kames.  As becomes obvious from this list, the 
members were not limited to one field of study and this society was a place where, 
as David Allan argues, „students of man and society… and the moderate clergymen 
mingled easily with pioneering investigators of the natural world‟.
66
  This 
environment must have occasioned a variety of discussions spanning multiple 
disciplines and enriching the thought of all of its members.  Ferguson played a 
significant role in the society and notoriously participated in a reading of John 
Home‟s controversial play, Douglas, in which Ferguson read the role of Lady 
Randolph, a move which angered the Kirk traditionalists who wished to censor the 
play.
67
  Ferguson became so deeply involved in the Douglas controversy that he 
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 Oz-Salzberger, „Introduction‟, x. 
65
 Fagg, „Biographical Introduction‟, xxvi. 
66
 Allan, Adam Ferguson, 13. 
67
 Small, Biographical Sketch, 7. The cast list according to Small was „Lord Randolph, Dr. Robertson 
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published a pamphlet in 1757, The Morality of Stage Plays Seriously Considered,
68
 
which proposed that the church should not condemn the theatre.  The debating 
societies, in which Ferguson participated, as well as those in Glasgow, Aberdeen 
and St. Andrews, formed the backbone of intellectual discussion and the exchange 
of ideas further demonstrating the importance of sociability in the Scottish 
Enlightenment.
69
     
In 1762 the moderate literati founded the Poker Club, named by Ferguson, to 
„stir up the militia issue‟ with a metaphoric fire poker and, according to Lorimer „to 
which nearly the whole of the celebrities of Edinburgh belonged‟.
70
  The militia 
issue was an important point of discussion for the Edinburgh literati because, in the 
wake of the Jacobite rebellion, the English government had banned the Scottish 
militia in fear of another uprising.  The Scottish opposition to this bill argued for the 
necessity of a militia for protection against the perceived threat of the French.   
Ferguson published on the debates addressed in the Poker Club.  In 1756 
Ferguson had anonymously published the pamphlet, Reflections previous to the 
Establishment of a Militia,
71
 a discussion of current politics in Britain, which is a 
clear presentation of many of his political ideas.  In 1760 Ferguson, „instigated by 
Carlyle‟, published The History of the Proceedings in the Case of Margaret, 
commonly called Peg, only lawful sister to John Bull, Esq. which was a satirical 
criticism of the Scottish Militia Bill.
72
 
The Poker Club continued beyond this original militia issue and Fania Oz-
Salzberger notes that this club „remained a social and intellectual caucus of 
                                                                                                                                         
Lord Milton, Lord Kames, Lord Monboddo (the two last were then only lawyers), the Rev. John Steel 
and William Home, ministers.‟ 
68
 Adam Ferguson, The morality of stage-plays seriously considered (Edinburgh, 1757), ECCO, 
accessed on 24 May 2011.  In this work he is focused on the church‟s reaction to the theatre and only 
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 Alexander Broadie, The Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2001), 2-3. 
70
 Lorimer, Edinburgh Review, 66. 
71
 Adam Ferguson, Reflections Previous to the Establishment of a Militia (London: R. and J. Dodsley, 
1756).  For a discussion of this work see David Raynor, „Ferguson‟s Reflections Previous to the 
Establishment of a Militia‟ in Adam Ferguson: History, Progress and Human Nature, ed. Eugene 
Heath and Vincenzo Merolle (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2008), 65-72. 
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 Small, Biographical Sketch, 10. „The object of this publication, which went through two or three 
editions, was to turn to ridicule the opposers of the Scotch Militia Bill, which had been rejected in the 
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Edinburgh luminaries for over twenty years‟.
73
  Ferguson was also a member of the 
Philosophical Society of Edinburgh which later became the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh in 1783.  Its members included William Robertson, William Cullen, John 
Robison, Hugh Blair and Adam Smith.  Through participation in these societies, 
Ferguson would have had access to many of the new, important and ever-changing 
currents in Scottish Enlightenment thought. 
Through his association with these societies and other international contacts 
Ferguson maintained lifelong friendships with many prominent intellectuals 
throughout Europe.  Although many of his letters have been lost, what remains of 
his correspondence
74
 reveals a large social network through which he was able to 
find employment, debate current topics, and cultivate personal relationships.
75
  
Some of his frequent correspondents were Sir John Macpherson (a former student 
and Governor General of India), Alexander Carlyle, his intimate friend John Home, 
David Hume, Adam Smith and William Robertson.  Other notable correspondents 
were Hugh Blair, Lord Milton, Lord Melville, William Cullen, William Creech, 
Baron D‟Holbach, Edward Gibbon, James MacPherson, Joseph Black, Henry 
Dundas and William Clerk.
76
  There are several examples of how this group of 
friends aided Fergusons‟s employment as well as his world view and intellectual 
foundations.  In August of 1756 Ferguson was asked by Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, 
Lord Milton, to travel to Groningen with his son, John Fletcher, who suffered from 
severe depression, providing company and assistance in the foreign city while 
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Fletcher completed his legal studies.
77
  Later, in Edinburgh, his friend David Hume 
assisted in securing Ferguson the position of Keeper of the Advocate‟s Library in 
1757 although he quickly left the Advocate‟s Library for a position as a tutor to the 
children of Lord Bute in 1758 when Ferguson moved to Harrow, near London, and 
was exposed to English society and a wider source of ideas.
78
  These experiences as 
a tutor enriched Ferguson‟s social networks and allowed him to gain a wider 
perspective on the world. 
 
Ferguson’s University Career and Publications 
 
In 1759 David Hume, John Home and Adam Smith helped Ferguson obtain a 
teaching position as a professor at the University of Edinburgh.  After a few 
setbacks, Ferguson was appointed as professor of natural philosophy.
79
  With only 
three months to prepare his course, Ferguson set out to educate himself in the field 
of natural philosophy and was very successful, meeting the approval of David Hume 
and Alexander Carlyle.
80
  Ferguson published Of Natural Philosophy: for the use of 
students in the college of Edinburgh (c. 1760),
81
 a brief outline of the topics raised in 
his course, illustrating his applications of modern methods of natural philosophy.
82
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 Small, Biographical Sketch, 9. 
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 Ferguson, Adam, Of Natural Philosophy: for the use of students in the college of Edinburgh 
(Edinburgh, c.1760), EUL De.9.50/2. 
82
 At this time Ferguson, to supplement his salary, also began to tutor Charles and Robert Greville, 
the sons of the Earl of Warwick, and John McPherson, who went on to become Governor-General of 
India and remained a life-long friend and confidant of Ferguson.  Many of the letters of Ferguson‟s 
that survive were those to and from McPherson, who kept them as a remembrance of his treasured 
friend.  See Small, Biographical Sketch, 10: „The connection thus formed was of great service to 
Ferguson, as it brought him more immediately to the notice of many persons of rank, and the fame he 
acquired shortly afterwards by his writings greatly extended his influence among his contemporaries.‟ 
 19 
Although Ferguson enjoyed teaching natural philosophy,
83
 in 1764 he took 
up the position of professor of pneumatics and moral philosophy at Edinburgh, 
which had been his true ambition.  According to Lorimer: 
Ten years before, Mr. Cleghorn, then the professor, considered 
Ferguson so highly qualified for the office, that when on his 
deathbed he urged him to apply for it; and after expressing his 
regret that he had not influence with the patrons sufficient to 
secure his appointment, added, as Ferguson sometimes related with 
much emotion, “I can only say of you as Hamlet did of Fortinbras, 




Ferguson was said to be a very good teacher and his students enjoyed his 
lectures, as did members of the public who often attended his lectures.
85
  The first 
part of the course on pneumatics included a definition of natural laws, the history of 
the species and the history of the individual.  In the second part he focused on moral 
philosophy including the theory of mind, laws of the understanding, laws of the will, 
the knowledge and attributes of God and the human soul, moral laws and their 
applications, laws of morality, jurisprudence, casuistry and politics.  Ferguson, in his 
lectures, would use this basic frame-work of the Institutes of Moral Philosophy 
(1767), the published outline of the lectures, and then spoke on whatever topic he 
thought was most important at the time, thereby keeping his lectures new and 
interesting to the students in Edinburgh.
86
  His lectures survive in the form of his 
handwritten notes held in the Edinburgh University Library‟s Special Collections, 
comprising about one thousand double-sided papers.
87
   
                                                 
83
 In a letter to Gilbert Elliot Ferguson claims „I like my Situation very well, & begin to admire Sir 
Isaac Newton as I did Homer & Montesquieu, but it is on Condition that he will let me go as soon as I 
become a tolerable Professor of Natural Philosophy.‟ Quoted in Fagg, „Biographical Introduction‟, 
xxxvii. 
84
 Lorimer, Edinburgh Review, 66-67. 
85
 „As a Professor of Moral Philosophy, FERGUSON amply sustained the reputation of the institution 
with which he was so long connected.  He was manly and impressive as a lecturer, but at the same 
time persuasive and elegant.‟ Small, Biographical Sketch, 45. 
86
 According to Small, „As he had delineated the general plan of his course in his „Institutes of Moral 
Philosophy‟, he had for many years no written lectures, but trusted to his mastery of the subject for 
the expression of his ideas on the spur of the moment.  When his health gave way in 1781, however, 
he found it necessary to write out his course‟.  Small, Biographical Sketch, 45; see also Oz-
Salzberger, Translating, 100. 
87
 There are three volumes of notes: the first two are his lectures dating from 1775 to 1785 based on 
the original lectures of 1776 including numerous substitutions and changes over the years; the third 
volume is bound and seems to be Ferguson‟s master copy of the lectures, though the year is not 
specified.  These lecture notes offer an invaluable and unique insight into Ferguson‟s philosophy.  
 20 
As in most of Ferguson‟s writings, he used both ancient and modern 
examples and sources to discuss his philosophy.  He also discussed ancient 
philosophy and in particular made a detailed comparison between the sects of the 
Epicureans, the Peripatetics and the Stoics on their distinction of the sole good of 
human morality.  Although in the lectures Ferguson made far fewer allusions to 
antiquity overall than in his major publications, he expressed in them some of his 
most fundamental opinions about the ancient schools.
88
  The lectures focused on the 
teaching requirements of the course, but Ferguson‟s overall philosophical principles 
and ideas are also expounded throughout the course of the lecture notes.  John 
Robertson has argued that this restricted Ferguson‟s work because „Both Smith and 
Ferguson, who conformed to the religious requirements of teaching moral 
philosophy, seem to have chafed at the intellectual restrictions which their chairs 
imposed.‟
89
  The result of this aspect of Ferguson‟s teaching has, in part, led to some 
of the scholarly criticism of his works because his published texts, based on the 
lectures, while representative of his philosophy, remain conservative and defined by 
the expectations of his course.  In one way, this has led scholars to view Ferguson as 
unoriginal, but rather this should be seen as a function of Ferguson‟s purpose in 
writing for his intended readership.  
Ferguson published several works while lecturing at Edinburgh 
demonstrating his interest in modern issues and debates, while at the same time 
continuing his knowledge and love of classical literature.  While addressing the 
contemporary issues of the Scottish militia debate, questions of government and 
republicanism, the nature of society, the debate over the effects of luxury on society, 
and the role of virtue in society, Ferguson drew on his classical and modern sources 
to address current and vital questions.  In 1766 Ferguson published An Analysis of 
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Pneumatics and Moral Philosophy: for the use of Students in the College of 
Edinburgh,
90
 which was a brief, fifty-five page overview of his course.  As it is a 
summary of his main arguments Ferguson did not offer detailed discussions on any 
subject, although, in his discussion of happiness Ferguson referenced the ancient 
sects of the Stoics and the Epicureans and the effect their philosophies had on the 




Ferguson published An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767),
92
 which 
was widely read and generally well received by such thinkers as James Boswell, the 
German philosopher Johann Friedrich Jacobi, Voltaire, James Beattie and Baron D‟ 
Holbach, and while David Hume was critical of the work, he nevertheless supported 
his friend and reported the compliments he received for it to Ferguson.
93
  The Essay 
was an attempt to solve the problem of commercial wealth and its effect on morality, 
drawing on ideals of civic virtue.  His aim was to discover the role of virtue in 
„modern‟ political societies, while investigating how human morals and intelligence 
affected societies in their construction and in their decline.  This book has been 
interpreted as a „warning‟ against corruption found in every society because his 
main concern was  that in a commercial society, the motivation for public service - a 
quality highly esteemed by Ferguson - dissipates in favour of individual pursuits.  
Although he was concerned with rising corruption, he did not advocate a return to 
non-commercial societies, unlike Rousseau, but rather acknowledged the economic 
benefits gained in modern states and highlighted the achievements of his 
contemporary society.  Ancient philosophy played a significant role in this work in 
that Ferguson often addressed aspects of classical philosophy, particularly the Stoics 
and Epicureans, as well as ancient ideas of politics.  Additionally, Ferguson 
referenced ancient authors as well as historic evidence.  Because Ferguson traced the 
development of civil society he was reliant on the report of „barbaric‟ peoples by 
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ancient authors like Caesar and Tacitus, while also using ancient examples to prove 
his points about society more generally. 
Ferguson then published the Institutes of Moral Philosophy in 1769, a 
textbook also based on his moral philosophy lectures, which was a concise outline of 
philosophical terms and ideas, and was intended to be used by his students as a 
learning aid to be read in conjunction with his lectures to remind his students of the 
structure of the course, his main philosophical points, and to suggest some additional 
reading on specific subjects.
94
  The Institutes was fairly popular within Britain, with 
four editions published in Edinburgh, as well as being translated into French, 
Russian and German
95
 and reprinted in the American colonies from 1771.
96
  It 
covers a wide range of topics including metaphysics and natural philosophy, the 
natural history of man and the individual, the theory of mind, the knowledge of God, 
moral laws and their applications, and natural jurisprudence and politics.  Although 
some commentators are critical of its short-hand style,
97
 it was designed as a work of 
reference for his students and took on the form of organised lecture notes.  Ancient 
philosophy plays a significant role in this work as well as defining his philosophical 
positions by relating his ideas to ancient schools, especially that of the Stoics, the 
Epicureans, the Peripatetics and Socrates, as well as making references to classical 
examples in almost all subjects. 
Although Ferguson was a successful lecturer and author, the money he 
earned was not sufficient during an economic decline in the late eighteenth century 
and much of his time was spent attempting to earn more money by whatever means 
were made available to him.  In 1773 Ferguson became the tutor of Philip Stanhope, 
5
th
 Earl of Chesterfield.  One of Ferguson‟s duties was to take the young man around 
the continent and offer him a proper education.  Although Ferguson had some 
difficulty taking leave from the University of Edinburgh in 1774, Ferguson‟s tour of 
France and other parts of the continent was a great success and led to many 
memorable experiences which he detailed in some of his letters.  For instance, he 
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stayed in Calvin‟s historic house in Geneva, where he was able to look over some of 
the religious reformer‟s manuscripts.
98
  He met Voltaire, who seems to have 
regarded Ferguson with respect after he demonstrated, while telling jokes, that he 
was „a person who, tho‟ true to my own faith, had no ill humour to the freedom of 
fancy in others‟.
99
  This employment as a tutor ended in 1775 and Ferguson returned 
to Edinburgh when he published a well received pamphlet, Remarks on a Pamphlet 
Lately Published by Dr. Price, which was a „balanced and uncommonly courteous‟ 
response to Price‟s defence of the actions of the rebels in America.
100
 
In 1779 Ferguson returned to teaching at Edinburgh and soon after suffered a 
paralytic stroke in 1780 which affected the use of his limbs.  Due to the excellent 
care of his cousin, Dr. Joseph Black, a highly restricted diet and a few trips to the 
spas at Bath, Ferguson mainly recovered, however, there were some life-long 
effects.  Ferguson stopped eating meat, drank only water, ate mainly boiled 
vegetables and was very susceptible to the cold.
101
  He was never content with this 
confined lifestyle, but nevertheless maintained a high level of discipline that allowed 
him to live on for many more years.
102




After his recovery Ferguson remained a prominent figure in Edinburgh society.  In 
the 1780s Ferguson was notoriously caught up in the Ossian scandal as a supporter 
of McPherson‟s work.  In 1782-1783, Ferguson was involved in William 
Robertson‟s project of founding the Royal Society of Scotland, which was modelled 
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on European societies that combined all the branches of philosophy, science and 
literature.  It also incorporated both the Philosophical Society and the Society of 
Antiquaries into one royal charter.
103
  Ferguson‟s sole contribution to this society 
was his 1801 essay on the life of his cousin Dr. Joseph Black.  The continued 
involvement with the societies ensured Ferguson‟s connection to late eighteenth-
century intellectual debates. 
In 1783 Ferguson published his History of the Progress and Termination of 
the Roman Republic in three volumes, which he had planned for some time, and had 
been inspired to write by Edward Gibbon‟s publication of the first volume of The 
History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire in 1776, which was when 
Ferguson began his extensive research for this work.  It narrated „the rise and fall of 
the republic as a story of civic virtue and its corruption‟,
 104
 and was written using 
the model of Tacitus, relying mainly on classical sources.
105
  The book begins with 
the revolt against the monarchy in 509 B.C.  The lack of „reliable sources‟ resulted 
in Ferguson writing a summary of the events up to the First Punic War in 264 B.C.  
His main concern through the final books was the rise of Caesar and the birth of the 
empire.  He concluded his history during the reign of Nerva in 98 A.D.
106
  Not only 
did he attempt to write a truthful, accurate history (neglecting Livy‟s tales of the 
foundations of Rome and correcting the inaccuracy of ancient descriptions of battles 
by inspecting the sites himself),
107
 he also interpreted historical events, such as the 
downfall of the republic and the birth of the empire, using his own moral values.  
Ferguson used a variety of sources to write this book,
108
 both ancient and modern,
109
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while his military experience helped solidify, if not form, his particular notions of 
the importance of civic virtues.  In 1793 he visited Rome to observe and in turn to 
better describe the locations in a later edition of the History.  For instance, from 
Verona, „he rode horseback on the banks of the Adige, checking the details of his 
Roman history‟.
110
  Ultimately, his firsthand knowledge of battles, gained during his 
time as the chaplain to the Black Watch, aided the composition of the History of the 
Roman Republic and led some people to equate him with Polybius, who is also 
noted as one who wrote histories based on firsthand knowledge.
111
  The History was 
well received and widely read in Scotland, Europe and America.  Alexander Carlyle 
stated that the book had many admirers who thought  „that Ferguson‟s was the best 
history of Rome; that what he had omitted was fabulous or insignificant, and what 
he had wrote was more pro-found [sic] in research into characters, and gave a more 
just delineation of them than any book now extant‟.
112
 
In 1785 Ferguson retired from lecturing, handing the chair of pneumatics and 
moral philosophy to his pupil Dugald Stewart, but in order to keep a salary, was 
appointed to the honorary chair of mathematics.  In 1792 Ferguson published his 
two-volume Principles of Moral and Political Science, being chiefly a Retrospect of 
Lecture delivered in the College of Edinburgh which was both an enlargement and 
refinement of his Institutes and a broadening of his thought.
 113
  It is in this work that 
many later thinkers find his greatest association with Stoicism.  The reason for this 
is twofold: first, Ferguson addressed the fact that he was seen to be a Stoic in his 
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introduction; second, he engaged with ancient schools more than in any of his other 
publications.  He explained ancient philosophical sects and their competing 
ideologies, as well as referring to them numerous times throughout the two volumes.  
In 1808 Ferguson took up residence in St. Andrews, where he continued to write 
during these years of retirement what would become his unpublished manuscripts.  
Ferguson died on 22 February 1816.
114
  
 Although Ferguson certainly was an interesting character for a number of 
reasons, what becomes evident when analysing his biography is the overwhelming 
importance of both ancient thought and modern debates to his intellectual 
development.  With an education founded on ancient literature, a distinguished 
knowledge of ancient Greek and Latin, and a strong appreciation of ancient authors, 
there can be no doubt that ancient thought played a significant role in Ferguson‟s 
thought.  Ferguson did not, however, limit himself to discussions of ancient 
philosophy and the importance of his contemporary intellectual climate cannot be 
ignored.  Ferguson‟s role as a Scottish Enlightenment thinker and as a member of 
the international Enlightenment community demonstrates the importance of his 
connection to the debates of his time.  Ferguson, therefore, should perhaps be seen 
as a European figure whose classical education affected his work in a very specific 




1.3 Ferguson and Modern Scholarship: The Scottish Cato? 
  
Scholarship on Ferguson has taken several different directions since his death in the 
early nineteenth century.  For many years Ferguson was perceived as a minor figure 
in the Scottish Enlightenment and was mainly discussed in relation to other 
members of the Scottish Enlightenment.  It is only since the early twentieth century 
that scholars have begun to look at Ferguson as an important thinker in his own right 
and assess his individual contribution to European thought.  Several central themes 
appear in this scholarship, including Ferguson‟s role as a political thinker, as a 
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sociologist, as a moral philosopher, and as an eighteenth-century thinker more 
generally.  One of the most fundamental topics addressed by scholars is Ferguson‟s 
relationship to ancient philosophy, particularly Stoicism.   
 This marginalisation of Ferguson as an Enlightenment thinker has had 
several serious implications for the study of his works.  Because the perception of 
him as a friend of the leading thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment rather than a 
central figure has persisted through the years, the work of scholars on Ferguson 
often is defined by this characteristic.  One consequence of this is that scholars have 
attempted to discover the individual contribution of Ferguson‟s thought, or at the 
very least postulated its existence.  Ferguson has been identified as a proto-
sociologist which gave new life to the study of his thought and gave him a 
prominent place among eighteenth-century thinkers in the mind of some twenty and 
twenty-first-century scholars.  Others have noted his independent and original 
contribution to political thought in the Enlightenment.  Ferguson‟s political and 
social theory and history of human society have been acknowledged as being a 
significant contribution to intellectual history.  These advances in the scholarship on 
Ferguson have indeed highlighted the importance of Ferguson as an Enlightenment 
thinker.  Ferguson‟s moral philosophy, on the other hand, has remained dominated 
by the opinion that Ferguson‟s thought is highly unoriginal.  Curiously, Ferguson‟s 
moral philosophy, although often acknowledged as being central to his overall 
thought, has been little analysed by recent scholarship compared to the work done 
on his politics and sociology.  The arguments for Ferguson‟s originality in his 
political and social theory are not continued in the study of his moral theory, which 
is a problematic element of scholarship on Ferguson.  What has resulted from this is 
a picture of Ferguson‟s ethics that demonstrates his absolute reliance on the thought 
of other thinkers, particularly Francis Hutcheson, Montesquieu, Aristotle, and the 
Stoics.   
 Critical analyses of Ferguson‟s moral philosophy highlight his central 
relationship to ancient thought, particularly the Stoic and Aristotelian schools.  
While his political theory and his concept of civic virtue are also noted to have 
ancient origins, particularly following from Cicero and the Stoics, it is in his moral 
philosophy where scholars attempt to establish Ferguson‟s reliance on ancient 
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philosophy as the origin of his principles.  Most scholars consider Ferguson‟s 
philosophy to be a mixture of ancient and modern philosophy.  They comprehend 
Ferguson‟s philosophy as a combination of modern science, modern philosophy and 
politics, Christianity and ancient philosophy.  He was indeed a modern thinker, 
concerned with modern problems and reading modern authors, but he also respected 
and considered himself well-grounded in classical literature and brought both 
elements into his overall philosophical system.   
 
 
Early Scholarship on Ferguson: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Century  
 
In the nineteenth century, discussion of Ferguson was mainly confined to critical 
biography and there are three important biographies which later became the 
foundation of biographical and intellectual scholarship on Ferguson.  These 
biographies, all of which follow the same format and include much of the same 
information, are based on Ferguson‟s correspondence and published remarks about 
him.  They offer critical examinations of Ferguson‟s works and thought, and there 
are significant differences between them in their treatment of Ferguson as a man, the 
presentation of what they consider important events in his life, and their analyses of 
Ferguson‟s ideas.  Since they comprise some of the first works on Ferguson their 
conclusions have influenced later opinions about Ferguson.     
 The first followed Ferguson‟s death in 1816 when John Lee, Church of 
Scotland minister and university principal,
115
 published in the Annual Biography 
and Obituary for 1817 an article on Ferguson in which he told the story of 
Ferguson‟s life and commented on his works.
116
  Of the three biographers, Lee was 
the only one to have known Ferguson personally and went to some length to prove 
the greatness of Ferguson‟s character and was, perhaps unsurprisingly, the least 
critical of Ferguson‟s works and most often discussed them by simply repeating 
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large quotes.  He found that Ferguson‟s politics and morals - particularly the 
assertion in his History that the morals of Caesar led to the fall of the Roman 
republic - were some of the most interesting topics he addressed.  Regarding the 
question of Ferguson‟s Stoicism, Lee identified Ferguson‟s association with 
Stoicism originating in his education as well as the influence of ancient philosophy 
on Ferguson‟s thought, but did not see it as being the most important aspect of 
Ferguson‟s wider ideas. 
 The second biography was written in 1864 by John Small, librarian of the 
University of Edinburgh and publisher of several edited works,
117
 who produced the 
Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson for the Royal Society of Edinburgh.  
Following a similar method as Lee, Small used correspondence to tell the story of 
Ferguson‟s life, although he included many more letters and quotations.  He 
attempted to prove that Ferguson stood out against his contemporaries, both by the 
eventful life he led and by his intellectual contributions.  The third biographer, jurist 
James Lorimer,
118
 wrote an article in the Edinburgh Review in 1867 titled, „Adam 
Ferguson‟, which was based heavily on these two previous biographies.  Out of the 
three Lorimer‟s work is the most intellectually critical and he devoted a significant 
amount of time attempting to explain to his mid-nineteenth-century readers why 
Ferguson did not write the analytical and methodical philosophy to which people in 
his time would have been accustomed.
119
   
 These early biographies of Ferguson are important for several reasons.  First, 
they offer some insights into the life of Ferguson.  Lee‟s work in particular is helpful 
for understanding Ferguson‟s character because he knew Ferguson personally and 
for this reason perhaps represented Ferguson more accurately than later authors.  
Second, they demonstrate nineteenth-century interpretations of Ferguson‟s work and 
show how opinions about philosophy as a discipline developed over the nineteenth 
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century.  Furthermore, the first two biographies discuss Ferguson‟s work, but are not 
particularly critical of his ideas and instead highlight Ferguson‟s contribution to 
scholarship.  Small‟s book provides a more critical analysis of Ferguson‟s works 
than Lee‟s and highlights what he saw as defects in some of Ferguson‟s thought.  
Small reminded readers of Ferguson‟s positive influence on other thinkers, while 
also relating and comparing Ferguson‟s ideas to those of his fellow philosophers.  
While Small also noted Ferguson‟s connection to the Stoic school, he claimed that 
although Ferguson was a Stoic morally, in his metaphysics Ferguson followed the 
„doctrines of Aristotle revived by Reid‟.
120
  Lee and Small made references to 
Ferguson‟s Stoicism, but did not see it as a defining characteristic of his philosophy.  
Lorimer, the last and most critical of Ferguson‟s early biographers, both solidified 
Ferguson‟s role as a Stoic and condemned his practice of moral philosophy.  
Lorimer did not have a high opinion of Ferguson‟s thought, believing that he did not 
question the presiding ideas of the eighteenth century, and that Ferguson often 
avoided dealing with difficult questions, and sometimes reached the correct 
conclusion by the wrong argument.
121
  Lorimer was the author most convinced of 
Ferguson‟s Stoicism and his labelling Ferguson the „Scottish Cato‟ has affected the 
perception of Ferguson ever since.  Lorimer was quick to associate Ferguson with 
Stoicism on several occasions and thereby defined his philosophy as such, while at 
the same time he criticised Ferguson‟s poor practice of philosophy, explaining to his 
readers that Ferguson had philosophical goals which were not the same as would be 
expected at Lorimer‟s time.   
 Lorimer‟s criticism of Ferguson‟s philosophy is representative of post-
Kantian notions of analytical philosophy, which developed in the nineteenth century.  
Kant proposed that philosophy should be both analytical and systematic and this 
defined the practice of philosophy well into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
Ferguson wrote the majority of his work before this paradigm shift in philosophy 
had taken place and was therefore representative of eighteenth-century philosophy, 
and this aspect was criticised by Lorimer.  This post-Kantian philosophical 
conceptualisation has gone on to affect the perceptions of Ferguson‟s thought into 
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the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as evidenced by many interpretations of 
Ferguson‟s thought that assess his philosophy according to modern and therefore 
inappropriate philosophical standards.  These early biographies, therefore, evidence 
the development of criticism of Ferguson. 
Unfortunately, in the fields of history and philosophy, Ferguson remained a 
minor figure in the Scottish Enlightenment in contrast to other thinkers like David 
Hume and Adam Smith.
122
  The early twentieth century saw the scholarship on 
Ferguson broaden beyond biography and textual analysis and began to address wider 
themes related to the eighteenth century.  Fania Oz-Salzberger notes „twentieth-
century interest in Ferguson began with the sociologists.  At a time when British 
historians tended to shelve him as a quaint Scottish memento, his work attracted the 
serious attention of German scholars‟.
123
  One of the first major works in English to 
address Ferguson as an important thinker and to a large extent revitalise the study of 
Ferguson in many other contexts was W. C. Lehmann‟s 1930 book, Adam Ferguson 
and the beginning of Modern Sociology, in which Lehmann identified the ideas 
expressed in Ferguson‟s Essay as being the origin of sociology as a discipline.
124
  
The question of Ferguson‟s role in the history of sociology and the sociological 
nature of his ideas continues to be discussed among scholars.  For instance, John 
Brewer has noted that the conjectural history written by Ferguson and others was 
sociological in its form.
125
  Although he is careful to note that Ferguson did not 
anticipate the nineteenth-century sociologists, as some other historians have argued, 
Brewer maintains that Ferguson‟s history does have elements that later came to be 
identified as sociology.  Brewer instead sees the social changes occurring in the late 
eighteenth century, of which Ferguson was a part, as creating sociology.  Although 
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the work on Ferguson as a proto-sociologist often runs the risk of anachronism and 
in a sense places modern ideas onto the eighteenth century it, does often highlight 
aspects of Ferguson‟s thought that had previously been ignored. 
 
New Editions of Ferguson’s Texts 
  
As a result of this increased interest in Ferguson as an Enlightenment thinker, there 
have been numerous editions of Ferguson‟s works and subsequent critical academic 
scholarship on his thought has developed into an important topic.  Duncan Forbes 
was the first to publish a modern English edition of Ferguson‟s Essay on the History 
of Civil Society in 1966, since Ferguson‟s final edition was last published in 1814.
126
  
In the introduction to this edition, Forbes argued that the importance of Ferguson‟s 
works lay in his engagement with eighteenth-century debates and his representation 
of early sociology.  In 1995 Fania Oz-Salzberger produced a new edition of the 
Essay in which she included an excellent critical biography of Ferguson and analysis 
of his works.
127
  Yasuo Amoh published in 1996, Adam Ferguson‟s Collection of 
Essays, which is an edition of Ferguson‟s unpublished manuscripts found in the 
Edinburgh University Library.
128
  Amoh argues that the unpublished manuscripts are 
useful because that they demonstrate a new „dimension‟ to Ferguson by addressing 
topics not discussed in his published works.  He states „The “Collection,” therefore, 
is not merely a work by the aged Ferguson, Scottish Cato, but is also very important 
material for us to reconstruct Ferguson‟s thought as a whole.‟
129
  
The Italian scholar Vincenzo Merolle is a prolific commentator on Ferguson 
and has published Ferguson‟s collected correspondence and unpublished 
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manuscripts, as well as several editions of scholarship on Ferguson.
130
  The two-
volume, Correspondence of Adam Ferguson, covers much of the correspondence 
which survived and also includes a „Biographical Introduction‟ by Jane Bush Fagg, 
which is based on her Ph.D. Thesis „Adam Ferguson: Scottish Cato‟ (1968) and 
which is considered the most complete biography of Ferguson to date.
131
  This 
biography is based mainly on his correspondence and includes analyses of 
Ferguson‟s works. 
Merolle‟s The Manuscripts of Adam Ferguson, co-edited with Robin Dix and 
Eugene Heath, is a collection of Ferguson‟s unpublished work including the 
manuscripts and work previously published by Amoh from Lee‟s collection, as well 
as additional material on the reception of Ferguson and Ferguson‟s correspondence.  
The edition also includes Merolle‟s useful and detailed footnotes attempting to 
contextualise Ferguson‟s thought both in the wider context of his work and in the 
context of ancient and modern philosophy.  In the „Introduction‟ to the manuscripts, 
Heath claims the manuscripts „represent a late chapter in the history of Stoicism, and 
an attempt at giving an answer to contemporary philosophical debate…essentially 
on the basis of ancient philosophy‟.
132
   
 More recently, Eugene Heath has published an edition of Adam Ferguson‟s 
Selected Philosophical Writings (2007), which is an anthology of some of 
Ferguson‟s most famous and important sections of his various works.  Heath stated 
that in all Ferguson‟s works there is one moral point, „that the individual should 
bring to completion the qualities of human nature productive of virtue and 
happiness‟
133
 and that the main question addressed by Ferguson is finding the 
„proper end‟.  The „Introduction‟ is an outstanding overview of Ferguson‟s main 
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works and an insightful discussion of Ferguson‟s thought draws particular attention 
to Ferguson‟s influences as well as the originality of his thought.  
 Beyond the publication of his works, scholarship on Ferguson has continued 
to grow and there are several main themes that have emerged through the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries.  In the last fifty years there have been several general 
studies of Ferguson‟s thought, which have greatly enhanced the scholarship on him.  
The earliest example of these studies is David Kettler‟s Adam Ferguson: His Social 
and Political Thought (1965, 2005), which examines Ferguson‟s philosophy and his 
contributions to debates in the eighteenth century.  Kettler assesses Ferguson‟s 
moral philosophy in relation to his ideas of politics and society and ultimately finds 
that while Ferguson had some illuminating insights his philosophical project was a 
failure.  Further studies of Ferguson include Fania Oz-Salzberger‟s Translating the 
Enlightenment (1995) which assesses Ferguson‟s influence on the German 
Enlightenment and Lisa Hill‟s The Passionate Society (2006) which analyses 
Ferguson‟s intellectual intentions.  In addition to these works there have been many 
which discuss Ferguson‟s relationship to sociology, his politics, his social theory, 
and his morality.  Through these and many other publications, the critical 
scholarship on Ferguson has developed and confirmed his place as a prominent 
member of the Enlightenment. 
 
Politics and Society  
 
Ferguson‟s work easily lends itself to discussions of politics in the eighteenth 
century, not only because it is a crucial aspect of his work, but also because he 
addressed many of the current and important issues of his time.  Ferguson is also 
unique in some respects because of his connections to ancient thought.  Although 
Ferguson‟s moral philosophy has been widely discussed as being influenced by 
classical philosophy, his political thought has also been assessed in relation to his 
classical foundations.  As a result there has been significant scholarship done on 
Ferguson‟s politics that reflect both his eighteenth-century context and as well as the 
influence of the classical tradition.   
 35 
 The „Introduction‟ to Duncan Forbes‟ edition of the Essay and David 
Kettler‟s Adam Ferguson: His Social and Political Thought are two of the earliest 
and most detailed discussions of Ferguson‟s political theory, and from there the 
scholarship on Ferguson‟s political thought has evolved to focus on several 
characteristics.  Ferguson‟s politics are often discussed with reference to the 
influence of other thinkers such as Montesquieu,
134
 Machiavelli and Cicero.  This 
has often resulted in Ferguson being seen as someone who followed other political 
thinkers, rather than having an innovative political philosophy.  Furthermore, 
Ferguson is considered to have embraced conservative politics, by not advancing 
revolutionary claims or conclusions.
135
  According to Richard Sher in Church and 
University in the Scottish Enlightenment, Scottish Whigs, although in some ways 
tolerant, rejected reform, revolution and most instances of progress.
136
  Further, Sher 
argues, Ferguson attempted to create „a universal theory of political conservatism 
that would provide a sociological justification for supporting virtually every existing 
government‟.
137
  As Sher also argues, Ferguson believed each country had a national 
character that was made up of moral and socio-economic factors, which had a 
government that suited the particular conditions of the nation, and should only 
gradually change as the national character itself changed.  
It has been noted that many members of the Scottish Enlightenment followed 
in a republican tradition
138
 and Ferguson seems to represent this group, particularly 
in his Essay.  Marco Geuna found that Ferguson followed the republican tradition by 
accepting the economic developments resulting from the rising commercial society 
while at the same time criticising the „dehumanising consequence of the division of 
labour‟.
139
  Although Ferguson accepted the benefits of a commercial society, with 
the inevitable division of technical labour, his main concern was the corruption of 
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society, Geuna contended.  Iain McDaniel has more recently contended that 
Ferguson‟s connection to classical republicanism, and indeed his relationship to 
Montesquieu, need to be reassessed, and has found that Ferguson did not totally rely 




An important element of the republican tradition is the emphasis placed on 
civic humanism, which is seen as vital for understanding Ferguson‟s thought.  In 
The Machiavellian Moment (1975), the classic book on civic humanism in the 
Enlightenment, and in Barbarism and Religion,
141
 a multi-volume work addressing 
the origins and context of the publication of Gibbon‟s Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire, J.G.A. Pocock discusses the republican tradition in the eighteenth 
century and describes Ferguson‟s Essay as the „most Machiavellian of the Scottish 
disquisitions‟.
142
  He states that Ferguson‟s concept of the „necessary struggles‟ in 
society and the „passion‟ for society is the same as Machiavelli‟s virtu, as well as 
being the source for the virtue of patriotic citizens.  In this work he also claims that 
Ferguson answered the political questions of the Aristotelian theories with 
Machiavellian language,
143
 highlighting Ferguson‟s connection to classical thought 
and his modern approach.   
Another important aspect of Ferguson‟s politics is found in his discussion of 
corruption and civic decline.  According to Duncan Forbes, Ferguson applies a 
moral dimension to his political theory when he argued that the decline of 
civilisations is the result of moral corruption.  The division of labour results in social 
inequality, which is followed by political peace necessary for commercial and 
industrial progress.  Ferguson believed that the decline of a society was the result of 
decayed morals and could only be solved or avoided by a revival of morality 
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  Fania Oz-Salzberger finds that in the Essay, „his notion of 
corruption was not that of a Stoic, but closer to Cicero‟s thought: the real moral 
danger in modern times, he said, was not luxury per se, but political laziness.‟
 145
  
Furthermore, according to Richard Sher, Ferguson also had a didactic purpose in his 
attempts to demonstrate how to spread virtue according to each form of government, 
as Ferguson was above all a moralist.
146
  Additionally, Duncan Forbes maintains that 
Ferguson, combining his views of morality with Montesquieu‟s views of politics, 
was able to create a solution for the problems he saw in the modern world.
147
  Marc 
Geuna argues that according to Ferguson corruption results from a decline in active 
citizenship and a lack of public involvement, a sign of a lapse in ethical 
behaviour.
148
  This notion of equating the corruption of society with a corruption of 
morals also ties into what some scholars see as the influence of Ferguson‟s moral 
philosophy on his politics.  J.G.A Pocock postulated that Ferguson‟s politics were a 
result of his moral thinking and highlighted the effect of ancient thought on 
Ferguson‟s views of civil society.  Pocock maintained that Ferguson‟s views are 
only „republican‟ because he thought that individuality needed to be maintained for 
morality.  Ultimately, for Pocock, Ferguson‟s history of society was a reflection of 
his concept of morality, following from ancient philosophy,
149
 and the importance of 
the civic humanist tradition is central to understanding Ferguson and Ferguson‟s 
notions of civil society are dominated by his moral philosophy.   
 
From Politics to Moral Philosophy 
 
Although it is clear that political philosophy is central for scholarship on Ferguson, it 
is also evident that his politics cannot be completely separated from his concept of 
                                                 
144
 Forbes draws a connection between this kind of corruptions and Ferguson‟s relationship to 
Machiavelli.  Forbes, Essay, xxxi.  See also Iain McDaniel, „Adam Ferguson's “History of the 
Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic” (1783) and its Place in His Political Thought‟ 
(Cambridge Ph.D. Thesis, 2004), 73-106. 
145
 Oz-Salzberger, Translating, 98-99 
146
 Sher, Church and University, 196.  
147
 Forbes, Essay, xl-xli. 
148
 Geuna „Republicanism‟, 187. 
149
 „All this, however, is expressed in the idiom of a neo-classical moralism, in which ancient 
examples can be used to rebuke or edify the modern, and he is not constantly required to distance 
himself from antiquity.‟  Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, Vol. II, 347-348.     
 38 
morality.  Ferguson‟s moral philosophy has also been widely discussed in modern 
scholarship, either in connection to his politics or independently.  In her book, 
Translating the Enlightenment, where she assesses Ferguson‟s reception in Germany 
in the eighteenth-century, Fania Oz-Salzberger argues that Ferguson combined 
Stoicism, Christianity and contemporary issues to formulate his own moral 
philosophy.  For Ferguson, virtue is an action for the public good; moral actions 
cannot be judged by their consequences, but by the will of the person and intention of 
the action.  She believes that Ferguson added a political element to his philosophy as 
well as drawing attention to the importance of action.
150
  According to Oz-Salzberger, 
Ferguson drew on Stoicism‟s concept of human life as a game: „Play and competition 
were, for Ferguson, the true matrix for human well-being.‟ 
151
  Conflict was a „good 
thing in its own right‟.
152
  Although Oz-Salzberger discusses Ferguson‟s political 
Stoicism clearly, she is less interested in the importance of Stoicism for Ferguson‟s 
moral philosophy.    
 In David Allan‟s biography of Ferguson he begins his discussion of 
Ferguson by correctly noting that Ferguson‟s „greatest achievement... was to have 
offered an essentially naturalistic account of man‟s existence in society‟.
153
  Because 
of this, Ferguson has been viewed as either a sociologist or a political theorist, but 
„if one feature of Ferguson‟s intellectual career... should caution us against 
straightforward acceptance of these long-posthumous re-interpretations of his work, 
it is his unswerving devotion, as one of the Scottish Enlightenment‟s leading 
teachers of philosophy, to the traditional duties of moral instruction.  For it bears 
endless repetition that Ferguson was, more than anything else, a moralist‟.
154
  
Allan‟s argument that Ferguson‟s intellectual life was guided by his teaching of 
moral philosophy is of crucial importance to the study of Ferguson‟s thought.   
 The question then remains as to how Fergusons should be viewed – as a 
political thinker or as a moralist.  While many scholars focus on Ferguson‟s political 
thought and its importance in the eighteenth century as well as its later reception, his 
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role as an „early sociologist‟ or his relationship to other eighteenth-century political 
thinkers and events, they are apt to include discussions of his concept of morality 
into this scholarship and because of this, Ferguson‟s politics and morals seem to be 
inextricably linked together.  There is a surprisingly small amount written on 
Ferguson‟s moral theory when compared to the wealth of information written about 
his political theory.  The reason for this may be simply because it is the political 
historians who have found value in Ferguson‟s writings or it may be because 
Ferguson is not seen to have written a comprehensive system of moral theory, like 
those of other Enlightenment figures, and as a result his moral philosophy is largely 
overlooked.  The political interpretation of Ferguson‟s thought, while critical, 
important and valuable, results in a disproportionate amount of scholarship on this 
topic when compared to someone who can be seen as „more than anything else, a 
moralist‟.
155
  When Ferguson‟s moral philosophy is considered on its own, 




Ferguson‟s supposed Stoicism is a pervasive theme in the scholarship on Ferguson.  
There are three main ways that scholars attempt to comprehend his relationship to 
Stoicism.  First, scholars base this judgement either on the opinions of others or on 
few pieces of evidence.  Second, some scholars attempt to understand Ferguson‟s 
relationship to the Stoic school through the concept of Christian Stoicism.  Finally, 
some scholars have made a close textual analysis attempting to discover the 
influence of Stoicism on Ferguson‟s.  Although some scholars further highlight the 
influence of Aristotle of Ferguson, it is his relationship to Stoicism that draws the 
most attention. 
One reason this interpretation is so prevalent follows from the identification 
of Ferguson with Stoicism made by his contemporaries.
156
  Fania Oz-Salzberger is 
understandably critical of the ease with which people discuss Ferguson‟s Stoicism 
and notes that subsequent to the publishing of his Roman Republic there was an 
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attitude about Ferguson and his reliance on classics that „aided Ferguson‟s decline 
by providing him with a simplistic image and epitaph.  Contemporaries and posterity 
came to view him, as the fiery, likable “Scottish Cato”, an increasingly quaint 
moralist of stout but old-fashioned Stoic convictions‟.
157
  Oz-Salzberger is right to 
argue that the tendency to see Ferguson as a Stoic is influenced by events in his later 
years.   
 For instance, Ferguson‟s character as a student at Edinburgh has been 
described as being both interested in modern philosophy, but also having a strong 
foundation in classical literature.
158
  Speaking of his education at Edinburgh, a friend 
described him as being well „versed in Grecian and Roman literature‟, and noted his 
resemblance to Aristotle.  One biographer remarked that Ferguson united „the 
acquirements of ancient learning, to a perfect knowledge of the world in which he 
lived.‟
159
  Thus, in the records of opinions about Ferguson as a man and as a thinker, 
his contemporaries have named him as a Stoic or an Aristotelian and identified the 
importance of classical philosophy in his thought.  How influential these accounts 
are is not something to be determined here, but the presentation of Ferguson in this 
fashion does seem to drive modern opinions about Ferguson. 
 From the origins of scholarship on Ferguson, in the original biographies and 
through to the present day, the importance of Stoicism is seen in the critique and 
interpretation of his thought.  In John Small‟s Biographical Sketch of Adam 
Ferguson, he repeatedly refers to Ferguson as a Stoic and brings up his connection 
to the classics more generally.
160
  Small also identifies Ferguson as adopting 
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Stoicism into his everyday life: „It has been remarked, that no Stoic philosopher 
more completely subjected his passions and his emotions to his reason than did 
FERGUSON…‟
161
  Lorimer‟s article in the Edinburgh Review made a more definite 
case for Ferguson‟s personal Stoicism.  Lorimer began his biography of Ferguson by 
stating „Hard yet kindly, hot-tempered and outspoken but very prudent and 
judicious, stout of heart Adam had many claims besides his professed stoicism to be 
regarded as a Scottish Cato‟.
162
  Lorimer also referenced an occasion when 
„Ferguson‟s stoicism for once failed him‟, when, during the cold winter in Scotland 
while he was living in a castle, Ferguson remarked, „If anybody think me a 
philosopher, he is grievously mistaken.  I have done nothing but pest and scold 
inwardly‟ (perhaps outwardly also, if Lord Cockburn may be believed) „for three or 
four weeks, not to say months‟.
163
  Finally, Lorimer remarked that one of Ferguson‟s 
friends claimed that there „still burned a Roman soul in Ferguson‟.
164
   
 Twentieth- and twenty-first-century authors are quick to highlight 
Ferguson‟s personal preference for Stoicism.  Jeng-Guo Chen‟s categorical 
statement, „The Stoic influence on Ferguson‟s thought is conspicuous‟,
165
 is 
indicative of the opinion that many modern authors have of Ferguson.  The ease 
with which he is identified as a Stoic, sometimes based on an analysis of his writings 
and sometimes based on the scholarship and opinions of other commentators, can be 
highly problematic.  One element in scholars‟ assertions, particularly those 
regarding Ferguson‟s character, is the lack of evidence and reliance on the 
arguments of others. 
In her Ph.D. thesis, „Adam Ferguson: Scottish Cato‟, whose title alone 
identifies Ferguson as a Stoic, Jane Bush Fagg employs the label „Scottish Cato‟, 
which was applied to Ferguson in the 1867 Edinburgh Review article, because of his 
affinity for the classics.
166
  Although that article was written over fifty years after his 
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death, Fagg accepts this term as accurate and takes the classification a step further, 
equating Ferguson‟s own character with his description of Cato in his History of the 
Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic: „Like Marcus Porcius Cato, one 
of his own heroes, Ferguson was a professed Stoic strict and austere in his habits, 
firm in character, brave, and highly esteemed‟.
167
   
 Fagg goes on to state that Ferguson „apparently saw himself as a Stoic and 
frequently referred to himself as an “Old Roman”‟; this idea has been repeated by 
other authors such as Lisa Hill.  In The Passionate Society (2006), Hill states, „So 
much the Stoic was Ferguson that he commonly referred to himself as “the Old 
Roman”‟,
168
 although she only cites Fagg‟s thesis as evidence for this opinion.  
Upon further investigation, in the one letter referred to by Fagg written to John 
Macpherson, Ferguson - discussing his health problems - stated „My He[ealth] is 
wonderfully Good.  I go into the Wa[rm] Bath every Day like an Old Rom[an]‟.
169
  
When this statement is seen in context, this comment appears to be more of an aside, 
or a cultural reference, and not actually an admission of Stoicism.  Indeed, even in 
making a comparison of himself to a Roman, Ferguson does not imply any 
connection to Stoicism at all.  This example demonstrates that notions based on this 





One interpretation of the role of Stoicism in the eighteenth century involves 
understanding its relationship to Christianity.  John Dwyer in Virtuous Discourse: 
Sensibility and Community in Late Eighteenth-Century Scotland (1987) focuses on 
the fundamental moral concerns of members of the Scottish Enlightenment and 
believes there are three major currents of moral thinking: civic humanism, Stoicism 
and sensibility.
170
  Although he identifies Ferguson as a civic humanist, he goes on 
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to claim that Stoicism was most important for the Moderate clergy because, as a 
system of philosophy acceptable to Christian doctrine, it was a „basis for 
independent moral decision making‟.
171
  In Church and University in the Scottish 
Enlightenment, Richard Sher discusses Ferguson‟s Stoicism in relation to the notion 
of Christian Stoicism.  Sher sees Ferguson as one of the moderate literati who both 
admitted his own preference for Stoicism and who represented this line of thought.  
Alexander Broadie has also identified a strong Christian Stoic trend in the preaching 
of the moderate literati, especially in the writings of Hugh Blair.  Broadie claims 
Blair‟s metaphysical discussion of God seen in his sermons is Christian Stoic 
because „our patience is to be supported by our faith in a future state in which the 
good Lord will reward those who have walked in his ways‟.
172
  
According to Sher, Ferguson did not accept Stoicism as a withdrawal from 
society, as it appears in some definitions, but as a guide to virtuous, benevolent 
actions within society and as the means to true happiness.
173
  Ferguson then adopted 
the ideas of Francis Hutcheson and incorporated Christian ideas into the broader 
framework of Stoicism.
174
  Sher continues by arguing that Ferguson adopted this 
Christian Stoicism into his thought because, for Ferguson, virtue and a benevolent 
disposition are the love of mankind, individuals and all of society.  According to 
Sher, Ferguson fully adopted the Stoic notion of happiness - that happiness is a result 
of virtue - into his moral philosophy.
175
  According to Sher, the main point about 
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Christian Stoic morality, especially for Ferguson, is that to be happy one must be 
benevolent and not worry about the ultimate consequences as those are left to God.  It 
is in this way that Ferguson and others, like Hutcheson and the Edinburgh moderate 
literati, can combine Stoic principles with Christian ideas to create a complete 
system.
176
  This is, however, not a universally-held view and Lisa Hill questions 
Sher‟s thesis that Ferguson was absolutely a Christian Stoic postulating that Ferguson 
may conversely have been a deist, but continues to note the influence of Hutcheson‟s 
Christian Stoicism on him.
177
    
Interestingly, some of these characterisations of Ferguson as a Christian Stoic 
focus solely on the Scottish context; particularly the importance of Hutcheson‟s 
thought.  This diminishes the importance of a European concept of neo-Stoicism 
which encompassed much sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth-century thought and 
which Ferguson would have been exposed to, not only in his personal experiences 
with thinkers on the continent, but also in his vast erudition.  Not only did European 
Calvinists find particular interest in Stoic ideas, but the natural law theorists, 
including Grotius, also found the relation of Stoic morality to legal theory a useful 
combination.
178
  To discuss Ferguson‟s supposed Christian Stoicism without 
reference to the vital scholarship done on the continent seems to overlook a 
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Examinations of Ferguson’s Stoicism 
 
There are several authors who attempt to assess Ferguson‟s relationship to Stoic 
philosophy in a very analytical and helpful way.  In the „Introduction‟ to her edition 
of Ferguson‟s Essay,
179
 Fania Oz-Salzberger concludes that Ferguson is 
participating in the civic tradition which, in the modern sense of the term, 
incorporates Stoic philosophy with eighteenth-century ideas.  She believes he was 
looking to prove that classical values were still important for a modern society and, 
in effect, tried to bring Stoicism up to date and observes that Ferguson is not 
adopting Stoic thought, but is taking from it useful and important ideas.
180
 
David Allan‟s 2006 biography of Adam Ferguson also draws attention to his 
connection with Stoicism.  He notes that eighteenth-century moral philosophy is 
indebted to Cicero, and Ferguson is no exception.
181
  Ferguson has much in common 
with other thinkers who follow the Stoic tradition, such as an interest in the 
influence of community on man‟s behaviour and morals.
182
  Allan sees significant 
debts to Stoicism in Ferguson‟s works, both in his ideas and in his references to 
Stoic texts,
183
  and categorises Ferguson as having an „ambivalent‟ relationship to 
Stoicism because he never fully adopts it as a system.  He concludes that  
Stoicism has - literally - a great many virtues to recommend it as 
the basis of practical morality, particularly in providing compelling 
arguments in favour of the regulation and essential moderation on 
inter-personal behaviour.  But where Ferguson‟s moral philosophy 
ultimately gives way to the preoccupations of the historian and the 
social theorist, the Stoical values of patience and forbearance are 
necessarily abandoned for the even more necessary virtues of well 
directed creativity and ambition.
184
   
 
Allan and Oz-Salzberger note the importance of Stoicism in Ferguson‟s thought 
generally and both acknowledge that he was not attempting to adopt the Stoic 
philosophy, but incorporated elements of Stoicism into his philosophy.   
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David Kettler was one of the first critical commentators on Ferguson and his 
work has been of central importance in the scholarship on Ferguson.  In his classic 
work, The Social and Political Thought of Adam Ferguson (1965 and 2005), Kettler 
attempted to identify the strong influence of Stoic ideas on Ferguson‟s moral 
philosophy.  He noted that Ferguson was influenced both by ancient and modern 
thinkers: „Epictetus and Lucretius, Marcus Aurelius and Machiavelli, Cicero and 
Locke, Reid and Hume, Aristotle and Bacon, Montesquieu and Hobbes, Shaftesbury 
and Newton, Rousseau and Grotius - he drew on them all for useful information and 
edifying principles‟.
185
  He subsequently argued that Ferguson was highly 
influenced by classical authors rather than contemporary debates.
186
  According to 
Kettler, Ferguson accepted several Stoic principles including the importance of 
philosophical contemplation, the obligation to fulfil the duties of one‟s station, and 
the basic ideas of Stoic morality and virtue. 
Kettler further acknowledged that Ferguson did not accept all Stoic ideas.  
According to Kettler, Ferguson did not think wisdom and contemplation were the 
true source of virtue, but saw them as a means to achieve virtue.  On the other hand, 
Ferguson did admit the usefulness of wisdom, especially in the study of natural 
science, and therefore does not differ completely from the Stoics.  It is simply a 
different focus of knowledge and use of that knowledge that Ferguson employed.
187
  
Kettler also noted that Ferguson differed from the Stoics in his ideas on the 
importance of social benevolence and political activity in relation to duty.  According 
to Kettler, the Stoics argued that virtuous people ought to play the role assigned to 
them in society and that for Ferguson, unlike the Stoics, „passionate involvement in 
social life is at once the path to virtue and the manifestation of its highest 
realization‟.
188
  Another important facet of Ferguson‟s morality is his belief in self-
improvement.  Kettler correctly contended that the concept of improvement was 
pervasive in the wider context of the Scottish Enlightenment and directly contradicts 
the ideas of the Stoics.
189
  Although the Stoics emphasised personal improvement 
through their methods, members of the Enlightenment were looking for active 
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improvement relating to all aspects of society.  In the end, Kettler finds that Ferguson 
took from Stoicism what he liked, although he obviously did not agree with all of its 
principles.   
Kettler is highly critical of Ferguson‟s use of different philosophies and 
argues that Ferguson was willing to take certain ideas from different philosophies 
simply to have a continuous argument.  Kettler acknowledges that Ferguson deviated 
from Stoic ideas on certain subjects, although it seems very difficult for Kettler to 
analyse how much of Ferguson‟s writing is original and what had its origins in 
others‟ thought.
190
  Kettler maintains that Ferguson simply borrowed ideas wherever 
appropriate to such an extent that his philosophy became convoluted and overlooks 
many aspects of Ferguson‟s original contribution.   
Similarly, Lisa Hill in The Passionate Society has noted the importance of 
Stoicism in Ferguson‟s wider thought.  Hill correctly understands Ferguson‟s work 
as being mainly about a question of morals and natural theology more than 
philosophy or social science.  She claimed that he „rarely allows his moral 
prejudices to interfere with the empirical evidence and this is partly related to the 
fact that his theology is a form of Stoic theodicy‟.
191
  Furthermore she sees Ferguson 
as a transitional thinker who attempted to create a system of thought that was part of 
the civic humanist tradition and the new liberalism which she classifies as „liberal-
Stoicism‟.
192
  She argues that this is Ferguson‟s contribution to eighteenth-century 
thought, his unique combination of modern liberalism and his reliance on ancient 
Roman Stoicism, although it is also difficult to assess his thought for these reasons.  
She further noted the importance of Stoicism for Ferguson‟s wider thought:  „Above 
all, Ferguson is a practical thinker.  He does not moralise for the sake of an abstract 
idea, but in order to find ways of maximising human happiness.  Like the pragmatic 
and influential Roman Stoics he idealised and sought to imitate, Ferguson insisted 
that philosophy must be of practical use to the community‟.
193
  Although she talks 
about Ferguson‟s ancient and modern sources, she highlights the importance of the 
Roman Stoics as one of his main sources and claims that he „liked almost everything 
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 and believes that Ferguson, above all his contemporaries, was 
influenced most by it.  Ultimately, Hill sees Ferguson‟s entire social science as 
being based in Stoic ontology.
195
  Hill makes many excellent observations about 
Ferguson‟s thought, but her understanding of his relationship to Stoicism, 
particularly the notion of „liberal Stoicism‟, seems to ascribe ideas and intentions to 




The association with Stoicism is so prevalent that Ferguson himself dealt openly 
with perceptions of his role as a Stoic in his 1792 book, Principles of Moral and 
Political Science.  This discussion is one repeatedly used by Ferguson‟s 
commentators to demonstrate that he in fact sees himself as a Stoic, although this 
interpretation seems suspect.  He stated, „The Author, in some of the statements 
which follow, may be thought partial to the Stoic philosophy; but is not conscious of 
having warped the truth to suit with any system whatever‟.
196
  Ferguson explains 
that his ideas were created in the search for truth and when he read the Stoic view of 
human life as a „game‟ it only supported the opinions he had previously formed 
from looking at the world with his own eyes.  The fact that he agreed with some 
Stoic concepts only serves to increase his confidence in his ideas, even though „the 
name of this sect has become, in the gentility of modern times, proverbial for 
stupidity‟.
197
  Several scholars have taken this statement as proof of Ferguson 
secretly admitting that he is actually a Stoic by openly stating he is not, but this 
interpretation seems counter-intuitive and misleading.  A better explanation is to 
read it as a straight-forward statement in which Ferguson is arguing against his 
critics and separating himself from the Stoic school, which he respects, but does not 
adopt.  Perhaps Eugene Heath stated it most appropriately when noting that 
Ferguson „borrows heavily from the ancients, especially the Stoic thinkers‟.
198
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Moreover, „He makes plain, in the opening pages of the Principles, his debt to the 
Stoics, and he offers references to leading Stoic thinkers throughout the 
essays...emphasising at several points a preference for Stoic thought over that of 
Aristotle or Epicurus‟
199
 and argues that Ferguson was demonstrating a debt or 
preference to Stoicism, which is presented throughout the Principles, rather than an 
adoption of Stoic philosophy.   
Ferguson addressed his relationship to Stoicism again in his lectures, 
providing an in-depth analysis of the differences between the Epicurean, the 
Peripatetic and the Stoic sects, particularly in reference to their notion of the sole 
good of morality.  In the end, he found that the Stoics had the best concept because 
they chose virtue over any other consideration of human morality, which leads to 
goodness and happiness.  Ferguson noted the difference between his goals and the 
goals of the ancient schools as follows: 
As our object is not the same as theirs; to ascertain a sole good 
exclusive of every other consideration But to ascertain what is best 
for mankind, the comparison on which we are going to enter may 
not lead us to embrace the Doctrine of either Sect.  When we shall 
have ascertained what is best it will be wise to adhere to it as the 
sole good And the Language of Zeno tho not less paradoxical than 
that of Epicurus is Safer than that of Plato or Aristotle.
200
    
 
Here, Ferguson identified his relationship to Stoicism: he was not adopting the 
doctrine as a whole, but employed Stoic language to better discuss morality.  This is 
evidence against those who claim Ferguson‟s absolute Stoicism. 
 The idea that Ferguson is a Stoic is at the very least problematic, if not false 
in some senses.  Detailed research into Ferguson‟s ideas has proved, however, that a 
connection to Stoicism which cannot be denied.  The mixed nature of Ferguson‟s 
Stoicism has lead to many issues with the study of Ferguson, not to mention some 
misunderstanding of Ferguson‟s methods.  One of the difficulties academics have 
faced in assessing Ferguson‟s Stoicism is separating the aspects of Ferguson‟s 
thought that are and are not „Stoic‟, which in turn creates another dilemma: how can 
Ferguson be a Stoic in some cases and not in others?   
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1.4 Solving the Problem of Ferguson’s ‘Stoicism’ 
 
The solution to the question of Ferguson‟s relationship to classical sources and to his 
supposed Stoicism is neither easy nor straightforward to answer.  As has been seen, 
many scholars have struggled with how best to understand Ferguson‟s Stoicism.  
The aim of this thesis is to suggest an alternative interpretation of Ferguson‟s 
relationship to the classical sources, particularly his relationship to the Stoic school.   
 As has been noted, some scholars view Ferguson as a moralist primarily, 
while others focus on his political theory.  It seems that Ferguson‟s intellectual 
purpose was mainly moral and his moral philosophy affected all other aspects of his 
thought.  As a result, it is imperative to analyse his moral philosophy alone, without 
reference to any other topic, to clarify Ferguson‟s concept of moral philosophy.  
This approach is important in understanding his relationship to Stoicism because this 
is the context in which Stoicism is most discussed in Ferguson‟s work.  Although 
the question of civic virtue is imperative for understanding Ferguson‟s politics, this 
concept cannot be understood without assessing its place in his moral philosophy 
first and foremost.  Ferguson intentionally put Stoicism into an ethical context and 
ignores all other aspects of their philosophy, including metaphysics and logic, and 
therefore, to assess Ferguson‟s relationship to Stoicism, his moral philosophy will be 
the sole topic discussed. 
 Another significant consideration must be made of Ferguson‟s opinions and 
interpretations of these sources.  Determining what Ferguson actually thought about 
his classical sources has proved problematic for some scholars.  In Adam Smith and 
the Classics, Gloria Vivenza addresses the question of direct or indirect influence of 
classical ideas on Adam Smith.  She states  
Within the former group one can further class two types of 
reminiscence: the one explicit and, so to speak, conscious, including 
all the express references, quotations, recounted episodes, parallels, 
and so forth; the other unconscious but of great significance, 
observed when Smith, not always aware of doing so, echoes classical 
phrases or passages that he has clearly read over and studies so much 
that they stick in this memory and re-emerge in his own 
expressions.
201
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Vivenza finds that indirect influence is more important for Smith and his 
contemporaries and that references to the classics were „common currency‟.  She 
maintains that Smith „allowed himself to be influenced by [classical literature] only 
to the extent that it could broaden his mind and stimulate its capacity for 
independent thought‟.
202
  This must be taken into consideration in the case of 
Ferguson as well.  Ferguson demonstrated in his work both direct and indirect 
influence of classics and both of these will be addressed when interpreting 
Ferguson‟s engagement with the classics. 
 The question of Ferguson‟s concept of Stoicism is also very important.  One 
of the difficulties in assessing Ferguson‟s relationship to Stoicism comes with the 
definition of Stoicism used to compare ideas.  In the eighteenth century, „Stoicism‟ 
was not understood as it might be today or in centuries before.  One of the 
difficulties in dealing with how people use classical literature in more modern 
thought is that the definitions can be changed to support different opinions.  It 
became clear at a conference held at the University of Edinburgh in September 
2009, „Lucretius in the European Enlightenment‟, that both Lucretius and 
Epicureanism more generally had a fluid place in the history of modern thought and 
that different modern authors transformed the classical text to fit their needs.
203
  This 
is indicative of the way that ancient philosophy was used in the early modern period.  
Although there was a certain understanding of the ancient school based on the 
remaining texts, the application of those ideas to modern thinkers changed with the 
author and the usage.   
 Additionally, the discipline of philosophy has developed since the eighteenth 
century into something analytical, systematic and formally structured, which would 
not have been the pre-Kantian philosophers‟ priority.  Thinkers in the eighteenth 
century would not have followed the same philosophical rules that are essential now 
because they were just beginning to develop at the time.  To apply a twentieth- or 
twenty-first-century concept of a „Stoic philosophy‟ to Ferguson and assess how he 
follows this idea, therefore, has proven problematic for scholars.  
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 To avoid this problem, Ferguson‟s own definition of Stoicism is used to 
compare Ferguson‟s philosophy and assess its relationship to that school.  In several 
of his works, notably the History and his lectures, Ferguson defined Stoic ethics.  
Using this definition, Ferguson‟s concept of Stoicism, a proper analysis of his ideas 
and his ideas of the Stoics raises and answers the question whether Ferguson would 
consider his philosophy to be Stoic philosophy. 
 Finally, the central aspect of Ferguson‟s thought which needs to be addressed 
to understand his relationship to his classical sources is his methodology.  Although 
some scholars find his work „unsystematic‟, Ferguson‟s methodology – his process 
of philosophy, the structure he followed, his use of sources and evidence – also 
explains the role of ancient philosophy in his works. 
 From a review of the scholarship on Adam Ferguson, it becomes apparent 
that when considering the question of Ferguson‟s relationship to ancient philosophy 
and his ancient sources, the interpretation of him as a Stoic does not give a sufficient 
answer.  Ferguson‟s relationship to ancient philosophy was actually highly complex 
and limiting the discussion to Stoic philosophy distorts not only his view of 
antiquity, but also his own philosophical goals.  By addressing the eighteenth-
century intellectual context that specifically relates to interactions with ancient 
philosophy, as well as the ancient world, and modern responses to ancient sources, 
Ferguson‟s conception of the ancient and the modern world can be discerned.  Only 
from this intellectual foundation can Ferguson‟s relationship to ancient philosophy 

















Adam Ferguson drew frequently on a wide range of both ancient and modern 
authors.  He amassed a varied collection of sources from ancient literature, 
philosophy and history as well as modern philosophy, history, literature, natural 
philosophy, travel accounts, economics and politics which he employed in his 
several published and unpublished works to provide evidence in his moral, political 
and social theory.  This element of Ferguson‟s work has puzzled scholars who 
attempt to identify the influence of particular aspects of either ancient or modern 
philosophy, politics in particular.  Some scholars have claimed that Ferguson 
actually made no independent contribution to Enlightenment thought because he 
relied so heavily on the thought of other authors, while some have claimed that it is 
very important that Ferguson attempted to „combine‟ his sources in order to have 
more information when formulating his conclusions.
204
  Ferguson‟s reliance on 
divergent sources has further led to an often made criticism by scholars that 
Ferguson‟s inability to adhere to one philosophy, to follow one pre-set model, means 
he ought to be viewed as an unsystematic thinker.
205
  David Kettler sees this 
confluence of ancient and modern ideas in Ferguson‟s work as „frequently taking on 
a patchwork appearance, sacrificing depth and consistency for utility‟
206
 and he has 
found Ferguson‟s use of both modern and ancient ideas to be unsystematic and, 
perhaps, even un-philosophical.
207
  Vincenzo Merolle, on the other hand, argues that 
Ferguson could not explain society without relying on classical thought and finds 
this adoption of classical references does not make Ferguson an „unsystematic 
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  This discrepancy in the analyses of Ferguson‟s work, this unsettled 
question of whether or not Ferguson was an unsystematic thinker because he used 
ancient sources to understand his modern world, results from differing 
interpretations about Ferguson‟s methodology. 
 Fania Oz-Salzberger has noted that Ferguson‟s use of both classical and 
modern sources has caused problems for scholars:  „As his intellectual biographers 
stress, Ferguson was no systematic philosopher.  This has misled some to see him as 
unoriginal, though gifted, eclectic, who produced shrewd compilations of moral 
philosophy and recent ethnography.‟
209
  As Oz-Salzberger notes this „unsystematic‟ 
approach has led scholars to claim that Ferguson‟s writings do not constitute an 
individual contribution to eighteenth-century philosophy.  She counters this charge 
arguing that Ferguson‟s actual contribution is his insistence on the importance of 
„civic virtue in modern life‟ and also that his insightful combination of different 
sources can be seen as adding a new element to Enlightenment thought.
210
  This is 
an apt assessment of Ferguson‟s work that seems closer to identifying the source of 
the importance of Ferguson‟s intellectual project. 
 When interpreting Ferguson‟s moral philosophy, many scholars connect 
Ferguson‟s work to ancient philosophy, particularly the Stoic school and Aristotle 
and Cicero.  There are some scholars, however, who note the importance of modern 
thought and contemporary debates in Ferguson‟s works.
211
  Both positions are 
justified because Ferguson undeniably draws inspiration from both ancient and 
modern philosophy, literature and history.  What has yet to be determined is how 
these two different, yet connected, contexts come into play in Ferguson‟s thought.  
Ferguson, as still others have argued, was not an unsystematic thinker, but adopted a 
                                                 
208
 Vincenzo Merolle, „Introduction‟, to The Manuscripts of Adam Ferguson (London: Pickering, 
2006), xi-xiv. 
209
 Fania Oz-Salzberger, Translating the Enlightenment: Scottish Civic Discourse in Eighteenth-
Century Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 111. 
210
 „Leaving aside the question of whether the apt phrasing and novel combining of traditional and 
current ideas do not produce a creative work in its own right, a stronger argument can be made to the 
effect that Ferguson‟s books offered their readers something distinctly new.  Addressed to the 
members of modern societies, they diagnosed novel dangers and transmitted a strong sense of 
didactic mission and political urgency.  Of particular importance was the case that Ferguson made for 
the application – and, indeed, the applicability – of the principle of civic virtue to modern life.‟ Oz-
Salzberger, Translating the Enlightenment, 111. 
211
 See Gladys Bryson‟s Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1945) and Christopher J. Berry, Social Theory of the Scottish 
Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997).  
 55 
methodology that was grounded in the intellectual milieu of his time.  There are 
three contemporary contexts in which Ferguson participated which must be 
considered in order to explain his methodology: the Quarrel between the Ancients 
and the Moderns; modern eclecticism; and the experimental method.  A new 
appraisal of Ferguson‟s methodology based on these contexts will lead to a better 
understanding of Ferguson‟s relationship to his sources, and ultimately begin to 
disentangle his specific relationship to ancient philosophy. 
 
 
1.1 Ferguson and the Quarrel Between the Ancients and the Moderns 
 
While attempting to determine the eighteenth-century contexts which would most 
affect Ferguson‟s opinions of the literary, philosophical and historic sources 
available to him, the Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes is clearly one of the 
most important.
212
  Despite being often referred to as „The Battle of the Books‟ after 
an eponymous work by Jonathan Swift (1697), the Querelle was not merely a 
literary dispute, but one of the central intellectual contests in the cultural history of 
Europe, one that lasted more than a century and involved „not only the world of 
literature but the worlds of science, religion, philosophy, the fine arts, and even 
classical scholarship.‟
213
  At the heart of this „war between tradition and modernism; 
between originality and authority‟
214
 were the questions of the possibility and the 
nature of progress: whether or not people in antiquity were ultimately superior to 
those living in a modern age or if they could be surpassed, and finally if the rules set 
out by the ancients had to be perpetuated.
215
  When looking at his ancient 
philosophical, literary and historic sources, Adam Ferguson certainly would have 
thought about the questions raised in this Quarrel and arrived at his own answers.  
Understanding this debate leads us to a new assessment of Ferguson‟s relationship to 
his ancient and modern literary and philosophical sources and helps us to explain his 
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use of them in his writings and define his overall opinions of antiquity.  The central 
problem which scholars in all fields of enquiry addressed was how to reconcile the 
importance and authority of antiquity with the changes and discoveries made in the 
modern period.  Continuing the work began by Hippolyte Rigault
216
 and Richard 
Foster Jones‟ seminal Ancients and Moderns,
217
 scholarship has focused on two 
main aspects of the Quarrel: one side has chosen to focus on literature while the 
other focuses on the divide between science and philosophy and the humanities.  
Although the main threads of the Quarrel fall into these two categories, the influence 
of the Quarrel was much wider and can be seen in scholarship about architecture, 
taste, style and music.
218
  Therefore the debates were not limited to a narrow range 
of topics, but constitute a broad conversation about the „importance of the new 
science, the meaning of history, and the mechanisms of cultural transformation‟.
219
   
 The Quarrel is, nevertheless, usually characterised by scholars as mainly a 
literary phenomenon.
220
  This approach largely ignores the fact that the participants 
did not restrict their discussions only to topics of literature and poetry, but applied 
their ideas about ancients and moderns to all disciplines.  According to George 
Becker, while some scholars have categorised the quarrel as a literary episode, 
„More appropriately perhaps, it merits treatment as a central chapter in the struggle 
for freedom of the mind and, as such, not only has significance for literature and the 
history of ideas, but is intrinsically tied to the rise of the modern man of intellect.‟
221
  
Allan Bloom has contributed to the discussion on the Quarrel as follows: 
 They understood the dispute over poetry to be a mere subdivision 
of an opposition between two comprehensive systems of radically 
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opposed thought, one finding its sources in ancient philosophy, the 
other in modern philosophy.  The moderns believed that they had 
found the true principles of nature and that by means of their 
methods, new sources of power could be found in physical nature, 
politics, and the arts.  These new principles represented a 





The dispute over the authority and relevance of the literature, philosophy and texts 
of antiquity then is not limited to literary discussions, but was involved in diverse 
discussions of all topics that were addressed by Enlightenment thinkers.   
 
Prehistory of the Quarrel 
 
The dispute over the supremacy of the „ancients‟ or „moderns‟ did not occur as a 
singular event, but is part of the more general trends in the history of thought.  The 
Quarrel on the one hand is fixed in a specific time and context, but on the other has a 
more general application: all later generations question the validity of their 
predecessors when reconciling what had come before with subsequent developments 
that have made significant changes in the way that any discipline is understood.  
While these questions infamously were brought to the front in the early modern 
period,
223
 François Hartog notes that there is a trend that every generation asserts 
itself as the younger over those that came before it, and furthermore that while the 
younger generation creates something new, they are never the first to innovate.
224
  
According to Hans Robert Jauss, the Quarrel therefore „is a literary trope dating 
back to antiquity and returning repeatedly in the generational revolt of the young; it 
indicates nothing more than the shifting proportions of writers old and new.‟
225
  The 
Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns, as it will be analysed here, however, 
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is not just this general trope, but one episode that had a specific context and that 
changed European intellectual life. 
 The history of the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns is usually 
located in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, but it had its origins 
much earlier.  While some historians have argued that the concepts of the quarrel 
originated in antiquity itself,
226
 many more find that the debate began in the 
Renaissance
227
 when, with the revival and adoption of classical models in the 
humanities and sciences, it was common practice to imitate the ancients especially 
as a stylistic paradigm.
228
  While practices and questions of imitation and innovation 
remained important in the early modern period, Douglas Lane Patey has argued that 
„historians who romantically conceive imitation as mere formal and generic 
recapitulation fail to see that Augustan imitation was a mode of cultural transmission 
that crucially involved correction of tradition from within‟.
229
  Although imitation 
was common, this should not decrease the importance of the innovations made even 
during the process of imitation.  Eventually, authors, as well as those working in the 
arts and sciences, began to move beyond imitation, particularly in the field of natural 
philosophy, and made new and innovative developments, although this questioning 
of the ancients only took full force in the seventeenth century.
230
  Once people began 
to see that contemporary society had surpassed that of antiquity in some areas, some 
began to question the validity of following ancient authorities in all aspects.
231
  
Joseph M. Levine states: 
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 The quarrel, it is true, both preceded the Restoration and continued 
to be argued for a long time afterward, but it took on a peculiar 
form and significance in the later seventeenth century...  
Apparently, everyone was profoundly concerned about the 
authority of classical antiquity, and everyone had to fix a position 
with respect to it before taking the plunge into modern life; and 
apparently, there was no subject, from art and literature to 





 One reason why the Quarrel is so pervasive within early modern society is 
because of the rigorous and methodical education in the classics, which most 
educated people of the time would have received.
233
  Joseph M. Levine has argued 
that a proper education was believed to have been founded on the models of 
classical literature and history, and further that, „The best background to the battle of 
the books is therefore the history of education under the Tudors and Stuarts; and the 
first indication of modern resistance, as also its final triumph, appear invariably as 
challenges to the classical curriculum‟.
234
  Certainly, this was the case for Adam 
Ferguson‟s education; Ferguson learned from classical models himself.
235
  This 
prevalent education among English-speaking intellectuals at least determined their 
early experience with antiquity and gave them a common starting point in the 
Quarrel.   
 While education in the classics is of fundamental importance, the changes in 
education and scholarship developing in the seventeenth century is an equally 
crucial background for the Quarrel for both the proponents of the Ancients and the 
Moderns.  In the seventeenth century changes in the study of history and literary 
criticism followed changes in scholarship through the introduction of new methods 
in philology, textual criticism and hermeneutics.  In the Renaissance, scholars had 
developed new techniques to study the newly rediscovered ancient texts which led to 
a greater understanding of the ancient world and resulted in Renaissance humanists 
classifying antiquity as a static model which should be respected, emulated and 
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  This practice was later criticised by scholars, such as Spinoza and Le 
Clerc, who were developing a new concept of literary criticism.  They thought the 
Renaissance humanists, while translating and commentating on texts, focusing on 
grammar and style, helped „obscure from view, as far as most readers were 
concerned, the precious legacy of humanity‟s past, tightly restricting it to a mere 
handful of professional scholars‟.
237
  Jonathan Israel identifies Spinoza as the leader 
in this new kind of literary and historical criticism.  According to Israel, Spinoza 
insisted:  
that there can be no valid understanding of a text, and therefore no 
genuine scholarship, which is not in the first place a „historical‟ 
understanding...  Placing all writings in „historical‟ context 
effectively meant, in Bayle and Le Clerc no less than Spinoza, 
reassessing them within Cartesian-Spinozist mechanistic 
conceptions of natural cause and effect systematically excluding 





 These scholars took up philology and „humanist erudition‟ and „added the 
requirement for historical contextualization – elucidating the opinions and customs 
of each age, learning to distinguish different theological, philosophical, and 
historiographical ideologies, and showing how these tend to govern phraseology and 
vocabulary‟.
239
  The critical stance became an attempt to understand better the 
entirety of the ancient world, not only what could be found in the ancient texts 
superficially, but to commence exacting research to better understand the meaning 
of texts.  One result of this new method of dealing with ancient texts was the 
development of the history of philosophy, epitomised by Bayle,
240
 who maintained 
that the only means to approach ancient literature was „to apply the criterion of 
natural causality, using the historico-critical method to uncover not just false ideas 
but also the whole structure of assumptions, imposture, prejudice, fear, and tradition 
on which the distorted belief structures of the past rest‟.
241
  These scholars, 
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particularly Spinoza, Le Clerc and Bayle, developed a new system of hermeneutics 
which employed a close analysis of text to discover both the obvious and greater 
philosophical meaning as well as one that ensured that the text was placed into its 
correct and specific historical context.
242
  This new appreciation of history,  and the 
importance of understanding the historical context as well as striving for exacting 
scholarship, influenced thinkers across Europe in the period just before and during 
the Quarrel itself.  
  
 
The Quarrel in France and England 
 
From these foundations, intellectuals in Europe in the late seventeenth century began 
to ask questions that re-evaluated the authority of ancient texts and launched the 
Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns.  Although the Quarrel took place 
across Europe, its two main theatres, initially, were in France and England.
243
  The 
debate in these two countries, while connected, raised different questions resulting 
from their different contexts.
244
   
 In France, the debate continued the hermeneutical developments just 
discussed and took on its own character and has its own story.
245
  The spark that lit 
this intellectual powder-keg in France was Charles Perrault‟s poem Le siècle de 
Louis le Grand (1687), in which he argued for the greatness of his own age over 
antiquity.  Perrault took the first outright „modern‟ stance against the „ancients‟ in 
order to prove that in science the moderns were superior, extending the debate from 
one of literary merit and style.
246
  From this point, such authors as Racine, Boileau 
and La Fontaine took the side of the Ancients, while fellow Moderns included 
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Fontenelle and Antoine Houdar de La Motte.
247
  Chantal Grell has argued that in 
France the members who took the side of the ancients attempted „to bring about a 
concept of history directly inherited from the ancients‟,
248
 while the moderns either 
drew from German scholarship in analysing the ancient texts or „attempted to 
propose a new reinterpretation of history they tried to look at with hindsight and a 
critical spirit‟.
249
  Several authors
250
 have argued that one of the characteristics of the 
continuing quarrel in France was that it was not only scholars who were aware of the 
debates on a wide scale, affecting taste, style and fashion.
251
   
 In England, the Quarrel is more often referred to as the Battle of the Books.  
Patey writes that „the English Battle, though like the French Quarrel framed as a 
debate about the relative merits of ancient and modern literature, was from the start 
more concerned with books themselves with their production, uses and users, and 
especially with the rules and functions of the critic‟.
252
  This may be the result of the 
long argument between Sir William Temple, on the side of the Ancients, and 
William Wotton, on the side of the Moderns, as well as later authors who famously 
wrote in English, including John Dryden,
253
 Alexander Pope and Jonathan Swift.
254
  
The debate in England is often characterised as a literary argument more often than 
the one in France.  This literary emphasis is evidenced by an avowed affinity 
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between British thinkers and those of Ancient Rome.  According to Joseph Levine 
there was a natural connection between scholars in England and those in ancient 
Rome.  He notes the similarities of „political life in Augustan Rome and Augustan 
England‟, continuing to argue that education and eloquence were required for 
political life and required many of the same skills and abilities for success.  „What is 
beyond doubt is that when the eighteenth-century gentleman read the letters of (say) 
Cicero or Pliny the Younger, he discovered in them a mirror image of himself and 
he naturally identified with his ancient Roman forbearers‟.
255
  The works of 
antiquity held a special place for English authors and thus their debate about the 
authority of the texts had its own distinct character.  This is crucial because the 
ability to identify with antiquity affected the thinkers‟ relationship to their sources. 
 The divide between the French and English debates alleged by modern 
scholarship draws artificial, albeit convenient, barriers.  It is nevertheless clear that 
French and English authors read and influenced each other‟s works.  In both 
countries, moreover, the Ancients and the Moderns took basically the same position 
and, to understand these positions fully, examples from both need to be examined to 
elucidate their ideas.  




To understand the position of the Moderns, it is important to analyse their 
assumptions in order to explain what problems they found with the accepted 
superiority of antiquity and thus illustrate their reasoning when arguing against the 
Ancients.  To do this we will look at some authors who wrote for the side of the 
Moderns and this discussion must begin where the Quarrel itself began: with Charles 
Perrault. 
 When Charles Perrault (1628-1703) read his poem Le siècle de Louis le 
Grand (1687) to the French Academy he argued that the works and innovations of 
his contemporaries were great enough to compare and perhaps surpass those of the 
ancients.  This opening challenge in the battle between the Ancients and the 
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Moderns caused a heated debate within the Academy.
256
  Perrault then published the 
four volume Parallèle des Anciens et des Modernes en ce qui regards les arts et les 
sciences (1688-1697)
257
  in which he discussed his position as a modern and claims 
to prove the superiority of the moderns based on the innovations developed by 
scholars since antiquity.
258
  In the „Preface‟ to this monumental work, Perrault states 
that it is reasonable to „show veneration for whatever is possessed of true merit in 
itself and has the additional merit of age‟.
259
  This reverence for authority, either for 
the ancients or other figures, has become „a criminal superstition‟ and continues for 
those whose reputation, once great, has decayed over time.  „A thing had only to be 
done or said by these great men to become incomparable, and even today, for certain 
scholars it is a sort of religion to prefer the least production of the Ancients to the 
finest works of any modern author‟.  Perrault finds this reverence an „injustice‟ and 
a „refusal‟ to accept the greatness of their contemporaries.  Perrault acknowledges 
the „excellence‟ of the ancients, but maintains that the moderns are at least equal, if 
not superior, to the ancients.   
 Another notable French Modern was Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle 
(1657-1757) who wrote „A Digression on the Ancients and Moderns‟.
260
  In it, he 
argued that it is a claim of the Ancients that those in antiquity must have had better 
brains than the people of his time as a means to explain their superiority.  This 
cannot have been the case; however, since nature always works with the same „clay‟ 
and therefore the thinkers of antiquity could not have been physically superior to 
those of his time.
261
  He argued that the ancients and moderns were equal and that 
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the ancients should not be more highly esteemed for their discoveries over the 
moderns.  „I should be just as willing to see them praised for having drunk first the 
waters of our rivers and for us to be blamed because we drink only what is left‟.
262
  
Furthermore, the early discoveries made by the ancients were easily done, when 
compared to the work that moderns accomplished, that builds upon those 
discoveries.  To make new discoveries that surpass what had previously been 
accepted knowledge is clearly more difficult and worthy of admiration.  According 
to Fontenelle, moderns can make improvements in those fields that allow for 
progress.  In literature, the ancients and the moderns are equal, but in the field of 
philosophy the moderns are far superior, particularly due to the scientific method 
which holds absolute reason above all other considerations.  This emphasis on the 
superiority of reason he naturally enough credited to Descartes.
263
  Concerning the 
ancients and philosophy, Fontenelle is critical of their methods, „No matter the 
subject, the ancients rarely reason with absolute correctness‟, which justly proves, in 
his mind, the modern‟s superiority in this matter.  He concludes „in sum, there now 
reigns not in only our good scientific and philosophical works but also in those on 
religion, ethics and criticism a precision and an exactness which have scarcely been 
known until now.‟
264
  Fontenelle acknowledged the achievements of the ancients in 
the field of poetry, but also highlighted the fact that the ancients themselves had 
many faults.  Ultimately, he believed that the ancients could be equalled in all fields 
and surpassed in some, particularly in those of philosophy and science. 
 In England, William Wotton wrote Reflections upon Ancient and Modern 
Learning (1694),
265
 which was a response to William Temple‟s „Essay upon Ancient 
and Modern Learning‟ and which also closely followed Perrault.  In this work he 
summarises the argument of the Moderns.  He stated that while the Ancients could 
make claims on the fields of poetry, rhetoric and style, the Moderns claimed science 
on their side. 
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Among this sort, I reckon Mathematical and Physical Sciences, 
considered in their largest Extent.  These are Things which have no 
Dependence upon the Opinions of Men for their Truth; they will 
admit of fixed and undisputed Mediums of Comparison and 
Judgment: so that, though it may always be debated, who have 
been the best Orators, or who the best Poets; yet it cannot always 
be a matter of controversie, who have been the greatest Geometers, 
Arithmeticians, Astronomers, Musicians, Anatomists, Chymists, 
Botanists, or the like; because a fair comparison between the 
Inventions, Observation, Experiments and Collections of the 
contending Parties must certainly put an end to the Dispute, and 




It is because mathematical and physical sciences do not depend upon any authority, 
but on observation and experimentation that they can be free of the dictates of 
antiquity.  Wotton then continues to compare the works of different ages of science 
to determine whether Aristotle and Democritus or Newton and Boyle are the best.
267
   
 This is the critical argument of the moderns: that while the ancients 
accomplished much the Moderns could learn from, they were not the pinnacle of 
human achievement; contemporary scholars and artists could equal the greatness of 
antiquity and in some ways surpass it.  The field in which the Moderns could 
improve upon the Ancients most clearly was natural science.  Perrault identified 
Francis Bacon and René Descartes as the thinkers who influentially changed, for the 
better, the correct way to think about the natural world.
268
  Jauss has argued that in 
this context the Quarrel was between the Moderns, who „pitted the notion of 
progress, as developed by the methods of modern science and philosophy since 
Copernicus and Descartes, against the anciens and their belief in the transhistorical 
exemplarity of the ancient world‟.
269
  The Moderns looked to science to prove the 
superiority of their world, while the Ancients developed a new notion of history to 
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Although the Ancients were the first to have a specific and rigid position, that the 
authors of antiquity were superior to all modern authors, they had to respond to 
relentless attacks.  In order to be able to defend antiquity against the arguments 
brought forward by the moderns, the Ancients had to shift ground, developing a new 
and increasingly sophisticated approach.  What resulted from the debate between 
them was a new concept of history which incorporated historicism and the concept 
of historical human universals. 
 Englishman William Temple‟s „An Essay upon the Ancient and Modern 
Learning‟ provides a good example of the initial response of an Ancient to a Modern 
critique such as the one made by Perrault and Fontenelle.
270
  In this essay he 
attacked the position of the Moderns who believed, as he argued, first, that modern 
thinkers must know more than the ancients because they have the benefit of the 
knowledge of antiquity to learn and expand from, like a dwarf standing on the 
shoulders of a giant; second, following from the arguments of Fontenelle, that since 
nature remains constant, that plants and animals must be the same in antiquity as in 
modernity, the Moderns must have the same capacity for genius which the ancients 
had.
271
    Temple, however, did not agree with this position and strongly argued that 
authors of antiquity were far superior to anything modern.  Temple maintained that 
the „ancients‟
272
 in fact had the benefit of the people who came before them as well; 
the ancients had their own ancients to learn from and that this was the natural cycle 
of knowledge.
273
  Temple later argued that while the moderns learned from the 
ancient authors, that received knowledge had been corrupted and decayed over time.  
Like the decay of society, what the ancients learned and discovered was pure, but as 
that knowledge was passed to later generations it became corrupt and lost its initial 
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genius much like the empire of Alexander decayed after his death.  He argued that 
the learning of the ancients was greatly lost over time and that what remained was 
cause for imitation and repetition rather than increased knowledge and discovery: 
Thales, Pythagoras, Democritus, Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, 
Epicurus were the first mighty conquerors of ignorance in our 
world, and made greater progress in the several empires of science, 
than any of their successors have been able to reach.  These have 
hardly ever pretended more, than to learn what the others taught, to 
remember what they invented, and, not able to compass that itself, 
they have set up for authors upon some parcels of those great 
stocks, or else have contented themselves only to comment upon 





 Temple attacked the claims of the Moderns by arguing that they could not 
claim to have advantages in knowledge simply because they have the benefit of the 
learning of the ancients.
275
  He further appealed to the idea of genius,
276
 which is 
that the ancients consisted of great minds which could not be surpassed, not only in 
the arts, but in philosophy and science and poetry as well.
277
  Ancient thinkers did 
not have a specific environmental advantage, they were not physically or mentally 
superior, they were simply better.    
 Temple made a very clear argument that there are no achievements made by 
the moderns which can equal those of the ancients.  Specifically he argued against 
the position of the Moderns, stating that there were no modern philosophers who 
surpassed those of antiquity, although Descartes and Hobbes may „pretend‟ to do 
so.
278
  Temple further maintained that there have been no innovations in natural 
philosophy that can better what the ancients did; because the ancients had so little to 
start with what they discovered was important and truly revolutionary.  The 
Moderns, deriving their ideas from the foundation of what was discovered in 
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 69 
antiquity, have not made any innovations from what the ancients discovered that can 
compare to the magnitude of the discoveries that were accomplished by the ancient 
thinkers.
279
  Temple believed that ancient authors played a vital role in the lives of 
modern scholars, an idea central to the position of the Ancients.
280
 
 The writings of Temple are indicative of the early position of the Ancients 
because he holds to his inflexible, conservative position that progress could never 
defeat the achievements of the ancients.  Temple simply disagreed with the Moderns 
and would not concede that current developments in the arts and sciences could do 
more than equal that of antiquity.  Other scholars on the side of the Ancients, 
however, did agree that progress, especially in natural philosophy, could be made by 
their contemporaries.  While it may appear that they incorporated the side of the 
Moderns into their argument and that the two sides of the debate had more in 
common than might be assumed, this is not the case.  The Ancients, by accepting the 
idea of progress, were not completely giving in to the position of the Moderns, but 
were in fact restructuring their argument by appropriating some ideas of the 
Moderns and rejecting some of their original rigid positions, particularly that 
antiquity could not be surpassed.  It is a credit to the Ancients who fought to hold 
their position that „the Moderns could simply not have a monopoly on reason‟.
281
 
 This incorporation of the Modern‟s view on progress with the Ancient one 
demonstrates the changing nature of the debate and the innovation of the Ancients to 
keep their position relevant.  In order for the Ancients to be able to claim no longer 
the absolute superiority of antiquity, but the relevance it had in contemporary 
people‟s lives and scholarly work, they adapted some of the claims of the Moderns 
on the one hand by admitting the existence of modern progress, and on the other 
hand developed new historical perspectives which enabled them to look at ancient 
thought in a new light.
282
    
 Joseph M. Levine has convincingly argued that the Quarrel was „at bottom a 
dispute over the uses of the past, a quarrel about history‟.
283
  Because the Ancients 
had to change their perspective to fight the attacks of the Moderns, they did not want 
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to defend their position blindly and obstinately and as a result they developed two 
very important historical perspectives: one is that all literature is important because 
humans are universally the same, the other is historicism, or historical relativism, 
which allows the Ancients to look at the literature of antiquity in its historical 
context and under its historical circumstances.  If the nature of men must be the 
same in antiquity and the modern era, here following from Fontenelle‟s argument, 
the difference between the two is the result of historical circumstances and Perrault 
argued from this the notion of the „homme universel‟.
284
  The new conceptualisation 
of history created by the Ancients placed historicism in the centre of their studies, 
where they understood that all things produced by people are cultural in nature and 
determined by their specific external circumstances.
285
    
   They understood that cultures are different and have their own customs and 
norms which could not be judged by their present criteria and to successfully engage 
with the ancient authors they had to adopt an ancient frame of mind.  They had to 
have the scholarly background to know what the ancient context was and have the 
imagination to place themselves within it.  There was an idea, Jauss correctly argued 
„by the end of the querrelle, that the ancient and modern worlds were simply 
different.  From this notion there sprang a further idea, which Montesquieu, in the 
Esprit des lois, was to give its richest orchestration: that every nation, and not just 
every historical period, had its own unique, incommensurable “genius.”‟
286
   
 Furthermore, it is only because of the universal nature of humans that the 
Moderns could understand the ancients: the ancient authors tapped into truths about 
humanity which all people could learn from, that still spoke to modern concerns, and 
that knowledge, acquired by the great ancient thinkers should not be ignored.  This 
stance is related to the innovations in the field of historical criticism and the 
changing nature of history throughout the continent where the concept that each era 
has a specific and individual context which needs to be understood and considered 
before a true understanding of the literature can be reached.  This new perspective 
on history was adopted by the Ancients as their response to the Moderns, but went 
on to influence the discipline of history and thinkers in the Enlightenment.  The 
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ancients argued that since human nature is universal, the ancients hold a place in 
modern scholarship: „It was the Ancients‟ contention that the Greeks and the 
Romans were the first to have apprehended the true ideal of universal beauty - it was 
they who had fixed the point of perfection, and indisputably so, in the areas of 
language, literature, and the arts.‟
287
  The authors of antiquity should be read 
because they appeal to people in any time as much as they did when they were first 
written.  Patey notes that, „Ancients such as Boileau appealed to what had stood the 
test of time – to universal taste as revealed in ancient works of continuing popularity 
among readers of taste.‟
288
  Thus, the role of the ancient authors could be saved and 
remained important because they appealed to universal human nature and taste.
289
   
 The influence of historicism and historical universals appears in the 
Ancients‟ approach to history itself.  The Ancients attempted to write history in the 
style of ancient authors, following often from Tacitus, Livy and Cicero.  According 
to Patey, „Thus for Ancients such as Temple, history is still a branch of 
„eloquence‟...; its “great ends” and “the chief Care of all Historians” are to “argue 
the Virtues and Vices of Princes” and “serve for Example and Instruction to 
Posterity”, tasks to be accomplished through the construction of shapely historical 
narratives.‟
290
  For those on the side of the Ancients, history should maintain a 
didactic and moral role to instruct the readers through a carefully constructed story.  
The historian should combine both eloquence and scholarship to create the best kind 





Outcomes of the Quarrel 
 
One outcome of the Quarrel is the separation of the arts and sciences, a result that 
would affect the way that all people view the disciplines and the Quarrel has been 
interpreted as a battle, not of the books, but between science and philosophy, on one 
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side, and the humanities on the other.
292
  Levine states: „In short, it looked to 
Voltaire and to others that there was not just one simple quarrel in progress, but one 
for every field and at least two main battlegrounds: one for the arts and literature, the 
other for the sciences.‟
293
  It became a question of knowledge and achievement: in 
the sciences and philosophy, who knew more, and who had achieved more in the 
arts?
 294
  It is in this way that the Ancients and the Moderns could divide the subjects 
that were claimed by each side: „All those activities that seemed to work by 
accumulation, such as the sciences and philosophy, were won for the moderns, while 
all those that seemed to depend upon imitation, such as literature and the arts, were 
left securely in the hands of the ancients.‟
295
  This division of disciplines, given to 
the Ancients or Moderns, affected the way that Enlightenment thinkers viewed and 
studied them. 
 Because the Ancients seemingly incorporated aspects of the Modern position 
into their own, scholars have claimed that there was no real solution to the Battle of 
the Books, that in this fight there was no clear victor.  The Moderns and the 
Ancients argued for similar goals: they both believed that the ancients were 
important, just as they believed that the progress of modernity could achieve new 
heights.  The difference between the Ancients and the Moderns is evident in their 
emphasis on certain topics.
296
  As the eighteenth century progressed it seemed that 
thinkers easily adopted elements of both sides.  As Levine argues, „Now, it is one of 
the complications of this situations that the philosophes of the next generation, like 
Voltaire and d‟Alembert, lined up with the ancients in their disparagement of 




 Hans Robert Jauss and Dan Edelstein have insightfully argued that the 
dividing lines drawn during the Quarrel were the basis for the Enlightenment.  Jauss 
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has argued that the important members of the Enlightenment, the members that 
Jonathan Israel might term „radical‟, were the Moderns and this was itself the origin 
of „the Enlightenment‟ in that they dictated eighteenth-century views on the notions 
of history and progress.
298
  Edelstein argues: 
From the first embryonic theories of the Enlightenment to its best-
known midcentury celebrations..., the Ancients were consistently 
presented as worthy models and even in some cases, masters.  
While appropriating the Moderns‟ celebration of the new science, 
the philosophes may have ultimately been more indebted to the 
party of the Ancients, who demonstrate how faith in progress was 




The origins of the Enlightenment, therefore, the positions that Enlightenment 
thinkers had to take on the question of Ancient and Modern authority, were central 
in developing the methods and ideas that dominated the eighteenth century.  There is 
a problem with identifying which side later eighteenth-century thinkers took in this 
debate.  It is easy to see which scholars took the side of the Ancients or the Moderns 
during the Battle of the Books because they were self-consciously reacting to each 
other and engaging with the other side in a heated debate.  Once this Quarrel 
ostensibly subsided, when the Ancients and the Moderns had built up their 
arguments creating new disciplines, new concepts of history, new opinions about 
science and progress, the need to take unchanging positions that put a thinker on one 
or the other side dissipated and was replaced by an adoption of the concepts and 
methods developed as the Quarrel went on.  Finding the evidence to support this 
now subtle and nuanced debate has proved more difficult for later scholars to 
identify precisely because the Quarrel appears to have ended in the 1730s.  
Nevertheless, the issues raised in the debate continued to affect not only the early 
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1.2 Ferguson and the Quarrel: An Ancient or a Modern? 
 
The end of the Quarrel is usually dated between 1730 and 1740, but its effects can 
still be seen to linger throughout the rest of the eighteenth century.  Joseph Levine 
argued that Edward Gibbon‟s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776) was the 
last book that openly dealt with the Quarrel and, to a degree, that he synthesised the 
positions of the ancients and moderns by incorporating „the best‟ of ancient and 
modern scholarship.
300
  Yet there remain echoes of the Quarrel in Ferguson‟s 
History several years later, and there is evidence that the debates surrounding the 
Quarrel did not actually end early in the eighteenth century, but affected thinkers for 
generations to come.
301
  According to Levine, Gibbon believed in progress, but 
„with all those familiar qualifications of the eighteenth-century modern who was at 
heart still half an ancient‟,
302
 seeing unquestionable progress in the sciences and 
technology yet believing that in the arts and literature modernity could fall into 
decline, where the classical models remained „supreme‟. 
 Identifying Gibbon as the end of the Quarrel on the one hand is useful, but 
on the other demonstrates that the issues raised by the battling sides were not easily 
dismissed by thinkers in the Enlightenment.  Questions of the nature of history as 
well as of the authority and the place of ancient literature in the modern world were 
not finally answered in the debates between the Ancients and the Moderns.  
Eighteenth-century scholars continued to raise the same questions, or to use the 
arguments made by either side of the Quarrel to develop new ideas.   
 Adam Ferguson as well as other thinkers in the eighteenth century 
participated in the debate and to understand Ferguson‟s opinions of ancient and 
modern science, literature and philosophy his response to the Quarrel must be 
assessed.  Ferguson was an Ancient, but not one who only followed the likes of 
Temple whole-heartedly, believing that antiquity was superior to modernity, but one 
who attempted to create a place for ancient thought in his modern philosophy.
303
  
Ferguson accepted the belief in modern progress and was deeply interested in the 
                                                 
300
 Levine, „Ancients and Moderns reconsidered‟, 88-89. 
301
 Levine, Humanism and History, 178.  
302
 Ibid., 186. 
303
 Oz-Salzberger, Translating, 111. 
 75 
developments of natural philosophy.  Having taught a course on it at the University 
of Edinburgh this was especially important for him.  He also defended the 
importance and usefulness of classical authors and their relevance for his work, 
particularly in his moral philosophy and in his historical research, thereby 
epitomising the position of the later Ancients.  Ferguson‟s response to the debate is 
demonstrated in his opinion about ancient and modern sources, his belief in a 
universal human nature as well as his concept of history and the task of the historian. 
 
Ferguson and History  
  
Ferguson, like those participating in the Quarrel, was concerned with the nature of 
history and the job of the historian.  He elucidated his views on the subject in his 
unpublished manuscript „Of History and Its Appropriate Style‟.
304
  In this work 
Ferguson identified narrative history, rather than descriptive history, as the best to 
state in detail the „successive Events as in the origin Progress and termination of 
Past Transactions...  Narrative History extends indefinitely the field of Experience 
and Teaches to Anticipate or conjecture the Event of Transactions from their origin 
and progress‟.
305
  It is the task of the narrative historian to truthfully and rigorously 
record the history of events so that the reader can know the facts of these events, as 
if the reader was an „eye and ear witness‟.  The writer of history must also have the 
appropriate style in order to instruct the reader properly, otherwise „his work is 
impertinent and worse than useless because it misleads the mind of his Reader‟.
306
  
An author should not place too much of his own prejudice and opinions in the work 
because this detracts from the subject at hand and forces the reader to know more 
about the author than the history about which they want to learn.  To avoid the 
problem of confusing the reader the author should avoid „figurative expressions‟, 
metaphors and „Rhetorical Turns‟.
307
  In short, history should be devoid of both 
sentiment and all ornamented and rhetorical language so as not to confuse the 
reader.  The author must be careful to use a form of eloquence that is appropriate to 
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history.  For Ferguson, Livy, the great Roman historian, was too decorative for the 
proper style of history.
308
   
 According to Ferguson, history is instructive when it makes clear the facts 
and events of particular periods and if presented in such a way that the reader 
understands the circumstances, causes and effects, and particulars of an event and so 
that they can understand the future and anticipate the same outcome should certain 
events bear a similarity.  History can also morally instruct the readers who learn 
from the examples set forth in the work, not in the same fashion as in literature or 
poetry, but holding to the principles of historical truth.  Ferguson was aware that it 
was as easy to corrupt by example, as it was to instruct, a view that has been 
criticised by some moralists.
309
  If an historian states a fact, it is up to the reader to 
determine the good or bad of what they have read, and it is because of this that the 
style of the author must be so eloquent that the reader can experience the effect of 
the events without being „told also what to think of it‟.
310
 
 The author of histories should not be a professional soldier or politician, but 
a „Person observant of human affairs Intelligent & impartial collecting from the 
memoirs of those who were present from the Skillful & intelligent in their respective 
Professions‟ who can discern what information is important for the reader, and 
relying on their own scholarship to determine what should be passed down through 
the ages.
311
  Here Ferguson is clearly following in the developments made in the 
study of history earlier in the century.  He is following the position of the Ancients, 
who believed that history should combine eloquence with fact and that history 
should retain its moral character.  Like Temple, Ferguson saw that history is 
something that should be different from literature because it has a different purpose, 
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Ferguson and Historicism 
 
In keeping with the position of the Ancients, Ferguson believed in the universality of 
human nature.  He stated that „in the nature of man, there the operation of every 
principle, whether of affection or passion is known to every mind‟,
312
 claiming that 
basically all people are the same, and that the makeup of the mind and the laws that 
govern it are the same for all people.  He further states that, „Courage and 
generosity, fear and envy, are not peculiar to any station or order of men; nor is there 
any condition in which some of the human race have not shewn, that it is possible to 
employ, with propriety the talents and virtues of their species.‟
313
 
 For Ferguson, the best place to find evidence of this and to learn about 
human nature is in the subject of moral philosophy.
314
  People recognise their 
common human nature which leads them to an interest in the study of manners and 
customs.  One can thus recognise similarities with or differences from other people.  
He states: 
The occasions on which men are so affected with sentiments of 
complacency or reprobation, command their attention beyond any 
other  consideration in nature; insomuch that pictures of manners 
are, of all other subjects, the most interesting to the human mind.  
Hence the principal charm of history, on which the actions and 
characters of men are detailed; of poetry, in which representations, 
fictitious or real, are made; even of moral  discourse, whence the 
subjects of admonition, injunction, and precept are, by a 





The truth of the universality of human nature can be observed equally in individuals 
as in the societies they create.
316
  It is because of this that ancient and modern 
authors can both profitably be read to learn about human nature.  In Ferguson‟s 
lectures, he stated that the best guides in literature and philosophy were the 
respected and honoured authors of both ancient Greece and Rome as well as those of 
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„Modern Nations‟.  They should be read so that their conclusions can inform the 
students about human nature and the choice of conduct.  He further wrote: 
In literature and in philosophy… the best guides are writers who have 
stood the test of ages and for whose titles we continue to study 
languages of the dead that have long since ceased to be of any use to 
the living.  The Historians and the Poets of Greece and Rome together 
with those who hold a corresponding place in the Literature of Modern 
Nations.  And to trace facts up to the General conclusions that result 
from them and to argue from thence either comprehensive views of 
human Nature or a proper choice of our characters and a right 
judgement on matters of Public or Private Concern.  The Premises 
hence found in what men have done or exhibited the conclusions in 




Ferguson, like Boileau, found that the merit of ancient history is not in the mere 
facts presented, but in their literary prowess:   
It has been observed, that those celebrated nations are indebted, for a 
great part of their estimation, not to the matter of their history, but to 
the manner in which it has been delivered, and to the capacity of their 
historians, and other writers.  Their story has been told by men who 
knew how to draw our attention on the proceedings of the 
understanding and of the heart, more than on the detail of facts; and 
who could exhibit characters to be admired and loved, in the midst of 
actions which we should now universally hate or condemn.  Like 
Homer, the model of Greek literature, they could make us forget the 
horrors of a vindictive, cruel, and remorseless proceeding towards an 
enemy, in behalf of the strenuous conduct, the courage, and vehement 





Ferguson limits the usefulness of the ancient authors, to their value as stylistic 
models not as ultimate sources of information.  Here, Ferguson is very much 
upholding the side of the Ancients by restricting his praise of the ancients to their 
style rather than their context. 
 In An Essay on the History of Civil Society Ferguson wrote about the history 
of societies from their origins to the development of modern society.  To do this, he 
read the histories of ancient Greece and Rome, histories of modern Western 
European countries and the accounts of the newly discovered cultures in North 
America, India and the new histories of Eastern Europe, particularly those of the 
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Tartars.  The reason that he used such a variety of sources was because he believed 
that they could all inform him about the origin of societies: „The antiquities of every 




 Ferguson is critical of the ancient authors and cautions against the 
acceptance of conjecture when writing the history of man; that when there is a lack 
of actual evidence writers should not create judgements based on imagined 
situations.  From this supposition, people should also be cautious of the information 
accepted from past times which cannot be supposed to be purely factual:  
If conjectures and opinions formed at a distance, have not 
sufficient authority in the history of mankind, the domestic 
antiquities of every nation must, for this very reason, be received 
with caution.  They are, for most part, the mere conjectures or the 
fictions of subsequent ages; and even where at first they contained 
some resemblance of truth, they still vary with the imagination of 
those by whom they are transmitted, and in every generation 
receive a different form.  They are made to bear the stamp of the 
times through which they have passed in the form of tradition, not 
of the ages to which their pretended descriptions relate.  The 
information they bring, is not like the light reflected from a 
mirrour, which delineates the object from which it originally came; 
but, like rays that come broken and dispersed from an opaque or 
unpolished surface, only give the colours and features of the body 




Ancient sources cannot necessarily be followed because they are based on 
conjecture, rather than facts and observations, and lose their authenticity through the 
obstruction of time.  Here Ferguson follows the argument of Temple.  Ferguson 
therefore questioned the authority of ancient times based on conjectural history and 
opinion.  He believed there are ancient sources which use the proper methods of 
intellectual inquiry and brings those sources into his discussions, but he was careful 
not to accept all thinkers.   
 Ferguson notes that one barrier between the literature of antiquity and the 
modern reader is the difference in their customs.  The ancient world had completely 
different customs and behaviour compared to modern Europeans:  „Our manners are 
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so different, and in the system upon which we regulate our apprehensions, in many 
things, so opposite, that no less could make us endure the practice of ancient 
nations.‟
321
  Ferguson here acknowledged the inherent differences between ancient 
and modern cultures, but recognised the usefulness of this kind of text due to the 
rich history and full descriptions passed down from the literature of antiquity.  If the 
history had related only to facts, „we should never have distinguished the Greeks 
from their barbarous neighbours, nor have thought, that the character of civility 
pertained even to the Romans, till very late in their history, and in the decline of 
their empire.‟
322
  It is because of the history left by the ancients that the richness of 
their culture and the greatness of their thought could be understood.   
 Ferguson further argued that ancient literature can inform the modern reader, 
not about the facts of history, but the character and manners of the people of the 
time.  He argued:   
It were absurd to quote the fable of the Iliad or the Odyssey, the 
legends of Hercules, Theseus, or Oedipus, as authorities in matter 
of fact relating to the history of mankind; but they may with great 
justice, be cited to ascertain what were the conceptions and 
sentiments of the age in which they were composed of to 
characterise the genius of that people, with whose imaginations 





Ferguson‟s views of history, that it needs to be fact-oriented and rigorous, applies to 
ancient literature as well as modern authors.  The ancients, however, can 
additionally inform the modern reader about the culture and beliefs of an ancient 
people whose customs are inevitably foreign and otherwise unknown. 
 
The Role of Ancient and Modern Literature 
 
Ferguson believed that both ancient and modern literature played a vital part in 
forming the modern mind.  While ancient literature did not always provide the facts 
it might have been assumed to do, it was instrumental in teaching about the customs 
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and behaviour of people living in different times and places.  He argued that 
knowledge passed down through the ages was a benefit to the later thinkers, as 
follows: 
Knowledge, whether in the form of history or science, is surely of 
great value to the intellectual nature of man.  And the records of 
knowledge, preserved in literary compositions, are the principal 
means of communicating its benefits from age to age, and from 
one nation to another.  An art by which this effect is produced 
may, no doubt, be placed among the effectual means of cultivating 
the faculties of man; of forwarding his progress; of extending the 
fruits of experience, and of augmenting the powers to be derived 





He further believed that what should be learned from literature about 
morality should be taken equally from worthy texts, both ancient and modern.  It is 
not when the text was written that should dictate the validity of the source, but the 
ideas presented therein that determine how the source is used.  In his essay „Of the 
Comparative Forms of Being‟, Ferguson draws equally from ancient and modern 
sources saying that Cato, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius can instruct „how happy the 
Human Soul may become‟, while Copernicus and Newton were concerned with 
„how far its Views may reach‟.
325
  In his essay, „Reputed pleasures of Imagination‟, 
Ferguson stated that while Newton made „discoveries in the heavens‟, Socrates and 
Zeno had made discoveries in human nature which are not as well known as 
scientific discoveries.  „The multitude are still gaping for something new without 
knowing that the Cultivation of Genuine Wisdom is one [of] the newest things that 
mankind ever found‟.
326
  Here Ferguson separated the two authors into their 
disciplines, as already decided in the Quarrel, as we have seen.  Ancient authors 
appeal to human universals; they answer questions about human nature and virtue 
while modern authors only answer questions about natural philosophy. 
 Ferguson follows the thinking of others who participated in the Quarrel in his 
acceptance of progress and his understanding that while his time improves upon the 
past, subsequent generations will improve upon his: „The present age is perfecting 
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what a former age began; or is now beginning what a future age is to perfect.‟
327
  
Ferguson also believed that his contemporaries excelled the ancient nations on the 
battlefield: „the ancient nations have but a sorry plea for esteem with the inhabitants 
of modern Europe, who profess to carry the civilities of peace in to the practice of 
war; and who value the praise of indiscriminate lenity at a higher rate than even that 
of military prowess, or the love of their country‟.  Ferguson, however, recognised 
that the ancient Greeks and Romans have been praised for their martial valour and 
dedication to their country, even if they are more „barbarous‟ than their modern 
counterparts.
328
  In a discussion of arts and literature, Ferguson claims that the 
middle ages with the virtues of honour, chivalry and gallantry separated the moderns 
from the ancients and states, „And if our rule in measuring degrees of politeness and 
civilization is to be taken from hence, or from the advancement of commercial arts, 
we shall be found to have greatly excelled any of the celebrated nations of 
antiquity.‟
329
  Here Ferguson takes the position that the moderns were superior to the 
ancients, a position which may lead to the questioning of his supposed adoption of 
ancient Stoicism. 
Ferguson believed that modern thinkers were able to perfect what the 
ancients have said with the improvements and innovations of modern times.  He 
stated: 
When nations succeed one another in the career of discoveries and 
inquiries, the last is always the most knowing.  Systems of science 
are gradually formed.  The globe itself is traversed by degrees, and 
the history of every age, when past, is an accession of knowledge 
to those who succeed.  The Romans were more knowing than the 
Greeks; and every scholar of modern Europe is, in this sense, more 
learned than the most accomplished person that ever bore either of 
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His answer to this question is that merit is not determined by knowledge, but by 
what can be achieved:  „Even in literature, they are to be estimated from the works 
of their genius, not from the extent of their knowledge.  The scene of mere 
observation was extremely limited in a Grecian republic; and the bustle of an active 
life appeared inconsistent with study: but there the human mind, notwithstanding, 
collected its greatest abilities, and received its best informations, in the midst of 
sweat and of dust.‟
331
  Ferguson was willing to take from all sources, ancient and 
modern, based on genius or merit.  Here it is clear that he is adopting the position of 
the Ancients, that the merit of the author is based on their personal genius which has 
stood the test of time, not necessarily on the fact that they are innovative.  It is in this 
way that Ferguson can save ancient literature and accommodate modern literature. 
 He continued by arguing that people in „modern‟ Europe are content to learn 
about human nature purely by reading „ancient literature‟, that people learn from 
books what should be learned from experience.  As a result, „Our attainments are 
frequently limited to the elements of every science, and seldom reach to that 
enlargement of ability and power which useful knowledge should give.‟
332
  Ferguson 
believes that experience and activity are the true foundations of all knowledge of 
human nature and society in general.  It is a problem that so many people are willing 
to learn only from reading great authors and from imagination.  Ferguson argued 
that while being educated „under the rod‟ as a child, people are not expected to 
remember what they have learned once they leave school.  This practice continues 
into adult life and, as a result, „the human mind could not suffer more from a 
contempt of literature, as a business for life, not as a help to our conduct, and the 
means of forming a character that may be happy in itself, and useful to mankind‟.
333
  
Ferguson believes, as do many Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, in the innate ability 
of human progress and improvement, but also that this progress must happen 
through an active engagement with society and through experience.  Although the 
ancient authors have much to instruct the modern person, not only scholars, a 
passive acceptance of their writings, and uncritical learning of their texts, without 
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the added benefit of personal experience and engagement with them is a useless 
exercise that will not improve a person, but will allow him or her to remain lazy and 
careless in his or her life. 
 With all sources considered, Ferguson was concerned with truth and 
intelligence.  He only looked for the truth in his sources, at least what he believed to 
be truth.  Ferguson believed that, in some instances, such as literature and 
philosophy, the ancients have aspects of „genius‟ which remain crucial for his time.  
In other subjects, such as science and history, the modern techniques that have 
developed since antiquity offer more to the reader because these developments lead 
to the truth.  Truth, however, is not the only important aspect of intellectual inquiry.  
In „Of the Categories or Constituents of Discourse and Fabric of Thought‟, Ferguson 
claimed that the reader will only profit from reading if he actively engages with the 
work, thinks for himself and not from the information in the text alone, „and if a 
reader is to emerge from the study of Aurelius or Epictetus a partner in the felicity 
which they describe, he must owe it to himself however he may be disposed to 
ascribe it to them.‟
334
  It is up to the reader to learn from their sources, to use his or 
her intellect to determine what is right and good.  Ferguson found that if readers take 
from another author they may ascribe that thought to their source; however it is to 
their credit that they have accessed these glimpses of truth and genius.  This is 
Ferguson‟s larger methodology, which connects him to another crucial eighteenth-
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2.1 Eclecticism and Ferguson’s Method 
 
The Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns raised questions that extended 
beyond the initial debate and affected scholars in all disciplines throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  At the heart of the Quarrel, both sides 
fundamentally challenged the role of authority, either ancient or modern, arguing 
that no thinkers or systems should be followed simply because of the perceived 
position of authority.  One of the most influential outcomes of the Quarrel between 
the Ancients and the Moderns therefore was a criticism of sectarianism.  Sectarians, 
those who were seen as adhering to one dogmatic philosophy or religion, were 
criticised because they were viewed as being uncritical, lacking analysis, and blindly 
following the thought of others; thus appealing to an authority without further 
investigation.  With this new way of thinking about authority, early modern thinkers 
developed an innovative approach to argue against their opponents: with the 
champion of reason on their side, they could convincingly disprove the arguments of 
dogmatic sectarians which influenced the intellectual history of modern Europe.  
Philosophical disputes could be answered therefore by a reliance on reason rather 
than an appeal to one authority or another.  The Quarrel therefore ultimately resulted 
in a new conceptualisation of information passed down from antiquity and new 
perspectives on the modern writing of history and philosophy. 
One response to these questions, a response pervasive in much of eighteenth-
century thought, was that of the method of modern eclectics.  Although eclecticism 
originated in Greece in the first century B.C., it was further developed as a method 
during the early modern period.  By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
eclecticism became more defined and its practitioners began to stress the importance 
of the knowledge of past philosophers to create a new philosophy
335
 and to rely on 
the experimental method found in modern natural philosophy.
336
  Modern eclectics 
conceived of the answer to the problem of sectarian philosophy by using the tools of 
experimental philosophy, observation and reason, combined with ancient and 
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modern literature and philosophy used as evidence to „discern the truths for 
themselves‟.
337
  The eclectics studied the arguments of the ancients and moderns, 
casting aside the absolute authority of both, but adopting what they determined as 
best from either kind of source.  Moreover, eclectics believed that to understand 
philosophy truly it must be studied from its origins in antiquity, thus developing the 
concept of the history of philosophy as a discipline.  From the study of ancient 
philosophy they were able to view philosophical principles and schools over time, 
assess their ideas, and combine those ideas from the past with current thinking to 
create what they believed was an improved philosophical system.  
Perhaps the most concise definition of eclecticism can be seen in Denis 
Diderot‟s article in the Encyclopedie (1755): 
The eclectic is a philosopher who, trampling underfoot prejudice, 
tradition, antiquity, general agreement, authority – in a word, 
everything that controls the minds of the common herd – dares to 
think for himself, returns to the clearest general principles, 
examines them, discusses them, admits nothing that is not based on 
the testimony of his experience and his reason; from all the 
philosophies he has analysed without respect and bias he makes for 




Eclecticism is a philosophical method whose members do not rely on 
authority, who are staunchly opposed to any kind of sectarian philosophy, who 
instead take their information from their own personal experience and belief, but 
also allow that the „truthful‟ ideas of others should have a place in their systems.
339
  
Although these philosophers do not base their ideas on those of others, it is 
advisable to study the history of philosophy in order to examine older texts in the 
hope of discovering the truth in them and combining a variety of sources for a better 
understanding of any topic.  Donald Kelley has characterised it as „the revival of 
ancient and patristic learning; evangelical religious reform; the “liberty of 
philosophizing,” a secular version of the Protestant rejection of dogmatic authority; 
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and the adoption of critical history as the basis for understanding‟.
340
  Eclectics 
believe that elements of truth can be found in past philosophies and with a critical 
eye can be used to create a new system.  The quintessential example of this is 
Johann Jakob Brucker‟s Historia Critica Philosophiae (1741-1744) wherein the 
author traced systems of philosophy from ancient Greece to the seventeenth century 
and concluded that the best philosophers were modern eclectics.  Brucker names 
thinkers such as Francis Bacon, René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, Samuel 
Pufendorf, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Thomasius as examples of 
eclectic thinkers, who do not simply rely on the authority of other thinkers, but are 
inspired by those of the past and subsequently create their own systems.  
 Modern eclectic philosophy had several practitioners writing in the fields of 
natural philosophy, history of philosophy, natural law and philosophy more 
generally.  Although some fully adopted this as a philosophy and methodology 
Ferguson did not; he would not have thought of himself as an „eclectic‟.  Eclectics 
were themselves participating in the wider eighteenth-century context of a variety of 
developments: the debate between the Ancients and the Moderns, the changes in 
natural philosophy, and the adoption of the scientific method in the social sciences.  
Eclectics used reason to analyse previous philosophies in order to create what they 
believed was a new, better philosophy.  Their method of analysis strove to mirror 
that of the natural philosophers following in the systems of Francis Bacon, Robert 
Boyle and Isaac Newton.  It is in this way that eclectics more generally participated 
in the eighteenth-century debates about the ancients and moderns and developments 
in natural philosophy which also makes their aims steeped in their contemporary 
concerns. 
 Modern eclecticism also relates to growing concerns about organising an 
increasing amount of information.  Many eclectic thinkers used histories of 
philosophy, and wrote histories of philosophy themselves, to find truthful 
philosophical principles from past thinkers.  This development in eclectic thought 
mirrors current early modern trends of writing reference books and encyclopaedias 
that aided readers in easily accessing large amounts of information.  Ann Blair has 
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recently argued that the practice of compiling large amounts of information into 
reference books had been attempted since antiquity, but that in the early modern 
period, after the invention of the printing press, new questions of how to deal with 
„too many books‟ emerged.  She claims that one of the main criticisms made about 
this abundance of literature was that the concept of authority was called into 
question.  Many authors, both ancient and modern, that had previously been largely 
unknown were now accessible to a wide scope of readers and this new information 
challenged the place of the traditional authority figures, such as Aristotle.  What 
resulted, she argues, was either syncretism (an attempt to combine all authority 
figures into a greater narrative), the choice of one authority figure over all others, or 
scepticism about textual relevance and the role authority figures should play in early 
modern thought.
341
  Blair argues further that one reaction to this was a desire to 
create a new philosophy based on experience and „rational principles‟, which she 
associates with the Moderns in the Quarrel.
342
  This conclusion should be taken a 
step further to include the practices of the modern eclectics.  Richard Yeo, in his 
study of encyclopaedias and scientific dictionaries in the Enlightenment, 
Encyclopaedic Visions (2001), has argued that one of the important elements of 
eighteenth-century reference books was the „appeal of universalism as an aspect of 
the communication of knowledge‟.
343
  This further relates the goals and methods of 
the modern eclectics to current approaches to dealing with knowledge, authority and 
sources.  The methods of the eclectics, therefore, were not limited to German 
universities, but connect to more general questions raised by early modern and 
Enlightenment thinkers about the usefulness of authority figures and the role of 
sources in new kinds of philosophy. 
 Adam Ferguson‟s relationship to modern eclecticism can be seen in his 
overall attitude toward his sources and philosophy in general.  Ferguson did not fully 
adopt one school of thought, but took a rational, analytical, and critical view of all 
the sources available to him.  He used a wide variety of scholarship to better 
understand the world as inspiration for creating his own ideas, and only referenced 
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his influences where he saw fit to back up his argument.  Although this approach to 
philosophy has been criticised, particularly by David Kettler,
344
 Ferguson was 
actually participating in a wider tradition in the eighteenth century of rational, 
experimental, anti-sectarian philosophy which can be compared to the eclectic 
methods. 
One of Ferguson‟s fundamental concerns is anti-sectarianism, which he 
discusses in most detail in his Principles.  He argued that in modern times, ancient 
philosophical sects have been compared to „modern sects of religion‟ instead of „the 
varieties of opinion in matters of philosophy that have been entertained in modern 
times‟.  He was very critical of religious or philosophical sects, because „Sectaries 
are ever ready to value themselves more on their profession of faith, than on their 
practice; and are fonder of any mystery or paradox they have adopted, than of the 
plainest and most important dictates of reason or good sense.‟
345
  Thus, the 
association of ancient philosophy with sectarianism should further cast doubt upon 
Ferguson‟s supposed adoption of Stoicism.  Ferguson, however, argued that this was 
no reason to disregard the examples set by people of great virtue, such as Marcus 
Aurelius, who go beyond the intricacies and paradoxes of a philosophical system, 
but who demonstrate the validity of true virtue.
346
 
Ferguson, therefore, like the eclectics, believed that a sectarian follows the 
tenets of a philosophy without assessing its validity, that they do not rely on their 
reason, but accept the dictates of the faith which they adopt.  This is common to all 
people and nations:
347
 „Confidence in the effect of superstitious observances is not 
peculiar to any age or nation.  Few, even of the accomplished Greeks and Romans, 
were able to shake off this weakness.‟
348
  Ferguson was also distrustful of blindly 
following religious ideas when determining the definition of virtue, because he 
believed it was actually through an intelligent understanding that people would be 
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We must not therefore trust to whatever may bear the name of 
religion or conscience, or to what may have a temporary vogue in 
the world for our direction in the paths of a just and manly virtue.  
Every advantage of a benevolent mind and well informed 
understanding are conductive to the purpose, and the 
characteristics of a virtuous life, frequently revolved in the mind 




Ferguson argued that people should not rely on anything preached by religion or 
what is fashionable to dictate their ideas of virtue, but only rely on what they can 
determine from their own reason and sentiments.   
 It is this strong argument against sectarian philosophy that connects 
Ferguson to the wider context of modern eclecticism.  Ferguson‟s anti-sectarian 
ideas are in part his reaction to the Quarrel and he follows a similar method to the 
modern eclectics, as we shall see.  Ferguson did not want to be perceived as 
following one school and his criticisms of the philosophy of others further 
demonstrates that he disapproves of any philosophy or religion which is sectarian.  It 




2.2 The History of Eclecticism 
 
According to Diogenes Laertius, in his Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 
eclecticism in its ancient context originated in first century B.C. Greece with 
Potamon of Alexandria and was characterised as adopting doctrines from other 
schools to create a new system of philosophy, but was one that did not have its own 
doctrines,
351
 but little more was said of the school in his text.  Although the ancient 
eclectic school was not as prevalent as some others, it had several notable adherents, 
who either called themselves eclectic or subsequently have been labelled eclectics 
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including Galen, who discusses it in the context of medicine, Clement of 
Alexandria, a Christian author, and Xenophon, who claims that Socrates selected 
ideas from older, wisdom.
352
  Further examples include the Romans, Cicero and 
Seneca and the Greeks, Panaetius, Posidonius, Antiochus, Plutarch, Albinus and 
Ptolemy.
353
  Although the concept of eclecticism certainly originated in ancient 
Greece, the form of the philosophy as understood by the ancients later evolved from 
a philosophical school into a philosophical method.
354
   
Later, eclecticism became important for thinkers during the Renaissance, 
some of whom intentionally adopted it thinking it was a new philosophy.  Others 
were critical of eclecticism and classified it as „Syncretism‟, which is the process of 
reconciling different ideas together to form one system of thought without including 
new or innovative ideas.  An example of this reconciling process can be found 
among the Renaissance Humanists, because they wanted to combine ancient 
philosophy with Christian ideas in order to make ancient philosophy acceptable to 
religious thinkers.
355
  Renaissance thinkers such as Giovanni Pico della Mirandola 
(1463-1494) vowed not to accept authority or follow one school, but to incorporate 
the truth from many schools.  He attempted to combine ancient schools with 
Christianity and also took up the modern scientific tools of linguistics and philology 
to do so.
356
  Here, Mirandola was using eclectic methods with respect to philosophy 
and questioning authority, but was syncretistic in his attempts to combine 
philosophy with Christianity. 
Eclecticism became more developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries when adherents continued to rely on Diogenes Laertius as their model
357
 
and stressed the importance of the knowledge of past philosophers to create a new 
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  At this time thinkers attempted to move away from the Humanist and 
Scholasticist traditions towards methods that relied on modern natural philosophy 
and ancient traditions, which resulted in some scholars adopting eclecticism.
359
   
In Germany in this period eclecticism was an important intellectual current, 
particularly within the universities.
360
  By the 1690s, eclecticism was important 
especially within the universities of Halle and Leipzig and included Johann 
Christoph Sturm, Christian Thomasius, Arnold Wesenfeld (professor of ethics, logic 
and metaphysics at Frankfurt) and Johann Franz Buddeus (professor of theology at 
the universities of Halle and Jena).
361
  It is here that the trends of questioning 
authority, anti-sectarianism, making conscious attempts to approach philosophy 
rationally, and using methods taken from natural philosophy can be seen in the 
works of a number of thinkers.  Also, eclecticism became important in the debate 
between humanism and rational science, as well as in the debate between the 
Ancients and the Moderns, leading to the conclusion that eclecticism can be seen as 
Germany‟s answer to the quarrel between the ancients and moderns,
362
 and this can 
also be seen as Ferguson‟s answer to the debate.  The eclectics chose to question 
rather than accept ancient authority, thus taking a critical stance on both ancient and 
modern ideas to discern for themselves what they saw as truthful principles.  
According to Ulrich Johannes Schneider, this debate illustrated larger issues of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: „freedom of teaching and research; 
independence from authority, both political and theological; and the conditions for 
forming responsible judgements and reasonable forms of discussion.‟
363
   
Gerardus Johannes Vossius (1577-1649),
364
 a humanist scholar and author, 
stressed the „active and methodical‟ nature of eclecticism to perhaps support his own 
methodology of interpreting and analysing with reason and judgment.
365
  Johann 
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Christoph Sturm (1635-1703), professor of mathematics and physics at Altdorf, used 
the principles of experimental natural philosophy which used observations of nature 
to rationally settle philosophical disputes.
366
  Christian Thomasius (1655-1728) also 
took ideas from Sturm and Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) to create his concept of 
eclecticism.
367
   
This tradition of eclecticism continued into the eighteenth-century where the 
methods of eclectics were used in critical philosophy and the history of philosophy.  
For people writing in the eighteenth century the innovations that occurred in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, following developments made in the 
Renaissance to the study of history and philology,
368
 are central for their concept of 
the study of history.  As Aristotelian ideas and methods of natural philosophy were 
replaced by the new methods of experimentation and the focus on reason over belief, 
so too were these same methods applied to history and philosophy.
369
  The change 
allowed for a more specialised type of philosophy and the history of philosophy to 
be written.  From the changes in the modern European world a need grew for a 
systematic history of philosophy and this was answered in the seventeenth century, 
for example Thomas Stanley‟s The History of Philosophy (1655),
370
 who took the 
Renaissance humanist interest and added new dimensions of scientific, philological 
and literary inquiry. 
Although attempts to improve the discipline were made, the histories of 
philosophy produced by thinkers like Stanley, who remained heavily influenced by 
the methodology of Diogenes Laertius, were mainly doxographical and included 
little analysis or even the concept of development within philosophical schools, and 
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  Eventually, this doxographical, antiquated method 
was replaced by syncretism, but the syncretists could hardly be said to improve 
matters since they maintained that the ancients could not be surpassed.   
The eighteenth century saw the beginning of the serious intellectual 
programme of the history of philosophy as a new „discipline‟
372
 and a „true and 
independent science‟.
373
  Eighteenth-century scholars‟ concept of writing the history 
of philosophy was a reaction to the Renaissance Humanists who attempted to merge 
disparate intellectual trends into one system, referred to as syncretism, which 
seventeenth and eighteenth-century thinkers criticised for forcing ancient pagan 
philosophies into a Christian framework.  The more immediate intellectual context 
that bore this new conceptualisation of history of philosophy is the debate between 
the Ancients and the Moderns.  They believed that the means to detach themselves 
from these old, repeated mistakes was to analyse philosophy rationally and 
empirically, leaving behind any sense of dogmatic prejudices to discern the true 
merits of a philosophical system, either ancient or modern.
374
  One of the main aims 
of philosophy became the reconciliation of ancient and modern philosophy and this 
method helped some thinkers reach that goal.
375
  Philosophy itself became more 
systematic and the method of the eclectics offered a clear and influential solution.
376
 
One method which accommodated these changes was that of the eclectics, 
who were critical of any philosophy which was seen as combining individual ideas 
with those written by past authors or who mixed modern doctrines of philosophy 
together, which would have been seen as syncretism.
377
  The eclectics utilised these 
new ideas of the history of philosophy when writing their own works and their 
members included Christian Thomasius, J. F. Buddeus, N. N. Gundling, and J. J. 
Brucker.
378
  C.A. Heumann founded a journal in 1715 called the Acta 
Philosophorum which maintained that eclecticism was the only way to properly 
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write philosophy and which offered an „up-to-date‟ history of philosophy.
379
  
Heumann believed that knowledge of the history of philosophy needed to involve 
discussions of the history and culture surrounding the past philosophy and certain 
philosophical geniuses,
380
 thus participating in the new hermeneuticism developed in 
the Quarrel.   
The history of philosophy became an especially important discipline in 
Germany in the eighteenth century, and Martin Mulsow has argued that the origin of 
this trend had three contexts: the influence of Christian apologists on the writing of 
history in the seventeenth century, the influence of literary history which leads to 
historical scepticism and a new natural law theory and „theory of the passions‟.
381
  It 
is in Germany that the eclectic method was most prominent and held the widest 
influence on the new methods developed to for writing and researching history.  
Specifically, according to Mulsow, Johann Franz Buddeus (1667-1729) saw 
eclecticism as being linked to the history of philosophy and he thought that both a 
system and individual analysis were necessary for philosophy.
382
  Buddeus argued 
that historical truth could only be discovered by a reconstruction and 
reconceptualisation of history itself.  He was influenced in these ideas by Jakob 
Thomasius who sought to discover the origins of philosophical systems in order to 
reconcile them with Christianity.
383
 
Following on this new model of the history of philosophy thinkers developed 
a methodology of thinking about philosophy in secular terms thereby moving away 
from a reliance on religion.  As this new discipline progressed it became 
acknowledged as an internationally accepted method of highly critical, highly 
rational intellectual enquiry.
384
  It is from this analytical view of the history of 
philosophy and overall methodology that reflects the eclectic philosophy.  This 
modern model of eclecticism did not actually imitate the ancient school, but 
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followed Jakob Thomasius‟ ideal that „urged not just open minded review of all 
possibilities, and eschewing of dogmatism, but a rigorous critical exercise, 
employing reason and a “free and pure capacity of judgment”, to evaluate all the 
doctrines of the past‟.
385
  These historians placed themselves within the wider 
current eighteenth-century trends; and the school itself was associated with 
empiricism and the new natural philosophy.
386
 
The culmination of modern eclecticism is often identified with Johann Jakob 
Brucker‟s Historia Critica Philosophiae (1741-44) which was later rewritten into 
English by William Enfield (1792).
387
  Johann Jacob Brucker (1696-1770) was a 
German Lutheran theologian and historian.  He was a pastor in Augsburg (1744) and 
after studying theology with Johann Franz Buddeus, was later elected to the Prussian 
Academy of Sciences in 1731.
388
  Brucker‟s Historia recounted the history of 
philosophy from antiquity to the modern era and was instrumental in establishing in 
the philosophical canon which held sway for years to come.
389
  It is a comprehensive 
history of philosophy in which he examines the different sects of philosophy through 
human history, culminating in a selection of the great minds of the early modern 
period.
390
  He praised some of those he considered modern eclectics because they 
did not fall prey to the authority of one school, but took in disparate ideas to inspire 
and create their own philosophy.
391
  In this work, Brucker continues in this eclectic 
tradition of a self-consciously modern history of philosophy.  Brucker‟s history was 
not only a chronological list of sects and doctrines, but also argued that modern 
achievements in philosophy were made by means of eclecticism, by which he meant 
                                                 
385
 Israel, Enlightenment Contested, 477. 
386
 Knud Haakonssen, „Introduction‟ to The History of Philosophy, by William Enfield, ed. Knud 
Haakonssen (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2001), vii. 
387
 Johann Jakob Brucker, Historia Critica Philosophiae, translated by William Enfield, in The 
History of Philosophy, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2001) 
388
 Knud Haakonssen, The Cambridge History of Eighteenth Century Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1154; „Introduction‟ to The History of Philosophy by William 
Enfield. 
389
 Kelley, „Problem of Knowledge‟, 19; Donald R. Kelley, „History and/or Philosophy‟, 345-346. 
http://www.pdcnet.org/pages/Products/electronic/pdf/tnhp_Donald%20R%20Kelley.pdf, Accessed 4 
May 2011. 
390
 Israel, Enlightenment Contested, 481. 
391
 John M. Dillon, „Introduction‟ to The Question of „Eclecticism: Studies in Later Greek 
Philosophy, ed. John M. Dillon and A. A. Long (Berkeley; London: The University of California 
Press, 1988), 5. 
 97 
a clear discussion of authoritative figures combined with rational analysis.
392
  His 
work can be seen as the „culmination‟ of eclecticism and his wide readership 
brought forward these notions of method not only to eighteenth-century thinkers, but 
the wider study of philosophy in general.
393
 
One unique aspect of Brucker‟s work was that he attempted to tell the history 
of philosophy by promoting the idea that the best of philosophy of the modern age 
was eclectic.  As Hochstrasser understands it, „By this he meant not unsystematic 
syncretism, but a combination of careful estimation of the current validity of 
authorities together with abstract rational reflection, a via media between dogma and 
detachment.‟
394
  Brucker himself stated his positions as follows: 
The human understanding has, at length, however, through the 
favour of Divine Providence, asserted its native freedom and 
dignity, and shaken off the yoke of authority.  Many independent 
and exalted geniuses have arisen, who, despising the servile 
prejudice of yielding implicit deference to the decisions of the 
ancients, have determined, by the vigorous exertions of their own 
faculties, to investigate certain and universal principles for 
themselves, and upon this foundation to frame a system of 
opinions, which should be truly and properly their own.  They have 
not indeed disdained to consult the records of ancient wisdom; but 
they have admitted nothing as true, which their reason and 




For Brucker, not only have the modern eclectic philosophers moved beyond the 
practice of blindly following authority, they use reason and the experimental method 
to create their philosophies.  He further states  
The true Eclectic philosopher, renouncing every prejudice in 
favour of celebrated names or ancient sects, makes reason his sole 
guide, and diligently investigates the nature and properties of the 
objections which come under his observation, that he may from 
these deduce clear principles, and arrive at certain knowledge.
396
   
 
The true eclectic, unlike the ancient sects of philosophy where the members follow 
the authority of the „master‟ of the sect, does not follow another thinker simply 
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because he is recognised as an authority figure.  Bucker, therefore, argued that 
eclecticism is the most useful „method of philosophising‟.
397
  
 The eclectics began to argue that modern philosophy was a progression from 
antiquity and Brucker‟s work is one of the first which characterises the practice of 
philosophy since the Renaissance as surpassing that of ancient philosophy.
398
  
Brucker argued that during the Renaissance, scholars preferred to emulate the 
ancient authors, but eventually some thinkers were able to move away from the 
ancient sects because „they deplored the abject state to which the human mind has 
been reduced by indolence, superstition, and blind submission, and with a generous 
indignation threw off the yoke‟.
399
   
 In his discussion of modern eclectics, Brucker analysed the works of 
thinkers, who he identified as writing eclectic philosophy, either generally or in 
certain branches of philosophy, although many of these thinkers would not have 
considered themselves eclectics.  He believes general eclectic thinkers include 
Giordano Bruno, Gerolamo Cardano, Francis Bacon, Thomas Campanella, Thomas 
Hobbes, René Descartes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Christian Thomasius, and 
Christian Wolff.  The thinkers he claimed have improved the modern study of 
„dialectics and metaphysics‟ include Petrus Ramus, Baruch Spinoza, Nicholas 
Malebranche, and John Locke.  Of those who attempted to improve moral and 
political philosophy he lists Michel Montaigne, Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, 
Jean Bodin, and Niccolò Machiavelli, and since Machiavelli there have been the 
„true principles of government established by Sydney, Locke, Montesquieu, and 
many other able writers‟.
400
  Improvements in natural philosophy have been made 
by Francis Bacon, Daniel Sennert (a German physician), Sir Kenelm Digby (an 
English Chemist), Herman Boerhaave (a chemist and physician), Robert Boyle, 
Nicholas Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Johannes Kepler, Galileo Galilei, and Isaac 
Newton.  Although many of these scholars would not have considered themselves 
eclectics, Brucker found in their thought the principles of modern eclecticism: that 
is, the rejection of all prejudices, sectarianism and the authority of the ancient 
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philosophers, and instead they employed critical reason and observation to discover 
philosophical truths.  These thinkers were not part of a sect nor did they follow a 
master; they were their own masters and relied only on their own logic to formulate 
truthful principles.
401
  Brucker could look through the history of philosophy to find 
examples of eclectic thinkers, and evidence to prove the effectiveness and greatness 
of the method. 
Brucker‟s own notion of philosophy exemplifies what he believes that the 
ancients thought.  He maintains that the ancients defined philosophy as asking what 
perfection is attainable by the human mind.  He acknowledges that this perfection 
can improve and develop over time.  Unfortunately, since the ancient period, the 
human mind has stagnated in its growth because of corrupt religious authority and 
harmful traditions, which hindered the mind from progressing toward the truth.  
Once these dogmatic religious traditions were abandoned, people could again move 
forward in their pursuit of truth and intellectual perfection.  For Brucker, true 
philosophical contemplation requires abandonment of traditions.  People need to 
make a „radical break‟ from other authorities and use their own mental faculties and 
reason to truly understand the nature of the world and thus found a system of 
philosophy.
402
  It is in this way that Brucker was reflecting the Quarrel between the 
Ancients and the Moderns by praising the progress of modern thinkers, breaking 
away from tradition and using historicism to contextualise ancient philosophy.
403
 
Scholars have recently begun to acknowledge eclecticism as being central to 
the history of philosophy and the intellectual history of early modern Europe.  In 
fact, throughout the eighteenth century eclecticism was a widespread theme in the 
intellectual life of thinkers in Germany and in English-speaking countries in a 
variety of subjects.  Although most of the scholarship on eclecticism focuses on 
Europe in the Renaissance and Germany in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
there also existed a strong current of eclectic thought in England and Scotland in the 
eighteenth century. 
                                                 
401
 Ibid., 578-579.   
402
 Leo Catana, „The Concept “System of Philosophy”: The Case of Jacob Brucker‟s Historiography 
of Philosophy‟, History and Theory, 44 (February 2005), 75. 
403
 See Jonathan Rée, „The End of Metaphysics: Philosophy‟s Supreme Fiction?‟, in  Philosophy. Its 
History and Historiography, ed. A. J. Holland (Dordrecht: D. Raidel Publishing, 1983), 12. 
 100 
Ephraim Chambers‟ Cyclopaedia: or, an universal dictionary of arts and 
sciences (1738) defines eclectic as „a name given to some antient philosophers, who 
without attaching themselves to any particular sect, took what they judged good, and 
solid from each‟.
404
  Walter Anderson in his The philosophy of Ancient Greece 
(1791) stated that ancient philosophy is a subject which was understudied in the 
English language, apart from Stanley‟s work, and his history is the first complete 
history of ancient Greek philosophy.
405
  Anderson argued that the competition 
among the different sects of Greek philosophy ended in eclecticism.   
The result was, a declining the fetters of any particular system, and 
taking the liberty to borrow, out of the various theories, those 
tenets only, which were judged to be most agreeable to reason.  
Upon this ground arose the sect called Eclectic, from the selection 




Although he found that this system confined the research done by thinkers, it was 
overall „advantageous‟.  Ultimately, the reason and „philosophical study‟ of the 




The practice of modern eclecticism had become well established throughout 
Europe by the late seventeenth century.  It drew on the debate between the Ancients 
and the Moderns as well as the changes in natural philosophy.  The eclectics also 
helped influence the development of the history of philosophy, adapting the new 
methods to focus on a non-reliance on authority and a systematic, questioning spirit 
of investigation.  As Ferguson adopted his moral philosophy to follow the practices 
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of the experimental method, the historians of philosophy used the experimental 
method, but used historical texts as their evidence.  They attempted to dispel 
hypothesis and report only what was surely noted.   
 
Eclecticism’s Wider Influence 
 
The influence of eclecticism as a method of philosophy applies not only to critical 
philosophy or the history of philosophy, but also in the study of natural philosophy.  
Brucker identified Bacon‟s scientific method as one of the foundations of the 
modern eclectics and especially important in the development of eclecticism and 
natural philosophy and this method‟s importance continued throughout the 
eighteenth century.  In an edition of Francis Bacon‟s Philosophical Works printed in 
1737, the editor notes that in Bacon‟s discussion of Aristotle, „The candor and 
impartiality of our Author seems everywhere present‟.  He views Bacon‟s treatment 
of Aristotle‟s philosophy, which relates the facts without opinion, as proof that 
Bacon is „deservedly esteemed the Father of the modern Eclectic Philosophy‟.
408
  
Francis Bacon has also been credited by the editor with the introduction of the 
experimental method into philosophy, because „He considered philosophy as a 
science calculated to increase, at once, our wisdom and our happiness; confined it to 
what is really useful, and repeatedly recommended the study of nature.‟
409
  He 
further argued that although Bacon created a new method of studying and exploring 
the natural world, this was not a sect of philosophy where its followers bent to the 
authority of Bacon‟s writings, but contemporary and later thinkers were able to use 
and adapt his method of enquiry.  It was not a dogmatic philosophy, like the sects of 
old, but was one which allowed others to use their reason and judgement: the goal of 
the eclectics.  Here, it can be seen, that well into the eighteenth century, the 
importance of Bacon‟s method of natural philosophy was seen as important.  
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Isaac Watts, English minister and author,
410
 is one who identified himself as 
an eclectic.  In his Works (1753) he first claimed that Cicero was an eclectic and 
„chose out of each [philosophical sect] such positions as in his wisest judgement 
came nearest to the truth.‟
411
  He later identifies his philosophy as eclectic because, 
when discussing different approaches to studying philosophy, he claimed that he 
was not tied to any one system, but was an eclectic with the result that some of his 
ideas were Cartesian, while other were Newtonian.  He also followed thinkers who 
have brought the light of reason to philosophy: „But let those also who have opened 
the way for so great a light to shine, by removing the rubbish and darkness of former 
ages, have their proper monuments of praise.‟
412
  According to Watts, Newton first 
founded the best kind of philosophy based on reason and experiment and 
mathematical science.  Gassendi, Bacon and Boyle also worked to free „the world 
from the long slavery of Aristotle and substantial forms, of occult qualities, and 
words without ideas.  They taught mankind to trace out truth by reasoning and 
experiment‟.
413
  He also praises John Locke by stating „He has proceeded to break 
our philosophical fetters, and to give us further release from the bondage of ancient 
authorities and maxims.‟
414
  Watts, like Brucker, praised those authors that he had 
determined to have used an eclectic method, who rejected authority in preference for 
reason and experimentation.  Watts‟ philosophical works display the importance of 
the eclectic method for both moral and natural philosophy. 
Eclecticism is not only important in general discussions of science, but also 
in specific discussions of the history of medicine.  In the preface to his Medical 
Dictionary (1743-1745) Robert James notes the importance of reason in the 
advancement of medicine, the questioning authority without personal 
experimentation and observation, thus promoting the eclectic method.  In his 
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Dictionary, James argued that Galen would have been an eclectic for he declares 
that he will not blindly follow any of the Physicians who went before him.
415
  
Although the author goes on to criticise Galen for actually just following 




 Scottish chemist, author and physician, 
praised the eclectic system of Dutch physician, Professor of Medicine at the 
University of Leyden, and chemist Dr. Hermann Boerhaave (1662-1738).
417
  In the 
preface to his First lines of the practice of physic (1784), Cullen traced 
developments in different disciplines of natural philosophy and noted that 
Boerhaave‟s work had significantly changed the practice of medicine with his 
introduction of an eclectic system: „In forming a System of Physic, he seems to have 
studied diligently all the several writings of both ancient and modern physicians; 
and, without any prejudice in favour of any former systems, he endeavours to be a 
candid and genuine eclectic.‟
418
  Cullen commended Boerhaave‟s eclecticism, by 
reading both ancient and modern texts without preference for either, he was able to 
create a unique and superior system of his own.  Andrew Cunningham has studied 
Boervhaave‟s methods, finding that he followed the mechanical philosophy of Isaac 
Newton and Robert Boyle, but combined it with ancient authors, adopting an 
eclectic method of reading both kinds of sources in an „open-minded‟ and 




Cullen‟s opinions of Boerhaave‟s eclecticism did not go unchallenged, 
however.  In his Observations on the principles of the old system of physic, 
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exhibiting a compend of the new doctrine (1787), John Brown was critical about Dr. 
Boerhaave‟s eclectic method in medicine because it „selected from both ancient and 
modern writings … so the practice, which was the same in all the authorities he 
followed, remained the same with him and all his followers‟.
420
  Brown argued that, 
since Boerhaave took from many sources, his actual medical practice did not change 
or make any innovations in the field.  This is a common criticism of eclecticism: 
because eclectics take from other thinkers, they are perceived as copying ideas 
rather than formulating new methods and principles for themselves.  While this 
understanding of eclecticism is flawed fundamentally, because the eclectics do 
create and innovate, it is a criticism which was made of both ancient and modern 
eclectics. 
Eclecticism and the methods proposed by it affected English thinkers in the 
eighteenth century to the degree that it appears in Thomas Amory‟s fictitious novel 
The Life of John Buncle (1766).  One of Buncle‟s wives, Miss Spence, discusses 
eclecticism at length.  Although this is a work of fiction, the philosophical 
discussions in the book are based on Amory‟s intellectual curiosity and education.
421
  
In the section on „Moral Thoughts‟ when discussing religion, the author (who is 
meant to be Miss Spence) states that eclectic philosophy appeared after 
Epicureanism and that Cicero was an eclectic.  She goes on to claim that she is also 
an eclectic in religion, an „Eclectic in divinis‟.  „The practice of reason and truth is 
the rule of action to God himself, and the foundation of all true religion‟.
422
  God, 
therefore, is an eclectic himself because God uses reason and truth and Miss Spence 
seems justified in following this example in religion.  This text also engages with the 
debate about the nature of eclecticism in the Church.  She goes on to say that it is the 
Catholic Church that has actually perverted the true religion:  
Thus shamefully do the priests sink the credibility of our gospel, 
and impose upon the silly people, a ball of wax for the religion of 
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Jesus; making them believe contrary to knowledge, and prefer a 
system that is a lye against the light of nature, and the gospel.  But 
the chief end, duty, happiness, and highest perfection that man can 





While Amory‟s work is one of fiction and satire, and while this whole discussion 
may be a satirical criticism of eclecticism, the fact that in his philosophical studies 
he has come across eclecticism and freely discusses it demonstrates the pervasive 
nature of the eclectic method among English writers.  
Discussions of the useful influence of eclecticism can be seen also in 
histories of the Christian Church.  In Johann Lorenz Mosheim‟s „An ecclesiastical 
history, antient and modern, from the birth of Christ, to the beginning of the present 
century‟, he presents a view of ancient eclectics that is positive.  In his discussion of 
the state of learning and knowledge in the sixth century, he claims that some 
authors, such as Chalcidius, mixed Christian doctrine with that of Plato and other 
pagans.  The editor, Archibald Maclaine, tempers his use of Chalcidius as an 
example with an extensive footnote in which the editor draws upon Brucker‟s 
Historia.  He states that Chalcidius is the cause of great debate amongst historians 
where some, like Vossius and Fabricius, believe he was a Christian while others 
believe he was a pagan author,
424
 and yet believe that he is in between the two, 
which could make him an eclectic.  According to Maclaine, Brucker agrees that 
Chalcidius followed the „motley method of the eclectic Platonists, but does not see 
anything in this inconsistent with his having publicly professed the Christian 
religion‟.
425
  The editor claims that the eclectic first followed the teachings of Plato 
and when Christianity became the state religion adopted some teaching of the 
gospel, but maintained their original position. 
In East Apthorp‟s response to Edward Gibbon‟s Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire entitled Letters on the prevalence of Christianity (1778), Apthrop 
was very positive about the influence of eclecticism on Christianity, unlike his 
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clerical colleagues who found it the opposite.
426
  Apthorp states that the seventeenth 
century was „the age of erudition and criticism, of eclectic and experimental 
philosophy, of a rational and scriptural theology‟.
427
  He claims that the combination 
of rational philosophy and religion as a positive step in the development of human 
history, which he calls eclectic theology.  He finds this best represented in the 
Church of England:  
Eclectic theology, attached to no sect, compares the best systems, 
and combines from all such principles as best accord with 
scripture, antiquity and reason.  The church of England was 
eclectic in its reformation; it retained, from the church of Rome a 
limited respect for pure antiquity; from the calvinists, their 
veneration of scripture; and from the lutheran and arminian 





He also names Bacon as one of the fathers of the modern eclectic school.  Although 
this work is not without inherent bias, the simple fact that he is incorporating this 
discussion of eclecticism so freely into his history of modern theology demonstrates 
the pervasiveness of the idea of eclecticism in the eighteenth-century. 
Criticism of eclecticism often appears in church histories where the 
opponents condemned eclectic thinkers for their negative influence on early 
Christianity.  In Joseph Milner‟s History of the church of Christ (1800), eclecticism 
is described as being a corrupting force in early church writings
429
 and Thomas 
Haweis identifies the eclectic influence on church philosophy as heretical.
430
  
Brucker is also highly critical of the influence that eclectics had on early 
Christianity:   
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By combining into one system all the important tenets, both 
theological and philosophical, which were at that time received, 
either in the Pagan or the Christian schools, they hoped to confirm 
the heathens in their attachment to their old superstitions, and to 
reconcile the Christians to Paganism.  They endeavoured to 
conceal the absurdities of the ancient religion, by casting over its 
fables the veil of allegory, and thus representing them as founded 
upon important truths…  The Eclectic sect, thus raised upon the 
foundations of superstition, enthusiasm, and imposture, proved the 
occasion of much confusion and mischief both to the Christian 




Brucker here is critical of the ancient eclectic school because it promoted religious 
superstition rather than reason. 
There is another place where eclectics are identified: in Masonic history.  
There are several historians who discuss „eclectic masons‟ and are very negative 
about this section of the free masons and are negative about their eclectic qualities.  
Abbe Barruel writes that Eclectic Masons „should naturally predominate in an age 
when the Philosophism of the Atheists and Deists only succeeds to the ancient 
heresies in order to absorb them all‟.
432
  He was critical of those who „attach 
themselves to no particular system, either political or religious, into which they have 
been initiated, but adopt from them all whatever may best suit their political or 
religious views‟.
433
  James Thomson also notes the influence of eclectic masons and 
claimed that they were in fact influenced by the Illuminati.
434
  While the eclecticism 
discussed in this context is not actually connected to the intellectual movement 
under discussion, it is however interesting to see the breadth of criticisms against 
what is perceived to be the eclectic school. 
 
 
                                                 
431
 Brucker, HCP II, 344. 
432
 Abbé (Augustin) Barruel, Memoirs illustrating the history of Jacobinism. A translation from the 




 James Thomson, The rise, progress, and consequences, of the new opinions and principles lately 
introduced into France; with observations (Edinburgh, 1799), 107.  ECCO, accessed on 19 Apr. 
2011.  See also John Robison, Proofs of a conspiracy against all the religions and governments of 
Europe, carried on in the secret meetings of Free Masons, Illuminati, and reading societies. 
Collected from good authorities, by John Robison, A.M. professor of natural philosophy, and 
secretary to the Royal Society of Edinburgh. The third edition, corrected (London,  1798). ECCO, 
accessed on 19 Apr. 2011.  
 108 
The End of Eclecticism 
 
Because of a number of developments in the discipline of philosophy by the end of 
the eighteenth century, eclecticism was no longer seen as a valid system.  Thinkers 
such as Christian Garve, Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Frederich Hegel 
became disillusioned with what they saw as the unsystematic methods of 
eclecticism.
435
  Kant maintained that philosophy should be systematic and based 
only on reason, not taking ideas from others and the general acceptance of this 
premise in the German universities spelled the death of eclecticism in the nineteenth 
century.
436
  Although Kant was reacting against a specific philosophy prominent at 
the university in Halle, i.e. eclecticism, his philosophy went on to influence 
nineteenth century thinkers and hence eclecticism was viewed as out-dated and was 
largely abandoned.   
These early criticisms of eclecticism continued through the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries as eclecticism was viewed unfavourably as uncreative, 
unoriginal and unsystematic.  This is due in part to Eduard Zeller‟s 1883 A History 
of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy, in which book the idea of the eclectic as a 
negative term was legitimised and began to affect historians‟ opinions of the school.  
Zeller was influenced by Hegel and viewed the history of philosophy in terms of 
„high and low creativity‟, thus classifying the eclectics as „second-rate, dull, and 
largely derivative from the past in its perspectives‟.
437
  In this work, Zeller blamed 
the eclectics for what he deemed the end of ancient philosophy, which then of 
course led to the middle ages where philosophy seemingly no longer existed.
438
  He 
believed that eclecticism was mainly uncritical syncretism and much preferred 
Scepticism, the school which eventually brought about the death of the eclectic 
school in the ancient world.
439
 
Although this is a very brief discussion of the wider influence of eclecticism 
in the eighteenth century, it is clear that the eclectic method was a crucial part of the 
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intellectual history of the Enlightenment.  It can be traced in multiple disciplines and 
in many different countries.  Looking at eighteenth-century methods and practices, 
modern eclecticism is pervasive, partly due at least to the influence of the 
experimental method on the thought of the time.  Furthermore, modern eclecticism 
came to the aid of thinkers who were dealing with the Quarrel between the Ancients 
and the Moderns because it opposed the idea of following one authority or another 
and allowed for all sources to be used in creating a new system of moral or natural 
philosophy.   
 
2.3 Ferguson and Eclecticism 
 
Ferguson adopted a methodology that is similar to the modern eclectics in his moral 
philosophy.  Although Ferguson did not identify himself as an eclectic, he was 
following in the same method that discouraged a blind reliance on authority and 
instead  reliance on  the rational, experience based methods of natural science and 
individual thought and analysis.  Ferguson would have come across ideas of 
eclecticism not only in his frequent visits to German universities and other locations 
on the continent, but through his international intellectual connections, through his 
extensive research, and through contact with other members of the Scottish 
Enlightenment.  Furthermore, Ferguson‟s knowledge of and experience from 
teaching natural philosophy would have given him the foundation in the 
experimental method central to modern eclecticism. 
 Ferguson‟s methodology in his Principles of Moral and Political Science 
best demonstrates that he was indeed following modern eclectic practices.  In the 
introduction to this work Ferguson attempted to justify his approach to the 
discussion of the history of man and the mind.  Ferguson argued that the only way to 
gather information about the human mind is through facts of which people 
themselves are conscious.  External information is of little use in this practice 
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 Ferguson identified his role as author and teacher, and as one who proposes 
and demonstrates a philosophical method, but that is as far as Ferguson himself 
could lead the reader.  In order for the reader „to succeed in the study of mind, every 
reader must perform the work for himself‟.
441
  In other words, in order for a person 
to truly understand moral philosophy they must reason and think individually and 
not rely on any authority to instruct them or proselytise a certain philosophy, but to 
develop one independently according to information and analysis.  To do this, „He 
must be content to recollect what everyone knows; to value a fact rather for its 
consequence than its novelty; and even to value it the more for its being notorious 
and common.‟
442
  People must reassess common beliefs and ideas to determine the 
facts because even the most generally held beliefs need to be examined for their 
truthfulness.  Here Ferguson is clearly following the methods set out by the 
eclectics.  In his general approach to philosophy, Ferguson can provide the model 
and some evidence, but it is up to the individual reader to draw conclusions from his 
work.  He did not set himself up to be an authority figure, dictating what people 
should think.  Furthermore, Ferguson‟s acknowledgement that the reader needs to 
re-examine the basic facts accepted as common knowledge also points to his eclectic 
leanings because in order to create a unique set of philosophical principles, one must 
start examining all suppositions.  Like Descartes‟ famous starting point, „Cogito 
ergo sum‟, the thinker must begin with the most basic of premises to build up a set 
of philosophical principles.  Some, such as Brucker, of course, credited Descartes as 
being one of the founders of the eclectic method himself.  It is unsurprising, 
therefore, if Ferguson wanted to begin his work in a similar fashion.   
  One concern for Ferguson as well as other modern eclectics is the role of 
authority, specifically the place of different sources in the creation of a philosophical 
system.  From the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns, questions about 
the usefulness of literature have been answered to some degree by eclecticism in that 
the eclectics had allowed that all sources could be used to find true principles.  This 
applies to the position of the Ancients who adopted the practices of historicism and 
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the concept of historical universals so that the ancient and modern sources could be 
analysed and criticised equally.  The possibility that the truth could be found in 
either source, meant that the eclectics found both ancient and modern literature and 
philosophy indispensible.  Ferguson‟s attempts to define a role for ancient 
philosophy in his own works fall into this eclectic system because it allows him to 
find a place for both his ancient and modern sources. 
 Ferguson argued that the lessons of models taken from virtue „are happily 
received through the channels of ingenious literature and the fine arts, no less than in 
the way of formal instruction‟.  He appealed to the genius of both ancient and 
modern authors to demonstrate true virtue.  He stated „there are also valuable 
remains of antiquity in the Memorabilia of Socrates; the Ethics of Aristotle; the 
offices of Cicero; and still more in the remains of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius.  In 
our own language also there are many valuable compositions on the subject‟.  If 
students read both ancient and modern literature to detect the passages and premises 
which display accurate and true statements, they will learn about virtue to an even 
greater extent than if they had only been instructed in the topic.  From this 
foundation, Ferguson argued that it is through the method he has devised with which 
his students can learn about moral philosophy.  He stated: „I am ambitious to show 
that is a science of manners or of Ethics, ... and for this purpose would willingly 
point out a method, by which to derive the offices or duties of a virtuous life from 
principles at once so comprehensive and unquestionably evident, as to enable every 
person to fill up the detail for himself‟.
443
 
A further example of Ferguson‟s eclectic stance on the question of authority 
is his approach to the sources of authority.  Ferguson maintained the necessity of 
activity for progress of any kind, especially in education, and wrote that, „When 
learned productions accumulate, the acquisition of knowledge occupies the time that 
might be bestowed on invention‟.  While learning is crucial for the improvement of 
human kind, improvement cannot happen without invention.  Furthermore, if people 
only learn what they are taught by their teachers, then their knowledge will be less 
than that of their teachers.  He states: 
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Great names continue to be repeated with admiration, after we 
have ceased to examine the foundations of our praise: and new 
pretenders are rejected, not because they fall short of their 
predecessors, but because they do not excel them; or because, in 
reality, we have, without examination, taken for granted the merit 




Ferguson fears that when people only admire the accomplishments of others they 
will become perpetual students and „substitute the knowledge of books, instead of 
the inquisitive or animated spirit in which they were written‟.  Ultimately, the study 
of arts rather than the practice of arts will lead people to move away from their true, 
active nature and they will stop participating in society.
445
  This reasoning is similar 
to that of the eclectics who esteem thinkers who attempt to think for themselves, 
who do not only follow their masters, but create their own systems.  Although 
learning from those who are admired is essential, it is more important to take an 
active participating role creating things independently.  
 In Ferguson‟s Essay he states openly that it is better to rely on reason rather 
than the authority of the ancients.  He states: 
It is peculiar to modern Europe, to rest so much of the human 
character on what may be learned in retirement, and from the 
information of books.  A just admiration of ancient literature, an 
opinion that human sentiment, and human reason, without this aid, 
were to have vanished from the societies of men, have led us into 
the shade, where we endeavour to derive from imagination and 
thought, what is in reality a matter of experience and sentiment: we 
endeavour, through the grammar of dead languages, and the 
channel of commentators, to arrive at the beauties of thought and 
elocution, which sprang from the animated spirit of society, and 




Ferguson here is seemingly critical of the Renaissance Humanists because it is with 
the revival of the classics that people began to rely on the reading of the texts to 
discover the truth about human nature.  While it is „just‟ to admire and study the 
works of antiquity, the ancient men of genius arrived at their conclusions by 
participation in society and the experience and observation of an „active life‟.  
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Although Ferguson did not explicitly name Renaissance Humanists as the people 
who rely on learning and reading to write about human nature, it is clear that he is 
referring to this intellectual tradition.  Like other eclectics who adopt the 
experimental method, who rely on experience and observation, Ferguson believed 
that a reliance on other authors was not sufficient for the study of humanity, as 
others had done in the past.  While Ferguson remained committed to reading others 
for opinions and facts, those writings must be informed by a person‟s own 
experience and reason. 
Ferguson is critical of thinkers who do adopt the ideas of others without 
analysis as evidenced in his discussion of Hobbes‟ materialism.  Ferguson argued 
that Hobbes was „adopting‟ Epicurean metaphysics, which maintained the 
materiality of ideas, but offered no evidence for this.  He is also critical of people 
who seem to him to follow Hobbes without much reflection, including Descartes, 
Malebranche and Locke.
447
  While Ferguson was opposed to materialism and 
atomism as a philosophy, mainly because of the lack of evidence to support it as 
well as it being opposed to Ferguson‟s more Newtonian and conservative natural 
philosophy, he is actually more critical of the people adopting the ideas because they 
have done so without really considering the ideas themselves and rather simply 
follow Hobbes.   
 In Ferguson‟s conclusion to his Principles he defended his method in 
attempting to define moral rules.  He was aware that he could be criticised for 
following philosophers, he is here likely referring to the Stoics, who formulate 
systems which „far exceed what human nature is fit to attain‟ and that focusing on 
virtue appears to remove him from the actual world, but this is not his aim, only 
what he was perceived to be doing.  Furthermore, „It was thus, we may be told that 
philosophers in antient times affected a language, a manner, and dress peculiar to 
their respective sects; and hung out the supposed colours of wisdom, with little 
regard to its real possessions or use.‟
448
  He was aware of how people saw him, but 
was critical of the ancient schools for the same reasons. 
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 Ferguson argued that philosophy should not be based on the ideas that the 
philosopher is separate from humanity „otherwise than by a superiority which good 
education may give in any department of life, and by blameless or beneficent 
intercourse with other men‟.  Philosophy should not exist as a dogmatic system, 
although that is the common form it takes when written, and we should behave 
morally and „acquit ourselves properly, without any formal display of our general 
knowledge‟.  People, therefore, should not slavishly follow a system of philosophy, 
„technical terms‟ and „formal pretentions‟ do not help people in their lives, or indeed 
lead to a virtuous life; people should instead have a good character, a morality that is 
personal and private rather than public, so that they live well, but without recourse to 
philosophical pretensions.  In Ferguson‟s time, as he notes, society is critical of 
those who claim to follow a particular philosophy and „persons of the most 
honourable nature do well to avoid any unnecessary parade of their principles or 
system of action‟.
449
   Ferguson does not believe that anyone should wholly adopt a 
system of philosophy so much so that it dictates their actions and reasoning in the 
face of common sense.  Although he acknowledges the usefulness of models of 
virtue, such as the Stoics, he also realised that no one should base a philosophical 
system on their ideas alone or by following them as an ideal.  For Ferguson, 
philosophy remains a practical, useful guidance for making choices in the real 
world.  Ferguson is not attempting to be a philosopher who devises a system that has 
no applicability in the real world, but one that demonstrates the proper means for 
moral judgements and allows his readers to use it as they see fit.  This is the epitome 
of eclectic philosophy because Ferguson himself is not adopting or defining a 
dogmatic system and expects his readers to use their reason and observation to learn 
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from his work, but not to follow it to the letter.  Ferguson does not think of himself 




2.4 Ferguson and the History of Philosophy 
 
 
Adam Ferguson‟s work was also influenced by the techniques used by eclectic 
historians of philosophy.  Although Ferguson did not write a full history of 
philosophy, detailing the history of ideas and philosophical sects, he did apply the 
eclectic techniques to his discussions of moral philosophy.  Knowledge of ancient 
philosophy was central to Ferguson‟s own understanding of philosophy in general 
and of the methods of philosophy, and he had early experiences with it during his 
own education. 
 When Ferguson was a student at the University of Edinburgh he would have 
been exposed to the history of philosophy when learning about ancient and modern 
authors.  He could for instance have attended John Stevenson‟s course on Rational 
or Instrumental Philosophy in the 1740s in which Stevenson gave „a college upon 
Heineccii Historia Philosophica; in which he gives accounts of the lives of the most 
famous philosophers ancient and modern, and the several opinions by which the 
different sects were distinguished.‟
450
  If Ferguson was learning about the history of 
philosophy while earning his degree at Edinburgh, which can safely be supposed 
because he was closely attached to the lectures on moral philosophy at the same 
time, then he would have been exposed to an eclectic method of writing the history 
of philosophy.  Johann Gottlieb Heineccius (1681-1741) was a German Natural Law 
theorist who studied at the University of Halle under the guidance of the eclectic 
Christian Thomasius as well as Johannes Franz Buddeus.
451
  Heinecius was taught 
by the same people as Brucker, and was therefore equally familiar with the method 
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and principles of an eclectic history of philosophy, as well as participating in the 
debates about natural law, a topic central to many German eclectic authors.  In the 
Historia Philosophica, which is the opening to his Elementa Philosophiae 
Rationalis,
452
 Heineccius argues that philosophy is the study of what is good and 
true derived from proper reason, „rectae rationes‟, compared with the true happiness 
of man.
453
  Moreover, finding truth from reason is hindered when prejudiced 
opinions dominate and Heineccius argued that as a result people believe truth is 
what is handed down from authority figures, philosophers or sacred scripture, rather 
than from reason.  As a result, philosophy should „exile‟ tradition, scripture and 
sects because their ideas are not derived from proper reason.
454
  Heineccius argued 
that dividing philosophy into sects is both inaccurate and forces people to take sides, 
claiming one sect is true while another is false, because of the dogmatic nature of 
this kind of philosophy which does not help scholars understand human nature.
455
  
As an example of this, he finds that the dogmatism of the Scholastics discovers 
nothing about human happiness.  Philosophy, the knowledge of truth and goodness, 
should be investigated theoretically, in which metaphysics determines truths about 
the nature of man, God and the spirit word, and practically, to show what is good 
and virtuous and how that can be applied to natural law, politics and economics.
456
  
It is here where Ferguson would have had the definitive firsthand experience with 
eclectic methods of developing a history of philosophy and these methods can be 
found in Ferguson‟s works.       
 Ferguson argued that studying the history of philosophy was important for 
all who delved into the topic of moral philosophy.  According to Ferguson, it is the 
moral philosopher who truly understands human nature and therefore can discover 
the principles that best lead to a more fulfilling human life, but the philosopher must 
also develop these principles in accordance with the laws of nature.  When 
discussing the philosophy of Marcus Aurelius, he claimed „Its foundations are laid 
in the genius lessons whether of physical or moral science; and are to be met with in 
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the concluding observations of Newton‟s Principia, no less than in the remains of 
Socrates or Epictetus, or of Marcus Aurelius.‟
457
  From Epictetus, Ferguson learns 
that it takes both knowledge of natural philosophy and moral philosophy to „raise 
the mind to a just sense of divine providence.‟
458
  Thus, for Ferguson as well as for 
Epictetus, moral philosophy must be combined with natural philosophy to create 
laws of human nature, and the history of philosophy illustrated how these two 
realms support each other.
459
  Ferguson cited the history of philosophy as an 
example of human improvement:  
From the distinguished names that appear in the history of 
philosophy, whether as instructors of mankind, or themselves as 
actors in the great scenes of human life, such as Socrates, Plato, 
Xenophon, Epaminondas, Aristotle, Zeno, Cicero, Cato, Thrasea, 
Helvidius, Epictetus, and Aurelius; we must conclude that the 
progression of human nature, in this matter, is not less 
conspicuous, than it is in the other particulars, in which we have 
attempted to trace its advancement.
460
   
 
Although man is capable of progress, which is perfectly demonstrated by the 
development of philosophy, there is also a danger of decline: „The existence of an 
animal may be naturally limited to the scene for which his organization and his 
instincts are provided: But intelligence has no specific place.‟
461
  The memory of 
philosophy and the improvement of ideas continue through the ages and are not 
limited by the human lifespan.  Ferguson can trace the origins of his ideas back to 
ancient Greece, but this was not the only source of philosophy – it is the progression 
of philosophy that improves human intelligence, in moral philosophy and beyond, 
and as modern philosophy developed it continued to influence people‟s thinking.  
Here, Ferguson‟s connection to the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns 
is further demonstrated because he draws from the concept of human universals to 
arrive at a notion of continuity through the history of ideas and thus finds a position 
which can draw from both ancient and modern philosophy.  He further embraced the 
experimental method in his concept of philosophy, not only learning from Epictetus‟ 
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methods, but also from the example of the natural sciences which developed natural 
laws and by which process he hoped to discover similar moral laws.  It is therefore 
by this method that Ferguson applies the ideas of modern eclectics, taking ideas 
from ancient and modern philosophy to analyse philosophical principles and write 
the laws of morality. 
Ferguson additionally used the examples of ancient philosophy when 
developing his moral philosophy.  In Ferguson‟s section on good and evil in his 
Institutes of Moral Philosophy he categorised the different opinions of ancient 
schools and used them to compare different approaches to the topic.  He stated 
„Disputes among the ancient philosophers, related chiefly to the manner of stating 
this distinction‟ between good and evil and includes the example of Cicero‟s De 
Finibus.
462
  Ferguson then set out the principles of each school as he defined them.  
According to Socrates „they who prayed for riches, long life, &c. seemed to desire a 
throw of the dice, or the chance of a battle‟.  The Peripatetics „classed every thing 
that was by its nature, or use, desirable, under the general predicament of good‟, and 
everything the opposite as evil.  On the other hand, „The Stoics maintained, that 
nothing was to be classed under the predicament of good, but what was at all times 
invariably to be chosen.  That nothing was to be classed under the predicament of 
evil, but what was at all times invariably to be shunned, or rejected: That to call that 
good which ought at any time to be rejected, or that evil which ought at any time to 
be chosen, was not only absurd in terms, but tended to weaken the resolution with 
which a man ought always to make his choice‟.
463
 Ferguson here references both 
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius.  Finally, the Epicureans „substituted the term 
pleasure for good‟.  In this instance, Ferguson invokes the history of philosophy to 
present the ideas of the three most important ancient schools, but without criticism 
or approval, only as evidence to demonstrate different approaches to moral 
philosophy for his students.  
 Another example of Ferguson‟s treatment of different thinkers, both ancient 
and modern can be seen in his discussion of materialism.  Ferguson believes that 
                                                 
462
 Institutes, 142. 
463
 Ibid., 143-144. 
 119 
what is observed is what exists and by taking this position opposes materialism and 
scepticism more generally.  He stated:  
Upon the whole, we may venture to sum up the law of assent or 
dissent, respecting either extreme of credulity or scepticism.  In the 
following terms, “That, as it were absurd to believe without 
evidence, or to affect knowledge where nature has not furnished 
any means of information; so it were equally absurd and ruinous in 
its consequences to reject, in any matter of importance, the only 
means of information which nature has furnished.”
464
    
 
Ferguson‟s discussion of materialism and scepticism was one of his most critical and 
opinionated.  Ferguson identified the Epicureans as: „One sect of the antient 
philosophers [who] chose to forget the quality of mere rhetorical figure, under which 
such expressions are used; and treated the notion, or mental apprehension, as an 
image or picture of the thing, in the most literal sense.‟
465
  In this discussion, he cites 
both Cicero and Lucretius.  Ferguson was critical of modern materialists whom he 
believed simply followed the system of Epicurus, adopting this sectarian philosophy, 
without sufficiently considering the validity of the ideas.  He stated: „A similar 
language has been adopted in modern times, and repeated without sufficient 
intimation whether it be meant in a figurative or literal sense.‟
466
  He believed that it 
was Hobbes, who „so prone to materialism, and to the use of corporeal images, has 
led the way, and been followed with little variation, though perhaps with more 
respect to the distinction between mind and matter, by Descartes, Malebranche, 
Locke, and others.‟
467
  Ferguson believes that these thinkers do not deviate much 
from their ancient sources and he further continues to criticise Hobbes, Locke and 
Malebranche for what he sees as errors in their understanding of the terms „ideas‟ 
and „notions‟.  Like Brucker‟s criticism of philosophers who follow, but do not 
innovate, Ferguson is critical of these so-called materialists because they incorrectly 
adopted the ideas of the ancient philosophers without correctly understanding them 
or properly analysing them.  Ferguson‟s anti-sectarian methods are furthermore seen 
in these criticisms.  Ultimately, Ferguson claimed that, although Hobbes and Locke 
have „expressed many just observations in their metaphorical language of images or 
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ideas‟ in relation to knowledge, „But, to profit by these observations, we must 
remember that the fact is not any magical coherence, or association of thoughts, but 
a habit or disposition of the mind in us, to conceive together things which have been 
presented together.‟
468
  While these authors presented something of interest, 
materialism, which is stimulating, but not accurate in understanding human nature 
because their theories and hypotheses were not based on actual observation or 
experience, and furthermore contradict Ferguson‟s own philosophy. 
 Ferguson argued that one of Thomas Reid‟s greatest accomplishments was 
removing ambiguous, metaphoric language from discussions of science as these 
previous thinkers had not done.
469
  Ferguson summarises this argument by saying 
that  
the scepticism of ingenious men [David Hume and George 
Berkeley], who not feeling a proper access to knowledge, through 
the medium of ideas, without considering whether the road they 
had been directed to take was the true, or false one, denied the 
possibility of arriving at the end.  The reality of knowledge, never 
the less, however little to be explained by any corporeal analogy, 
may be safely assumed, and the facts which relate to the attainment 
of it, be considered as an important part in the history of the 
mind.
470
   
 
Thus, Ferguson maintains that, even in the face of these writers, knowledge exists 
and can be only studied without recourse to false analogies or misleading imagery.  
As he traces modern ideas back to ancient Greece and to the philosophy of Epicurus, 
he is in fact connecting Hume and Hobbes to the Epicurean philosophy, and 
charging both the ancients and the moderns with failing to draw sound conclusions 
from their starting position; in the case of Hume and Hobbes denying even the 
„possibility of arriving at an end‟, here making the same criticism of both ancient 
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When engaging with his classical sources, Ferguson is participating in the debate 
between the Ancients and the Moderns, maintaining a healthy respect for ancient 
authorities, but recognising that people in his time had improved upon the 
knowledge of the ancients.  Also, he did not believe that people should rely solely 
on the authority of the ancients, but should use their reason and observation to make 
their own moral choices.  This speaks to both the underlying message of the Quarrel 
and other eighteenth-century intellectual trends: that the reliance on authority, 
particularly sectarianism, should be rejected and replaced with personal observation.  
One final aspect of Ferguson‟s method remains to be analysed: how did Ferguson 
chose which evidence to be used in his philosophy?  What was the process that 
allowed Ferguson to create philosophical principles?  To do this, Ferguson, like 
some other eclectics and other eighteenth-century thinkers, relied on the 
experimental method practised in natural philosophy to accurately plumb true facts, 
whether about science or moral philosophy, in order to save his philosophy from the 

















3.1 Ferguson’s Adoption of the Experimental Method 
 
When considering Adam Ferguson‟s intellectual context and resulting methodology 
regarding his combination of ancient and modern thought, the Quarrel between the 
Ancients and the Moderns and modern eclecticism were essential in forming his 
ideas.  The Quarrel gave him a model to follow, the position of the Ancients allowed 
Ferguson to accept the progress made in his time in the field of science, while 
upholding the vital role of ancient thought through historicism and historical 
universals.  The modern eclectics, following from the Quarrel, provided a 
methodology which rejected blind acceptance of authority and sectarianism, 
substituting reason and analysis as the guides to create philosophical principles.  The 
eclectics maintained that ancient and modern sources could act as evidence because 
the truth found in certain texts and ideas did not decay over time.  Like those that 
took the position of the Ancients in the Quarrel, the idea of universal truths and 
historicism were adopted by the eclectics who employed the ideas of both ancient 
and modern authors in their search for true philosophy.  The combination of the 
ideas of the Ancients in the Quarrel and the eclectic method then allowed Ferguson 
to use a variety of sources to create his philosophical system.  The larger question of 
how he used evidence and analysis to formulate his moral philosophy can be 
answered with an examination of his adoption of the experimental method. 
 The experimental method initially developed in natural philosophy by 
Francis Bacon took hold of the European consciousness and even participants on 
both sides of the Quarrel admitted the effectiveness and usefulness of the method.  
Practitioners of the experimental method argued that truthful principles were derived 
from repeatable experiments, experience and observation, combined with critical 
analysis, to formulate reasoned and correct conclusions.  The pervasive adoption of 
the experimental method throughout Europe led to the widespread implementation 
of the method not only in natural philosophy, but in all disciplines.  The eclectics 
used this method to combat and prevent sectarianism of any kind because the use of 
experiments, be they practical, physical or theoretical, resolved sectarian disputes, 
proving or disproving the arguments on either side.  Furthermore, with the 
experimental method, the eclectics could avoid falling in line with one authority or 
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another, and attempted to work objectively having rid themselves of all biases, to 
discover what they believed was the truth. 
 The experimental method established a new process of scientific 
investigation that relied on observation and experience combined with 
experimentation to reach true and useful conclusions about natural philosophy and 
to disprove sectarian arguments.  The eclectics used this method to combat and 
prevent sectarianism of any kind because the use of experiments either practical, 
physical or theoretical, resolved sectarian disputes, proving or disproving the 
arguments on either side.  Furthermore, with the experimental method, eclectics 
could avoid falling in line with one authority or another, and attempted to work 
objectively having rid themselves of all biases, to discover what they believed was 
the truth.  While this method was designed for scientific inquiry, it was also intended 
to explain both theological and moral philosophical conclusions.  The inclusion of 
the experimental method into both natural philosophy and moral philosophy was 
prominent in Europe in the eighteenth century and can be seen as particularly 
common in the Scottish Enlightenment, especially with philosophers such as David 
Hume, David Fordyce and Adam Ferguson consciously applying the principles of 
this method to moral philosophy. 
  
 
3.2 The Experimental Method in the Scottish Enlightenment 
 
The experimental method‟s importance in early modern history, especially the 
eighteenth century, has been widely acknowledged by scholars and has been 
observed to be crucial for interpreting European thought after Francis Bacon 
proposed a new method of natural philosophical inquiry.  Bacon, however, was not 
the first thinker to begin changing the concept of philosophy and scholarship 
because he was following in the general questioning of ancient texts that dominated 
the Renaissance.  From the Renaissance onwards scholars researched the methods 




 and a large volume of translations and commentaries on ancient texts 
had been produced.  As was discussed in the chapter on the Quarrel between the 
Ancients and the Moderns, discoveries and innovations in natural philosophy began 
to demonstrate the inadequacies of ancient methods when confronted with the new 
knowledge developed during the seventeenth century.  Bacon‟s emphasis on the 
experimental method resulted from these new conceptions of natural philosophy and 
needs to be discussed in detail in order for his influence on later thinkers to be better 
understood. 
 Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was a lawyer and a philosopher who 
revolutionised the theory and practice of philosophy.  Bacon‟s method solved some 
of the problems he saw with natural philosophy as practised by alchemists and 
Scholastics, neither of whom Bacon found effective in their methods.
472
  Bacon 
devised a method that eschewed reliance on the authority of supposed knowledge, 
what he referred to as „idols‟, which are the corrupting force in philosophical 
inquiry.  According to Stephen Gaukroger, Bacon claimed, „We pursue natural 
philosophy with seriously deficient natural faculties, we operate with a severely 
inadequate means of communication, and we rely on a hopelessly corrupt 
philosophical culture.‟
473
  Bacon suggested a methodology which corrected these 
inherent mistakes by „the discovery of causes which are both necessary and 
sufficient for their effects‟.
474
  Bacon uses a process of induction which through 
repeated experiment and observation rules out a number of causes until a true and 
final cause can be discovered.
475
  Bacon attempted „a fundamental reform of 
philosophy from a contemplative discipline exemplified in the individual personal of 
the moral philosopher, to a communal ... enterprise exemplified in the persona of the 
experimental natural philosopher.‟
476
  It is this new method of basing natural 
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philosophical principles on experience, observation, and verifiable experimentation, 
that went on to influenced later thinkers. 
 Following the method proposed by Bacon, early modern scholars began to 
develop his method and apply it in a number of disciplines.  Perhaps the most 
important proponent of his thought for English and Scottish thinkers was Robert 
Boyle.  Boyle (1627-1691) was a natural philosopher and influential member of the 
early Royal Society.  He, like Bacon, wanted to supplant the Aristotelian method 
with a mechanistic philosophy which he called „corpuscularianism‟.
477
  In this he too 
followed an experimental method and believed that theory and experiment should 
work together.
478
  Boyle further intended his method to go hand-in-hand with natural 
religion, following other early modern debates, and arguing that natural 
philosophical discoveries reveal intelligent design.
479
 
  It is arguable that the most important scholar to change the methods of 
eighteenth-century natural philosophy and to promote the experimental method was 
Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727).
480
  Newton‟s works, particularly his Optics, 
displayed a method of using experimental evidence and mathematics to prove his 
theories.
481
  Newton‟s work was crucial for thinkers in the eighteenth century and 
his ideas influenced philosophical methods for years to come.  Furthermore, in the 
eighteenth century, Boyle and Newton‟s methods were often assumed to be the same 
because both promoted an experimental method.
482
 
 One reason that Newton was so influential, particularly in Scotland, was the 
adoption of Newtonian methods and ideas in the university curriculum in the early 
to mid-eighteenth century.  The move away from scholastic Aristotelianism to a new 
form of natural philosophy, be it Cartesian, Newtonian or something else, in the 
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curriculum of the Scottish Universities has been widely studied.  As Roger Emerson 
has argued, „By c. 1710 the experimentalist position was well known, summarised 
impressively in the works of Boyle, Locke, Newton, and Le Clerc.  It was available 
in texts and was seemingly vindicated by the discoveries which had accumulated so 
rapidly since the beginning of the previous century.‟
483
  From Francis Bacon and 
other influential thinkers onwards, the early modern period „called for an end to 
scholastic pedantry, dogmatism and disputatiousness in education and for the 
inclusion of polite and gentlemanly standards that would better equip students to 
engage in the affairs of the world around them.‟
484
  Colin Maclaurin, for instance, 
was an influential professor in Aberdeen and Edinburgh who drew upon the 
theoretical physics in Newton‟s Principia and the experimental method found in 
Newton‟s Optics and continued Newton‟s use of mathematics in the study of natural 
philosophy.
485
   
 Michael Barfoot has identified Robert Steuart, professor of natural 
philosophy at Edinburgh, as being instrumental in the dissemination of Newtonian 
ideas throughout the Scottish Enlightenment.
486
  In his lectures, Steuart followed 
closely the works of the early Newtonians, John Keill and David Gregory, to 
demonstrate the experimental method.
487
  A study of Steuart‟s reading list 
demonstrates that he taught the students an historical over-view of natural 
philosophy in which he „presented a review of rival systems of “physiology,” 
particularly within the atomistic, corpuscularian, and mechanical traditions.‟
488
  One 
of the most used authors for the course was Robert Boyle, highlighting the influence 
of Boyle‟s approach on Scottish natural philosophy.  Steuart‟s experiments in his 
lectures relied on experience-based, sensory observation as in Boyle‟s mechanical 
philosophy, rather than relying on a more Newtonian, mathematics based system.
489
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 The eighteenth-century Scottish universities were attempting to establish a 
useful and practical natural philosophy just as moral philosophy was also seen as 
being didactic and instructive to the morality of the students.  Paul Wood argues:   
Thanks to the writings of Robert Boyle, and the apologists for the 
early Royal Society, natural knowledge was widely thought to 
bolster religion because it served to illustrate God‟s providential 
governance of nature and consequently could be mobilised for the 




Through the lectures on natural philosophy in the Scottish universities students were 
exposed to the experimental philosophy and this method was applied to religion, 
history and moral philosophy as well.  The experimental method was so influential 
that it was adopted by thinkers across disciplines.  This follows from Bacon and 
Boyle‟s own intentions that their method could reveal truth regardless of which kind 
of truth.  Francis Bacon was not only interested in natural philosophy, but the history 
of philosophy as well.  Bacon thought the history of philosophy should not only be a 
list of philosophical sects and doctrines or simple biographies of ancient 
philosophers, but also a study of elements that could be scientifically proven.
491
  
With the introduction of Bacon‟s method, the more traditional overview of a 
philosophy was traded for an analysis of the development of ideas, events and 
knowledge that affected the philosopher.  The ancient philosophers were put into 
their historical context and within the wider development of philosophy.  This 
approach was completely different from that of the Renaissance philosophers who 
either followed Diogenes Laertius as their model or adopted the sectarian positions 
of one particular school.
492
  Bacon wanted to cleanse history of the attachment to the 
dogma of particular sects and analyse philosophy without prejudice.  Bacon believed 
that ancient schools were something to be studied, but not followed as models 
because they did not offer anything to modern thinkers.  The result of this was that 
„Empirical methods, with their Baconian emphasis on the nature of the human mind 
and on natural and civil histories, brought in tow antiquarian and historical studies 
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which vindicated the new methods that has produced progress‟,
493
 as Roger Emerson 
notes.   
If an eighteenth-century thinker followed the teachings of Newton, therefore, 
he was also adhering to this wider tradition of experience and experimentation.  
Alexander Broadie, in his recent History of Scottish Philosophy, has noted that 
members of the common sense school, led mainly by Thomas Reid, „use a Baconian 
or Newtonian methodology and see themselves as entitled to employ that 
methodology because they are studying human nature in the light of the belief that 
we human beings are part of the natural world.‟
494
  Furthermore, Broadie claims 
„They all considered that they were applying the experimental method of reasoning 
to moral subjects‟.
495
  Broadie argues that one of the foundations of the common 
sense school was the use and application of the experimental method. 
 Alexander Broadie also argues that George Turnbull taught Thomas Reid 
that Bacon invented the inductive method, rather than Newton, although the 
experimental method became associated with Newton in the minds of Scottish 
Enlightenment philosophers.
496
  Michael Barfoot has noted that when David Hume 
discusses Newton and „scientific procedure‟, this is normal: when „compared with 
the wider community of 18
th
-century texts which discuss such matters, it is clear that 
there is nothing unusual about them.  In fact, it can be argued that his rather brief 




The experimental method was pervasive in the Scottish Enlightenment.  One 
reason the experimental method was so widespread was because of the university 
education, but it is also reflective of the changing intellectual climate of the 
eighteenth century.  As was the case in the seventeenth century during the Ancients 
and Moderns debate, the advances made in natural philosophy affected all 
disciplines.  The implementation of the experimental philosophy in the Scottish 
Enlightenment demonstrates the modern and current elements of Scottish thinkers‟ 
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philosophy participating in a debate with their contemporaries in Europe and there 
are several notable examples of this including David Hume and David Fordyce.   
Scholars, such as Alexander Broadie, have analysed David Hume‟s 
relationship to the experimental method, and have shown that he had been heavily 
influenced by Bacon, Newton and Boyle in his application of this method to moral 
subjects and the understanding of human nature.
498
  David Hume set out to write 
philosophy in his Treatise on Human Nature using the experimental method, and 
this is an idea which runs through many of his works.  In the „Introduction‟ to the 
Treatise he stated that previously philosophers have built systems of thought on 
false principles and this is something he wanted to resolve.
499
  He argued that 
metaphysics uses the best kind of reasoning because it assesses „every kind of 
argument‟.
500
  He believed that all sciences are related to human nature and thus all 
natural philosophy is „dependant on the science of Man‟.
501
  He wanted to apply the 
best of natural philosophy to the study of human nature: „In pretending therefore to 
explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a complete system of 
the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which 
they can stand with any security.‟
502
  Hume identified this experimental philosophy, 
based on experience and observation, originating in the works of Francis Bacon and 
continued by British philosophers such as John Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, 
Hutcheson and Butler.
503
  He argued that as long as it is based on experience, „by 
tracing up our experiments to the utmost‟ and keeping our system simple, we will be 
successful.
504
  For Hume, experience is the ultimate authority, and he wished to base 
„experiments‟ on „cautious observation of human life‟, on the behaviour that he has 
experienced.
505
  Thus, he put into practice the experimental method in moral 
philosophy.  He continued this line of argument in his essay, „Concerning Principles 
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of Morals‟, arguing that morals, as facts can be understood by this method:  „As this 
is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect success, by 
following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims from a 
comparison of particular instances.‟
506
  Hume, therefore, consciously and 
influentially applied the experimental method to moral philosophy.  
  Hume‟s claims of successfully adopting the experimental method were 
countered by others, however.  In An essay on the nature and immutability of truth, 
in opposition to sophistry and scepticism (1771), James Beattie, speaking out against 
sceptics, demonstrated the problems of Hume‟s system.  Beattie argued that Hume‟s 
system was „founded on a false hypothesis taken for granted; and whenever a fact 
contradictory to that false hypothesis occurs in his observation, he either denies it, or 
labours hard to explain it away.  This, it seems, in his judgement, is experimental 
reasoning!‟
507
  Thomas Reid also has similar objections to Hume‟s methods.  He 
stated that Hume was trying „to introduce into moral subjects the experimental 
method of reasoning‟.  While this was a „very laudable attempt‟, however, he failed 
to recognise, „That conclusions established by induction ought never to exclude 
exceptions, if any such should afterwards appear from observation or experiment.‟
508
  
After reassessing Newton‟s method, Reid claims that Hume‟s approach „is contrary 
to the fundamental principles of the experimental method of reasoning, and therefore 
may be called rash and unphilosophical.‟
509
  While Reid was critical of Hume‟s 
method, perhaps to establish the superiority of his own method, this example shows 




 also used the experimental method to understand morality.  
Fordyce was the professor of moral philosophy at Marischal College in Aberdeen 
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and published The Elements of Moral Philosophy in 1754.
511
  In the introduction to 
this work Fordyce sets out his concept of philosophy and his definition of moral 
philosophy.  He claims to be following Francis Bacon‟s division of human 
knowledge and enquiry into three parts (history, poetry and philosophy).  He carries 
methods of natural philosophy in to his moral philosophy.  He claims: „Moral 
Philosophy has this in common with Natural Philosophy that it appeals to Nature or 
Fact; depends on observation, and builds its Reasonings on plain uncontroverted 
Experiments, or upon the fullest Induction of Particulars of which the Subject will 
admit.‟
512
  He further claims that philosophers must collect „phenomena‟ and 
discover the laws which they follow and then apply those laws to other phenomena.  
It is by this way that both natural and moral philosophy are approached according to 
the same method.  He applied the experimental philosophy of his time to his moral 
philosophy: „Therefore Moral Philosophy enquires, not how Man might have been, 
but how he is constituted; not into what Principles, or Dispositions his Actions may 
be artfully resolved, but from what Principles and Dispositions they actually 
flow‟.
513
  Man is to be understood just as a machine or other kind of animal that is 
subject to experimental investigation and his moral philosophy follows from this 
foundation. 
These are a few selected examples of the influence of the experimental 
method in the study of moral philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment.  The fact 
that such different scholars as Hume and Reid would appeal to the same method, 
while understanding it differently, demonstrates the importance of it in the Scottish 
Enlightenment.  The use of the experimental method to understand the entirety of 
philosophy, not just natural philosophy, illustrates a change in the intellectual 
history of the period resulting in a new focus on evidence and observation to prove 
all conclusions.  This method greatly influenced Ferguson‟s moral philosophy. 
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3.3 Ferguson and Experimental Philosophy 
 
Ferguson‟s use of the experimental method has been a source of contention among 
scholars: while some note the importance of the method,
514
 particularly for his 
Institutes and Principles,
515
 others are critical of his „inconsistent‟ use of this 
method.  Roger Emerson and Lisa Hill have argued that Ferguson combined 
Newtonian empiricism with Montesquieu‟s method of history to formulate a theory 
about human behaviour and morals based on reason, evidence and experience.
516
  
Scholars have further argued that Ferguson followed in the tradition of the „British 
empiricists‟, including Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Fordyce who had created moral 
philosophies based on the natural science of Newton and Bacon.  This is a familiar 
context that would have been recognised by his readers, where moral philosophy 
was influenced by Baconian and Newtonian methods of natural philosophy.
517
  
These scholars have found the centrality of this empirical tradition in Ferguson‟s 
thought to be an important characteristic. 
 David Kettler has found that Ferguson‟s use of the experimental method 
confuses his moral philosophy because of the discrepancy between the application 
of physical laws and the importance of non-factual, sentimental factors that lead to 
moral decisions.  Kettler believes that Ferguson used this method often to add 
weight to his ideas; however „it is so clearly an evasion of all the intellectual issues 
of his time that he could not rely on it alone‟.  Because he needed more support for 
his arguments, Ferguson also employed a „Newtonian type of teleology‟ which 
stated that the laws of nature followed God‟s creation of the universe.  Kettler 
believes that a combination of Ferguson‟s „heavy debt to classical sources‟ and „his 
affinity for a conception of virtue more heroic than that promulgated by his 
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contemporaries‟ led him to follow a classical, or Aristotelian teleology which helped 
classify man‟s aims and attributes but was an outdated „metaphysical apparatus‟.
518
  
Kettler finds that this teleology was not only inadequate for Ferguson‟s purposes, 
but was indicative of his lack of systematic logic and metaphysics, claiming that 
„such lofty speculative flights were probably beyond his capabilities and certainly 
outside the range of his interest.‟
519
  Kettler is perhaps Ferguson‟s harshest critic and 
what he finds so problematic about Ferguson‟s work is that it appears unsystematic, 
unanalytical, and greatly ignores what Kettler considers to be the most important 
parts of philosophy: metaphysics and epistemology.  Kettler‟s criticism of 
Ferguson‟s thought, while well founded, ignores Ferguson‟s exacting application of 
the experimental method to his moral philosophy and the nature of Ferguson‟s 
writings on the subject.  To counter these criticisms and to get at the heart of 
Ferguson‟s philosophical project, a close examination of his understanding and 
application of the experimental method, in both his lectures and printed works, is of 
fundamental importance. 
 In the Institutes and the Principles Ferguson published his lectures as a 
reference and for his students and they followed his lecture plan for this reason.  One 
reason that Ferguson‟s work appears „inconsistent‟ is that he is teaching both 
pneumatics and moral philosophy, two topics that are related, but have a different 
focus.  Moral philosophy is „the knowledge of what ought to be, or the application 
of rules that ought to determine the choice of voluntary agents‟.
520
  In order to 
determine moral laws, Ferguson first laid out the nature and the history of man so 
that he could establish their foundation.  To accomplish this, Ferguson began with 
pneumatics, which was the standard teaching method at the University of Edinburgh 
in the eighteenth century.
521
  Pneumatics is the „physical history of mind‟ and is the 
ultimate foundation of moral philosophy.  Pneumatics takes a purely „scientific‟ 
approach to man, according to Ferguson, follows the rules of the sciences, and 
„treats of man, may contain the history of man‟s nature, and an explanation or theory 
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of the principal phenomena of human life.‟
522
  Pneumatics holds „up a picture of 
man‟ and verifies it by „observation and experience and reflection.‟
523
  Pneumatics 
also assesses the role of God in people‟s lives and the nature of the human soul.  It is 
with pneumatics that Ferguson properly employs the experimental method in his 
work.  From the foundations established about the laws that govern the human body 
and soul, Ferguson can proceed to determine moral laws for the conduct of men.  It 
is this two-part method which causes confusion among some scholars because 
Ferguson seems to take on two different methods to analyse these two topics.  
Further investigation, particularly into Ferguson‟s lecture notes, demonstrates how 
Ferguson bridges the gap between these two subjects. 
 Ferguson‟s writings reflect the fact that he was foremost a teacher of moral 
philosophy and pneumatics.  Three of his major publications were based on his 
lectures and printed for the benefit of his students.  Because what he is writing is 
basically the same as what he is teaching, Ferguson did not attempt to analyse 
analytic philosophy in the way that other philosophers of his time did because that 
was not his goal.  Although at university, Ferguson was noted for being particularly 
fond of and accomplished in the study of metaphysics,
524
 in his books, Ferguson was 
attempting to create a practical, easy-to-follow philosophical system which benefited 
his students, not to create an entire system of philosophy. 
  Ferguson begins with an exploration of the universe and its laws.  He 
cannot avoid eighteenth-century natural philosophy and the innovations of his time, 
particularly the application of the scientific method to his wider methodology.
525
  He 
established that Bacon and Newton‟s scientific method should be used to understand 
facts, reality and the laws of nature.  People can determine general and particular 
laws from observing facts.  It is through observation and logical analysis that people 
can understand natural laws.  Furthermore, when people observe the natural world 
and derive conclusions from facts, they are actually viewing the universe which God 
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  God created a set of rational laws that people can then observe, as 
was seen in Boyle‟s thought.  This is not only a means for understanding the 
material world, but also allows humans to witness the divine plan and God‟s 
providence in action.
527
  Ferguson claims that God is the creator of the universe, 




Ferguson went into great detail to explain this experimental method.  
Ferguson argued that the experimental method revolutionised the study of „visible 
and mechanical subjects‟ by creating new methods to discover the causes of 
„operations‟.  Through numerous experimentation and varied methods, „the 
operation of a cause which in the ordinary course of things might have forever 
remained unobserved, was forced into view, and placed beyond the possibility of 
doubt or mistake‟.
529
  According to Ferguson, physical laws are collected from 
particulars that lead to general conclusions.  Once a physical law is established, it 
can explain a variety of phenomena.  Ferguson approved of the absolute nature of 
„fact and reality‟ discovered by physical laws because he was opposed to the use of 
hypothesis and theory to explain natural occurrences.  Ferguson was highly critical 
of the ancient schools of philosophy for this reason: 
…logic or the science of Investigation and Argument is the great 
organ to be employed in all our reasonings and discoveries…The 
logic of Aristotle or the schools were a mere Theory of Syllogism 
or Argument.  The Theory of Investigation was omitted.  Lord 
Bacon has endeavoured to supply this defect and in his Novum 
Organum has given.….  This new instrument of Reason has been 
successfully applied to extend the sciences that relate to the matters 
of system.  But as if the canons of reason were different in the 
treatments of material and intellectual subjects the use of them has 
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Ferguson further argues that once the laws of nature have been established, 
additional explanations become unnecessary and, „Such is the tendency of the rules 




 Physical science proceeds from facts and observations to general laws which 
are then used to understand phenomena and this process greatly increases human 
knowledge.
532
  This method does not provide only a means to categorising and 
understanding the world, but it also leads to the „possessions of power, or the 
command of events‟ because the knowledge gained from these laws of nature 
discovered through experimentation can be recreated and the knowledge can be used 
for invention and innovation: „Thus, men, knowing the laws of fluid pressure 
construct the pump and they siphon, and convey water in close pipes over 
inequalities of ground.‟
533
  For Ferguson, following from Bacon‟s conclusions, this 
method of „science‟ is successful when the reality of the conclusions is 
demonstrated, leading to further discovery, and thus greater increases human 
knowledge.
534
  Ferguson argued that natural philosophers discovered the causes of 
forces that had not been observed previously and proved, without a doubt, the 
validity of their conclusions.  What Ferguson takes from this method was the 
practice of basing conclusions and judgements on experience and observation more 
than the act of creating experiments.   
 Ferguson applied this method of „experimentation‟ and observation to 
discover truthful principles to his moral philosophy.  As has been noted, Ferguson 
was not the first thinker to relate the experimental method to moral philosophy; it 
was a common practice among his Scottish contemporaries.
535
  Ferguson maintained 
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that the best method in determining the laws of physical science and moral science 
was through observation and the use of reason and analysis.  People, more 
specifically his students, must take an active role in making observations about 
morality and in order to arrive at their own conclusions,
 536
 as was demonstrated in 
the discussion about Ferguson‟s eclectic method.  The importance he placed on the 
active pursuit of philosophical truth speaks to both his use of the experimental 
method as well as his eclectic methodology. 
 Ferguson argued that knowledge of mankind originated from the study of the 
natural world in which men exist, their surroundings, and the laws that govern the 
world in general.  By looking at others, people are inspired to think about their own 
nature and analyse both the history of man and questions of morals.  Ferguson‟s 
method then follows this premise: 
For this reason it is thought proper, in the choice of our method, to 
look abroad into the general order of things, and to contemplate the 
place as well as the description of man, while we endeavour to fix 
the distinction of good and evil relative to his nature; a distinction 
which may be collected from his situation relative to other beings, 




It is part of man‟s nature to attempt to understand the operating principles of the 
universe in which he exists.  Man is singularly gifted with the power of 
understanding, of comprehension, „qualifying him to perceive, and to estimate the 
bearings of a whole‟ to a „common end‟.  This power of comprehension allows men 
to learn the laws which govern the physical world, created by God, and run by 
providence, thus leading to an understanding of God‟s laws.  Here again, Ferguson 
follows Boyle and eighteenth-century thinkers who find the proof of God in the 
discovery of His laws.  This does not apply only to physical laws, but also to moral 
laws.  According to Ferguson, man is also capable of making moral judgements, as 
well as distinguishing right from wrong, which direct his private and public actions 
and „is formed on the dictates of a social disposition, which receives, with favour 
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and love, what constitutes the good of mankind, or rejects, with disapprobation and 
abhorrence, what is of a contrary nature.‟
538
 
Ferguson maintained that people can learn and find meaning in their actions, 
as well as the principles of moral philosophy; much like in natural philosophy 
people can correlate cause and effect.  The way that people learn to interpret the 
outcome of their actions is through experience and it takes specific understanding, 
not just instincts, to form judgements about them.
539
  Man is different from other 
animals because he has the powers of observation and intelligence, both of which he 
needs to survive.
540
  He states: 
The knowledge obtained by reflection, from consciousness, is, of 
all others, the most intimate and sure.  It consists in a conviction of 
reality that sets every cavil and dispute at defiance, or does not 
admit of a question, whether that of which we are conscious may 
not be otherwise than as we are conscious of it: In other matters, 
even in matters of perception, there is an information and a subject 
of information, that may be separately stated; but, in this instance, 
the subject and information it brings, the thought or affection, and 
the consciousness of thought or affection, are inseparable.  Here 
the evidence of reality remains unshaken and unattempted by the 
boldest assaults of scepticism.  The very statement of doubt is a 




Thus, people understand the world through their observation and reflection.  From 
this underlying belief, the method which Ferguson chose to follow was that of the 
modern experimental method.  
Ferguson, continuing to place importance on „laws‟ of nature following on 
from Newton,
542
 believed that moral philosophy also employs general laws but 
„moral principles also direct the choice of voluntary agents‟.
543
  For Ferguson, „The 
specific principles of moral science are some general expression of what is good, 
and fit to determine the choice of moral agents in the detail of their conduct.‟
544
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Ferguson argued that there are intellectual laws, while they are less frequently 
discussed,
545
 and these laws relating to the operations of the mind are fixed.  A law, 
however, can also refer to a „rule of choice, or expression of what is good‟ and it is 
in this meaning that Ferguson relates fixed laws to morals.
546
  As a result, moral 
laws may exist without being followed because moral laws do not rely on facts.  
There are similar laws which exist and relate to the physical world which are laws of 
arts, aesthetics and utility.
547
  The word moral has many „vague‟ uses and therefore 
Ferguson is limiting his concept of moral philosophy to „the study of what men 
ought to be, and of what they ought to wish, for themselves, and for their 
country‟.
548
   
 If Ferguson claims that the experimental method does not work for people, 
then how does he apply it to his moral philosophy?  The best explanation of this is 
found in his lectures.  Ferguson believes that science dealt with facts and reason, but 
„In moral philosophy we inquire not what is the Fact: but amidst the Existent and 
possible Qualities of our nature, what is the Best.‟
549
  The object of moral 
philosophy is not to look for facts about people, but to find the „object of progress 
and Improvement‟, looking for what is right and perfectible in a person‟s innate 
qualities.  To do this the moralist „consults his own feeling and he suggests to 
mankind the elevation which he derives from thence‟.  Thus, it is not fact which 
Ferguson uses to prove moral positions, but the realities of good and evil.
550
  Once 
the realities of the distinction between good and evil are determined, rather than 
facts, general principles can be derived.  Ferguson is using a similar method to the 
experimental method, but is using different evidence to create rules.  For Ferguson, 
„Conscience is the great source of evidence in this matter but there are many 
collateral considerations to assist our judgement.  For Good is probably also pleasant 
reputable salutary and profitable etc‟.
551
 
 Ferguson makes a conscious effort to distinguish between the application of 
the experimental method to moral and physical inquiries.  He believes that physical 
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and moral science should not be combined into one system.  He believes that there is 
a difference between the physical and the moral world. 
Such questions respecting human nature have been confounded 
together in consequence of vague and ambiguous use of words.  
All Questions whether of Fact or the Right respecting the Human 
mind are reckoned moral And whatever relates to the material 
world is distinguished from what relates to the intellectual, by the 
appellation of physical.  The consequence is that every speculation 
relating to man or to the conceptions or passions of men is 
supposed to constitute moral philosophy.  And so instituted for that 
science in which men are instructed in the great interest of human 




Science is defined by facts and explanations, while moral philosophy is composed of 
experience, choice and preference.  The two are connected „because we need to 
know man‟s actual state before we can understand what is good‟.  What 
fundamentally connects the two is pneumatics because people must understand the 
laws that govern the human body before they can understand what is best for 
them.
553
  Ferguson states „Pneumatics, like science, looks at the history of the 
species‟, while moral philosophy is different in „the sources of Evidence and in the 
conduct of Reason‟.
554
  In moral philosophy Ferguson was looking for facts to find 
the reality of good and evil, which is vital for people‟s happiness.  The source of this 
evidence is „of what we are conscious‟, or what is observed and experienced.  
Ferguson is consciously using the methods of physical science when writing his 
moral science: 
And that the application of physical law and physical science to 
mind will be admitted in the same sense as it is admitted to matter.  
It is indeed important that we should be able to state the Fact 
without mistaking it for the Right and the Right without mistaking 
it for the Fact…  In Physical Enquiry relating to human Nature our 
object is to Ascertain what men have done or established.  In moral 
Enquiries our object is to select what is best for human Nature and 
what we ought to wish for ourselves for our country and for 
mankind…  In the first we are led by Evidence of Fact.  In the 
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Ferguson applied the method of experimental science to his moral philosophy with 
some adjustments: he did not use experiments, but observations and he is not 
looking for facts, but realities of good and evil.  He makes this explicit in his 
lectures as well as in his written work.   
This method was so central to Ferguson‟s thought that it also influenced his 
concept of history.  In the Essay on the History of Civil Society Ferguson admitted 
that the natural historian also acknowledges „that his knowledge of the material 
system of the world consists in a collection of facts, or at most, in general tenets 
derived from particular observations and experiments.‟
556
  Ferguson believed the 
natural historian should avoid conjecture and hypothesis and rely solely on reason, 
fact and observation.   This use of the experimental method in moral philosophy and 
in history leads to an explanation of Ferguson‟s relationship with his sources.  In 
regard to the history of humanity and society, Ferguson used a variety of sources, 
both ancient and modern, as evidence of different stages of human development.  He 
used ancient accounts of „primitive society‟ as well as modern accounts of what he 
considered to be people in a similar stage as his empirical evidence about people.
557
  
Instead of performing experiments on people, he used the observations of others as 
the evidence on which to base his conclusions.   
He followed a similar method in his moral philosophy.  Because Ferguson 
believed that the study of the character of man, „the laws of his animal and 
intellectual system‟, and man‟s happiness, were the most important topics to 
study,
558
 he devoted a large amount of his writing and teaching to developing his 
method of inquiry into moral philosophy.  Ferguson maintained that the principles 
that explain humans must be based on observation and the principles must be 
applicable in human life.
559
  Ferguson, however, did not believe he could derive 
these principles from experimentation because people cannot be experimented upon 
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  Thus, moral philosophy is not based on experimentation, 
but on the use of facts and evidence found in texts and personal observation.  
Ferguson used both ancient and modern literature and philosophy to find evidence 
about human nature and morals combined with his personal observation and reason 
to conceive of his moral principles.  It is in this way that Ferguson was able to adapt 
the experimental method to explain moral philosophy. 
This concept is central to Ferguson‟s wider views about moral philosophy.  
All people can make observations about others, either based on personal 
observations or by reading the testimony of others.  If a person makes mistakes in 
the conclusions he draws from these observations it is because he has made 
improper judgements about the experiences he has had rather than there being a flaw 
in the method of basing conclusions on experience and observation.
561
  This, 
however, is not only through observation that people can form judgements about 
others, it also takes a „force of mind‟, or reason, to properly understand human 
nature and morality.  All people have opinions, but it takes a better understanding 
and reason to direct them to the best form and use.  Because Ferguson‟s moral 
philosophy is centred around helping people makes these moral choices, this is the 
ultimate foundation of his method.  He believes that each person will be able to 
make proper moral choices with a combination of his guidance along with their 
personal observations and experiences.
562
  He told his students in a lecture: „The 
facts must be verified by your experience, the sentiments must correspond to the 
feelings of your minds, and every particular to be of use must be …noted and 
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pursued to its consequence.‟
563
  It is up to each individual to look at what Ferguson 
has presented and to make up his own mind about its validity based on his 
experiences and emotions. 
It is through a combination of the experimental method and the methods of 
modern eclecticism that Ferguson sets out his moral philosophy.  He begins with the 
physical study of the human body and mind followed by an understanding of the 
human soul in his discussions of pneumatics.  From this foundation in the physical 
laws which govern humans, Ferguson proceeds to the laws of morality using the 
same method.  His empirical methodology is maintained through a shift in the 
evidence used to reach conclusions.  Observation and analysis combined with active 
personal experience are the keys to discovering moral principles.  Lisa Hill has 
argued that Ferguson was attempting to discover the laws of human nature through 
empiricism and reason, thus following Epictetus, who found the philosopher‟s 
purpose to discover natural laws and to live by God‟s will.
564
  While she finds the 
impetus for Ferguson‟s adoption of empirical philosophy located in Stoic 
philosophy, Ferguson more importantly followed in the tradition of modern natural 
philosophy, and in the methods devised by the modern eclectics to create this 





Approaching Ferguson‟s relationship to his ancient sources and ancient philosophy 
necessitates an examination of his intellectual context.  Ferguson‟s perspective on 
ancient philosophy was, in part, determined by how people in the eighteenth century 
thought about classical antiquity.  Because Ferguson‟s work has been often 
connected to ancient thought by modern scholars, the importance of establishing this 
context becomes even more imperative when analysing his active engagement with 
ancient philosophy. 
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The Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns is of fundamental 
importance for Ferguson‟s relationship to antiquity.  In the Quarrel, the Ancients, 
those who argued for the relevance of classical literature in the modern context, 
developed a highly sophisticated historical outlook to maintain this position.  With 
the tools of a new understanding of the importance of the universality of human 
nature and new techniques of hermeneutics and historicism, the Ancients could 
successfully argue for the applicability of ancient literature to modern ideas and 
debates.  The Moderns had argued that due to the progress of natural philosophy 
foremost and improvements and innovations in all disciplines, the works of antiquity 
had been surpassed and therefore did not hold a place in early modern thought.  The 
Ancients acknowledged the progress of natural philosophy, but also recognised the 
importance of ancient thought and their techniques allowed them to argue this.  
Adam Ferguson took up the position of the Ancients:  he readily accepted the 
progress of natural philosophy and the writings of modern authors while maintaining 
a firm belief in the importance of ancient thought and the usefulness of ancient 
literature.  His use of historicism and the concept of human universals further 
demonstrate his position as an Ancient in this debate.  This has a significant effect 
on his relationship with his ancient sources: not only did he establish a place for 
them in his works, he assessed them as he would any source, sometimes being 
critical, sometimes laudatory, looking at them analytically.  Ferguson did not bow to 
the authority of ancient philosophy, as might be assumed by his use of it in his texts, 
but viewed it as part of the history of ideas.  This stance speaks to Ferguson‟s wider 
methodology, that of a modern eclectic. 
Modern eclecticism is a method of philosophical inquiry that relies on no 
authority, but the power of truth and reason and which draws on a number of sources 
to reach philosophical principles.  The eclectics maintained that truth can be found 
in all sources, ancient and modern, and used the writing of others as evidence to 
prove and support the observations and analysis done by individual thinkers.  
Modern eclectics have been studied mainly in the context of the German universities 
and particularly their influence on the discipline of the history of philosophy, yet 
Ferguson was well aware of these techniques.  The pervasive nature of their methods 
has been traced in many different areas and the locality of the authors most noted to 
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be eclectic does not determine their sphere of influence.  Ferguson would have been 
exposed to the methods of the eclectics not only during his visits to German 
universities during his long career as both a lecturer and private tutor, but also in his 
extensive reading of seventeenth and eighteenth-century literature.  Ferguson did 
adopt the methods of the eclectics, not only in his working of the history of 
philosophy, but in his overall approach to philosophy.  Ferguson maintained that the 
philosopher should find philosophical truth from critical observation and the 
collection of data.  Ferguson was sceptical of superstition and enthusiasm, he 
rejected all elements of dogmatism and blind obedience to an author, and maintained 
that the path to truth follows from observation and experience followed by an 
analysis of evidence. 
 The experimental method is crucial for the eclectic method in stressing both 
the importance of observation and the use of evidence for discerning philosophical 
principles.  The experimental method promoted by Bacon, Boyle and Newton 
influenced thought throughout Europe in both natural and moral philosophy.  It 
further provided thinkers with the tools to combat sectarian philosophy and disprove 
dogmatic positions.  Ferguson created his philosophical principles from this method, 
and encouraged his students to do the same, by observing nature and human 
behaviour and by reading philosophical and historical texts to find evidence to 
derive their own concepts of philosophy.  Ferguson acknowledged that 
experimentation on humans was impossible, and therefore was unable to conduct 
experiments to find the laws of morality and human nature.  To meet this challenge, 
Ferguson used a variety of texts, ancient and modern, as evidence from which he 
could discover human universals and the laws of morality.   
 Ferguson therefore uses these methods as tools to create a philosophy that is 
unique and anti-sectarian.  Ferguson also places observation, analysis, the use of 
personal reason and sentiment, at the centre of his ideas about moral choice.  
Ferguson did not expect people to follow any one system and Ferguson himself 
follows this procedure.  Ferguson, for example, discusses Stoic philosophy, but does 
not subscribe to any part of the Stoics‟ position without first testing their ideas 
according to the this method.  His conclusions may or may not have been critical of 
Stoic ideas but any Stoic element in his philosophy would have been adopted only 
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after these ideas had undergone a thorough analysis.  Ferguson does not simply 
adopt their or any other ideas into his philosophy.  He has to prove to himself and 
others that whatever ideas he does propose should have passed through this rigorous 
questioning of authority, been assessed by experience, and have survived close 
examination of the assumptions on which they were predicated.  This method can 








































III. Chapter 2: Ferguson’s Methods in Practice: 






Adam Ferguson‟s eighteenth-century intellectual context was strongly influenced by 
the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns, modern eclecticism and the 
experimental method.  This rich foundation informed Ferguson‟s understanding of 
both ancient and modern philosophy and greatly influenced his opinion of different 
authors.  Drawing on these trends, Ferguson was able to formulate his own 
methodology, one that addressed the issues raised by his contemporaries and one 
that used the techniques found in the writings of modern authors.  From the Quarrel, 
Ferguson adopted the position of the Ancients, who attempted to establish a role for 
ancient philosophy through historicism and the acceptance of human universals, 
while at the same time maintaining an aversion to blindly accepting the authority of 
specific authors.  The modern eclectics promoted a reliance on reason alone to find 
the evidence to discover true philosophical principles, which also rejected 
sectarianism and dogmatic beliefs.  These modern eclectics formulated their ideas by 
basing them on the use of reason and a critical analysis of all evidence for any 
subject.  Ferguson too adopted this view when engaging with his ancient and 
modern sources to formulate his historical and philosophical principles.  The 
experimental method, while often used to explain natural philosophy, was also 
adapted to moral philosophy and Ferguson incorporated elements of this strategy 
when addressing other topics.   
Ferguson‟s approach to philosophy and the selection of his philosophical and 
historical sources was dictated by this method.  Ferguson did not simply accept the 
authority of ancient or modern authors, as has been argued by scholars, but took 
from ancient literature what he determined to be truth.  As with the eclectics, 
Ferguson had reached philosophical conclusions of his own, and found support for 
his ideas in other authors.  His ancient sources, particularly his philosophical 
sources, are brought to bear in his works to lend weight to his theories of moral 
philosophy; they are used as evidence for points he wants to make.  Because 
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Ferguson cannot prove his beliefs about the nature of man experimentally, he relies 
on the writings of others, both ancient and modern, as evidence to build the case for 
his philosophical principles.  The ancients, therefore, are not an authority he is 
following, but, thanks to the historicist position of the Ancients, are useful examples 
from which to draw conclusions. 
One way of observing the influence of these methods is to take an in-depth 
analysis of the role that ancient philosophy plays in Ferguson‟s lectures and 
published works.  Ferguson has a particular didactic and pedagogical purpose for his 
discussion of ancient philosophy in his lectures which better explains his complex 
relationship to his ancient sources and the frequency with which they appear in his 
works.  It further proves his commitment to an anti-sectarian philosophy because of 









Ferguson was foremost a moralist attempting to create a system of moral philosophy 
which would respond to the problems found in eighteenth-century Scotland.  He 
wrote the majority of his works on moral philosophy for the benefit of his students, 
offering them a complete view of the issues raised on the topic of moral philosophy, 
by detailing various philosophical options, and then presenting his own philosophy.  
In the „Introduction‟ to his Principles of Moral and Political Science (1792) 
Ferguson acknowledged that to do this he has to draw on a variety of sources:   
There is not perhaps in this collection any leading thought, or 
principle of moment, that may not be found in the writings of others; 
and, if the author knew where, he might have been as well employed 
in pointing them out as in composing this book: But the latter is 
perhaps the easier task of the two; and, as the concurrence of many in 
the same thoughts is not a presumption of their falsehood, it is no 
reason why they should be omitted here.  The object is not novelty, 
but benefit to the student.  The Author will not neglect citing those 
who have gone before him, as often as he is sensible of having 
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borrowed his thoughts, or as often as he recollects at the moment, that 




Ferguson included ideas of others so that he could present a more complete picture 
of philosophy to his students.  In addition, Ferguson often suggested texts for further 
reading and named authors who he believed would be most beneficial to the 
education of his students.  He was careful not to force ideas upon his pupils and 
readers, but rather demonstrated to them what possible philosophical options they 
could explore on their own.  Ferguson‟s pedagogical method of referring to both 
ancient and modern thinkers in his works offered his students and readers a more 
complete picture of moral philosophy.  Although he may not consistently 
acknowledge his sources, what he provides are general guidelines from which his 
students can pursue philosophical inquiry.  This incorporation of ancient and modern 
philosophy has led some scholars to view Ferguson‟s own philosophy as being 
overly influenced by ancient philosophy, particularly by the Stoic school, and that 
Ferguson has merely adopted elements of ancient philosophy into his own.  A closer 
analysis of Ferguson‟s unpublished lecture notes and his published texts 
demonstrates that Ferguson‟s relationship to ancient philosophy is much more 
complex. 
Of all aspects of Ferguson‟s engagement with ancient philosophy, the Stoic 
school has been discussed as the most important and influential for Ferguson.  The 
significance of Stoic philosophy on Ferguson‟s concept of moral and political 
philosophy has been addressed to varying degrees; some scholars attempt to find 
specific points of Stoic influence on Ferguson while other scholars only comment on 
its supposed importance.  Although some scholars
566
 note Ferguson‟s criticism of 
the Epicurean school and his account of its relationship to Stoicism, little attention 
has been paid to his debt to ancient philosophy in general.  While the schools of 
ancient philosophy that seem to be most important for Ferguson‟s thought are the 
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Stoics and the Epicureans, he also included discussions of the Peripatetic school, as 
well as mentions of Socrates and Aristotle specifically, as well as a range of other 
thinkers.  There is a specific intellectual context which defines Ferguson‟s 
interpretation of these schools, their relationship to each other, and modern 
philosophy, and this context is the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns.  
The Quarrel began as a literary debate in the seventeenth century and centred on the 
question of authority and on doubt whether representatives of ancient Greece and 
Rome should maintain their authority over rules of style and presentation.  Theorists 
wondered if modern representatives could create their own authority having the 
benefit of learning from the ancients, but moving beyond what they had proclaimed.  
This debate remained to influence many thinkers, including Adam Ferguson, in the 
eighteenth century, particularly in the development of historicism.  Ferguson, as has 
been argued, took the side of the ancients.  Instead of adopting any ancient system, 
moreover, he advocated moving beyond their initial philosophical claims and 
formulating his own.  Furthermore, Ferguson used the experimental method and the 
methods of the eclectics to analyse the truthfulness of ancient and modern 
philosophy when creating his system.  Well-versed in the classics, Ferguson 
attempted to understand classical philosophy as a thing that had existed in the past.  
For Ferguson, it is static, it is defined, and it is something of which he could make 
use to discuss philosophical problems.  Furthermore, Ferguson took this initial 
foundation in ancient philosophy to clarify his position regarding the parameters of 
modern philosophy.   
The importance of understanding Ferguson‟s concept of ancient philosophy 
is that it better explains his complex relationship to Stoicism and leads to a different 
interpretation than has been seen in other scholarship.  Ferguson did not discuss 
Stoicism as if it existed in a vacuum – he placed it within the tradition of classical 
philosophy and thus his ideas of Stoicism cannot be understood without an 
understanding of how that school related to the others.  Because the scholarship on 
Ferguson‟s relationship to ancient philosophy has focused on Stoicism and 
Epicureanism, an incomplete account of Ferguson‟s engagement with ancient 
philosophy has been presented and by attempting to offer a balanced assessment of 
this engagement, a more complete understanding should be reached. 
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1.2 Ferguson’s Concept of Ancient Philosophy 
 
An examination of Ferguson‟s works demonstrates a complex and broad knowledge 
of ancient philosophy and, adopting the mantle of the historian of philosophy, 
Ferguson presented his students and readers with a detailed account of philosophical 
schools in their ancient context.  He examined the interconnected relationship 
between the principal ancient schools, specifically the Epicureans, the Peripatetics, 
and the Stoics, in order to teach his students about different approaches to moral 
philosophy.  Furthermore, an analysis of Ferguson‟s views on these schools reveals 
his critical opinion of them and accounts for their repeated references through his 
works.   
 Ferguson‟s lectures on Pneumatics and Moral Philosophy given at the 
University of Edinburgh (1776-1785) offer his clearest discussion of ancient 
philosophy.  These unpublished lectures are an under-used source
567
 in the 
scholarship on Ferguson, possibly due to their location at the University of 
Edinburgh and their confused organisation.
568
  Nevertheless, they contain his most 
complete presentation of the ancient schools and therefore should be examined in 
detail for a full understanding of his thought.  Following these lectures, Ferguson 
published the Institutes of Moral Philosophy (1769), an outline of the lectures which 
was intended for students to use as a textbook in conjunction with his lectures, and 
The Principles of Moral and Political Science (1792) which Ferguson published in 
his retirement as an expansion of the Institutes.  A close examination of the lectures 
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and the printed material will offer a more complete discussion of Ferguson‟s view of 
the ancient schools. 
 In the section, „Of the Progress of Moral Apprehension‟ in the Principles, 
Ferguson traced the history of moral philosophy from its humble origins to the 
advances made by thinkers such as Socrates.  He believed moral philosophy is one 
of man‟s „common interests‟; that „Men are deeply concerned to ascertain, and to 
apply the distinction of good and evil‟.
569
  From this basic starting point, all people 
attempt to set out rules of right and wrong, praise and blame, as well as of proper 
conduct
570
 and this comprises Ferguson‟s definition of moral philosophy.
571
  
Ferguson maintained that philosophers, particularly „well distinguished‟ by the 
ancients, have attempted to find a „measure of just estimation‟.
572
  While Ferguson 
addressed the topic of ancient moral philosophy, unlike other contemporary 
historians of philosophy,
573
 Ferguson did not present accounts of the lives of the 
philosophers or a history of the development of the sects and schools.  Instead, 
Ferguson focused on the principal question of defining the „Sole Good‟ and explored 
the different answers given in the surviving works of the founders or their „votaries‟.  
Ferguson states; „My object is not [to] enumerate the sects to particularize the lives 
of Individuals or state all the diversity of opinions.  But to specify the principal 




 According to Ferguson, after societies began to develop science, asking 
questions about the nature of the universe, an innovation came when Socrates 
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substituted moral philosophy for cosmology
575
 and „is said to have brought down 
philosophy from the heavens; or, to have substituted, for conjecture relating to the 
origin of worlds, the consideration of what man is more immediately concerned to 
know; the distinction of excellence and defect, of good and evil, relative to his own 
nature, and the conduct of his own affairs.‟
576
  Socrates‟ „disciples‟ included Plato, 
Antisthenes and Aristippus, and it was from these thinkers that the main sects of 
philosophy, one hundred years after Socrates, the Peripatetics, the Stoics and the 
Epicureans, respectively, developed.
577
  Ferguson further argued that all ancient 
philosophy could be reduced to the Epicureans, the Peripatetics, and the Stoics.
578
  
Ferguson acknowledged that each of these sects had „complete systems‟ of 
cosmology, physics, metaphysics and „Dialectics, as well as Morals and Politics‟.
579
  
He claimed that in physics these three main schools „almost all equally mistook their 
way‟, in logic „some of them were more successful‟, while in morals they „were 
fortunate in the state of their Questions although they differed in the manner of 
solving them.  On the Solution of this question they agreed to rest the foundations of 
moral Philosophy.‟
580
  Limiting his discussion of these schools, Ferguson focused 
his discussion on the question of the „specific good competent to human nature, that 
in which the individual can most benefit himself and his fellow creatures‟.
581
  Moral 
philosophy is based on the distinctions between good and evil and this was furthered 
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by the ancients, who stated the „chief good‟ as the moral standard.
582
  Ferguson 
recognised that he was basing his knowledge of the ancient philosophers and their 
thought on what remained in the written record, and that what has survived might 
not be complete, but was sufficient for assessing their ideas.
583
   
 Ferguson‟s discussion of the ancient schools of Epicureans, Peripatetics and 
Stoics was intentionally limited to and exclusively focused on how they defined the 
sole good and the arguments they had with each other on this topic.
584
  Ferguson 
summarised his argument in the Institutes of Moral Philosophy: 
 Socrates always stated it in the strongest terms.  According to him, 
they who prayed for riches, long life, &c. seemed to desire a throw 
of the dice, or the chance of a battle.  The Peripatetics classed 
everything that was by its nature, or use, desirable, under the 
general predicament of good.  And every thing, by its nature or 
abuse, to be shunned, under the opposite predicament of evil.  The 
Stoics maintained, that nothing was to be classed under the 
predicament of good, but what was at all times invariably to be 
chosen.  That nothing was to be classed under the predicament of 
evil, but was at all times invariable to be shunned, or rejected: That 
to all that good which ought at any time to be rejected, or that evil 
which ought any time to be chose, was not only absurd in terms, 
but tended to weaken the resolution with which a man ought 
always to make his choice.  The Epicureans substituted the term 





In the Lectures, Ferguson began with the Epicureans who „limited the 
appellation of good to Enjoyment or pleasure‟,
586
 but, while animal sense and 
physical gratification were the main sources for pleasure, they could be remembered 
and felt without any actual sensual gratification, thus demonstrating that the 
Epicurean philosophy was not pure hedonism.  Also, they believed that men were 
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happier when in „retirement from Public cares or the Affairs of State‟.
587
  According 
to Ferguson, Epicurus maintained that all things, including personal qualities and 
external circumstances, were awarded value which was based on the enjoyment or 
suffering they produced.
588
  Not all pleasures and pains were equal, however.  Some 
pleasures should be avoided because of the amount of pain that results from them, 
such as the headache after a night of heavy drinking, and some pains should be 
endured in recognition of the long-term pleasure that results, such as the pain of the 
dentist‟s chair which relieves a toothache.  The greatest pleasure actually comes 
from a „uniform state of mind‟ resulting from controlled emotions.  Furthermore, 
according to Ferguson, the Epicureans found that „rational enjoyments‟, produced by 
virtue (i.e., „The Enjoyment of a Good Conscience. The pleasure of Benevolence.  
The Serenity of the Temperate The Intrepidity of the Brave.‟)  made them happier 
than any physical pleasure‟.
589
  Ferguson continued: „What one termed the Pleasures 
of the mind are preferable to those of the body And the Pleasures of Wisdom and 
Virtue the Supreme measure of happiness.  That the perfect or wise man possessed 
of wisdom must be happy in the absence of every other cause of Pleasure and even 
in the midst of every accidental cause of pain even in the Bull of Phalaris.‟
590
  The 
opponents of this system found fault in the concept of defining good as pleasure; the 
first school which opposed this view that Ferguson addressed were the Peripatetics. 
The Peripatetics, according to Ferguson, were different from the Epicureans 
because they viewed the „Sole Good‟ as consisting of virtue, pleasure and 
prosperity.  They believed external circumstances were important for a person‟s 
happiness, and also that pleasure could be the source of happiness, but maintained 
that virtue should always be preferred over any other consideration.
591
  Their main 
criticism of the Epicureans was that the term „pleasure‟ was ambiguous and, while 
the Epicureans equated pleasure with virtue, this new terminology was „commonly 
taken in a bad sense‟, allowing people to prefer sensual pleasure to rational 




 Ibid., ff. 149.  
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  The Peripatetics, as Ferguson noted, worried that „good‟ defined as 
„pleasure‟ would always outweigh the choice of virtue when compared with easy 
and passing sensual gratification.
593
  The Peripatetics believed that if people thought 
that pleasure, specifically sensual pleasure, was the Sole Good, there would be no 
impetus for performing virtuous acts because people would believe that physical 
pleasure was easier and more satisfying.  Ferguson continued by arguing that the 
Peripatetics countered this system by demonstrating that for people to find „true 
pleasure‟ they should choose what is „excellent and worthy‟ and avoid what is „base 
and unworthy‟.  Furthermore, to be happy, „We should be told to study the good 
Qualities of our Nature and that Pleasure will follow.  To shun its depravity and that 
shame and Remorse and despair And Malice and Envy and hatred and discontent 
will Remain at a Distance from us.‟
594
  Thus, the Peripatetics, to counteract the ideas 
of the Epicureans, defined the sole good as leading a virtuous, active and good life 
in the context of a prosperous and happy life following Aristotle‟s maxim, „A Proper 
exertion of the Mind in a life of Prosperity‟.  Virtue leads to the greatest happiness, 
but prosperity or external advantage can also lead people to be happy, although 
virtue should always be chosen over these other considerations.
595
  While Ferguson 
thought this was a worthy definition of virtue, he was also critical of the fact that 
they believed possessions were central to a person‟s happiness.
596
  Ferguson follows 
the discussion of the Peripatetics with his discussion of the Stoics, who are also 
critical of the ideas of both the Peripatetics and the Epicureans. 
The Stoics agreed with the Peripatetics in their criticisms of the Epicureans, 
but they disagreed with the idea that pleasure and external circumstances should be 
considered good.
597
  According to Ferguson, the Stoics took an extreme view of 
what should be considered the sole good by limiting good or right to virtue, and evil 
or wrong to vice, that anything else was „indifferent‟, and that actively to choose 
good was to be happy.  Furthermore, they believed intentions and actions were more 
important than outcomes because all one could control was one‟s own mind and 
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everything else was left to providence.
598
  When discussing the nature of the soul, 
Ferguson stated: „Plato conceived that the spirit came from the storehouse of 
Intelligent natures and returned thither.  The Stoics that it was a spark from the 




 Ferguson further stated that the Stoics criticised the Peripatetics because the 
Stoics did not believe that anything that should not always be chosen should be 
considered good, that what is good is always good, and whatever is considered bad 
or wrong is never to be considered good.  When the Peripatetics allowed that 
pleasures or possessions could be good some of the time, the Stoics saw this as 
misleading and believed that only what was always to be chosen should be 
considered good, that being virtue.
600
  Pleasure and virtue were not actually 
comparable and therefore could not both be termed good and this ultimately 
resolved any confusion as to which choice was best.  Additionally, personal qualities 
or external circumstances should always be valued for its „fitness to furnish a scene 
for the exercise of virtue‟,
601
 and all questions of valuation depended upon their 
relationship to virtue. 
 In this examination of these school, Ferguson did not address the entirety of 
their systems, instead he limited his explication to their ideas on the greatest good.  
Part of this analysis included a very detailed comparison between the Peripatetics 
and the Stoics
602
 because they criticised each other in their ideological reaction to 
the Epicureans on specific points and then could criticise the other school on similar 
points.
603
  He also examined the similarities between these three schools which 
ultimately allowed Ferguson to present ancient philosophy as a concrete structure or 
model.  One of the main similarities was their method of explaining their philosophy 
using the representative figure of the „wise man‟, or a „perfect character‟.
604
  This 
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model as well as others opened up these three schools to criticism from each other as 
well as philosophers and contemporary and modern critics.  Specifically, the 
Epicureans and the Stoics were ridiculed in particular for being highly paradoxical, a 
fault Ferguson finds with some of the later thinkers in these schools.  The paradox of 
the Epicureans was that while they maintained that happiness was defined by 
pleasure, their „wise man‟ could be happy while enduring physical pain.  The 
paradox of the Stoics was that although they were meant to be virtuous, benevolent 
and socially minded, their „wise man‟ could be happy in the destruction of his 
country or in the suffering of a friend.
605
   
 Ferguson‟s analysis of the differences between these schools can be reduced 
to a „question of Arrangement and Classification rather than a question of Fact, or 
even a question of choice‟.  This was the case because all schools eventually 
admitted that virtue led to the best kind of happiness and invariably should be 
chosen, it was the definitions and terms used to find this virtuous conclusion which 
led to their differences.
606
  Furthermore, Ferguson maintained that the Stoics and the 
Epicureans were the extremes of these cases and that the Peripatetics lay somewhere 
in between and this position gave the Peripatetics cause to criticise both the 
Epicureans and the Stoics, but he also acknowledged that the Stoics appeared 
successfully to refute those criticisms.
607
  Ferguson concluded that the Peripatetics 
were most similar to common opinion and appeared to promise „integrity and Good 
Sense‟.  The Epicureans, whose opinions could lead to moral corruption, 
„suppressed affection and public spirit, and sunk the Pretensions of human Nature‟.  
The Stoics „raised the Courage the affections the love of mankind and were 
supposed to form the school of Heroes‟, but this also meant that they raised the aims 
and abilities of human nature out of the reach of most people.
608
 
 Ferguson finished his discussion of these schools by crucially comparing 
how the objectives of his university course related to them.  He stated that the 
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ancient philosophers „disputed‟ what was to be considered the „Sole Good‟, but this 
was not his aim.  Ferguson wanted to determine what is „best‟, demonstrate what is 
good and evil, and show what should guide moral choice.
609
  Ferguson was not 
attempting to copy the ancient thinkers in his lectures because he was not forcing a 
definition of the „Sole Good‟ onto his students, but was demonstrating means with 
which his students could make moral choices and believed that looking for the „chief 
good‟ would actually make him more successful than the ancients in discussing 
morality.
610
  Ferguson distanced himself further from these schools and maintained 
that he was not attempting to adopt the philosophy of any of these sects, but 
recognised the usefulness of employing the language of the Stoics in the explanation 
of his philosophical ideas: 
As our object is not the same as theirs; to ascertain a Sole Good 
exclusive of every other consideration But to Ascertain what is 
best for mankind, the comparison on which we are  going to enter 
may not lead us to embrace the Doctrine of either Sect.  When we 
shall have ascertained what is best it will be  wise to adhere to it as 
the sole good And the Language of Zeno tho not less paradoxical 




 This explanation of his relationship to the ancient schools of philosophy is 
crucial for understanding his opinion of the ancient schools, his own philosophy, and 
the motivation for incorporating them into his philosophical discussions.  Here, 
Ferguson declared that he was not following any sect, including the Stoics, a 
statement he famously echoes in the „Introduction‟ to the Principles of Moral and 
Political Science: 
The Author, in some of the statements which follow, may be 
thought partial to the Stoic philosophy; but is not conscious of 
having warped the truth to suit with any system whatever.  His 
notions were taken up, where certainly Truth might be learned, 
however little it were formed into system by those from whom it 
was collected...If his inquiries led him to agree with the tenets that 
were held by a sect of philosophers about two thousand years ago, 
he is the more confirmed in his notion; notwithstanding the name 
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These two pieces of evidence prove that, at the very least, Ferguson was not 
adhering to any one system of philosophy.  Ferguson did not follow their definitions 
of the sole good, but set out to determine its definition for himself based on his 
considerations of what is best for mankind.  In stating that the „Language of Zeno‟ is 
„Safer‟ to use, Ferguson is neither saying that he agreed with the Stoics nor that he 
will adopt Stoicism, but that the language they use in describing the sole good is the 
most appropriate and useful when dealing with the topics of morality.  This also 
proves that Ferguson employed the methods of the eclectics because he employed 
the foundations laid in ancient philosophy, examined them, but improves upon them 
with his personal philosophy.  Ferguson drew upon the thought of the ancients to 
articulate his own ideas and used the same words and phrases so that his students 
and readers were presented with moral philosophy in a language and with 
terminology with which they were already familiar. 
 The presentation of the Epicureans, the Peripatetics and the Stoics in this 
way also enabled Ferguson to establish a philosophical framework for his moral 
philosophy.  Ferguson defined all philosophy by their relationship to these schools 
and therefore conceived of moral philosophical questions in reference to them.  He 
identified Epicureanism and Stoicism as the extremes of philosophy, Epicureanism 
representing the worst of all philosophies because of its corrupting nature, and 
Stoicism as the extreme of good philosophy, which is unfortunately too perfect for 
people to follow.
613
  Ferguson claimed there were other sects that attempted to „find 
a middle way between these two extremes‟, but those schools only differed in the 
amount they resembled these „opposite systems‟.
614
  In the lectures, the three schools 
are presented together in this introductory discussion to demonstrate the extremity of 
the Epicureans and the Stoics and the middle ground the Peripatetics occupy.   
                                                 
612
 P.I., 7-8.  In the statement Ferguson argues that his ideas are said to be Stoic, but that he has not 
intentionally adopted them into his system.  This statement is often used by scholars to prove that 
Ferguson was actually admitting his Stoicism, but taking this statement with the previous one their 
interpretation of Ferguson‟s words becomes more problematic. 
613
 P.II., 82.  „This may well be considered as a degree of perfection, far raised above the ordinary 
state of human nature: It is, nevertheless, that, for which it was given, a noble idea, upon which the 
ingenuous mind cannot too nearly form itself.‟ 
614
 History, 180. 
 161 
 Ferguson intentionally presented these two schools as the extremes of 
philosophy in between which all other schools fall; therefore, his view that 
Epicureanism was necessarily corrupting and Stoicism was absolutely virtuous is 
best viewed in these absolute terms.  This is Ferguson‟s most fundamental 
conception of philosophy.  Because these are the two extremes of philosophy, 
Ferguson would not want to adopt either; he believed people should practice 
philosophy that is moderate, between extremes.  Thus, Ferguson would not think of 
himself as a Stoic or an Epicurean because those extremes are unattainable or 
harmful and should be avoided.  This then explains Ferguson‟s concept of ancient 
philosophy, although the dichotomy between the Stoics and the Epicureans is 
actually most important for Ferguson‟s thought and hence the relationship between 
these two schools needs to be examined more closely in order to determine his 
opinion of them and their function in his thought. 
 
 
1.3 Stoics and Epicureans: Philosophical Opposites 
  
When dealing with all aspects of his moral philosophy, Ferguson made constant 
reference to the ancient schools.  He used Stoicism and Epicureanism, and to a lesser 
extent Socratic, Platonic and Peripatetic thought, to ground his discussions of moral 
questions in the history of philosophy.  Ferguson characterised Stoicism and 
Epicureanism as being diametrically opposed and he implemented this model of the 
Stoics versus the Epicureans as a valuable didactic tool; this is the framework 
Ferguson developed to teach his students about morality.  The two extremes of 
Stoicism and Epicureanism demonstrated the two extremes of philosophy as a 
framework or a foundation for all moral questions, a foundation of which his 
students would have been well aware.  Ferguson is not the only person to conceive 
of these schools as being extreme opposites; he is in fact following in a long 
tradition which dates back to antiquity and was maintained through to the eighteenth 
century.
615
  He presented Epicurean ethics as the opposite of a virtuous life and 
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considers those in antiquity who practised Epicurean philosophy to have 
misconceptions about the ultimate nature of humanity because Epicureanism always 
leads to corruption and selfishness.  In opposition to this school, he placed Stoicism, 
which he presented as always leading to virtue.  In Ferguson‟s mind moral 
philosophy exists along a spectrum where Epicureanism at one end is the least 
virtuous of all philosophies, while at the other end Stoicism is the most virtuous and 
all other philosophies fall in between.  This positive presentation of Stoic thought, 
however, does not make Ferguson a Stoic and does not necessitate that Stoicism is 
the philosophy which should be taken up as a way of life.  Ferguson is critical of 
Stoic philosophy in several instances, but uses their concept of virtue to explain to 
his students what is the most virtuous choice.  The divide between the Stoics and the 
Epicureans represents a paradigm Ferguson implements in his teaching so that 
students better understand their philosophical choices.  This presentation of a Stoic 
and Epicurean dichotomy in Ferguson‟s work appears more regularly than any other 
discussion of ancient philosophy.
616
  It is drawn upon repeatedly in all of Ferguson‟s 
main works and is evidenced in his politics as well.   
 Ferguson believed that Epicureans, Peripatetics and Stoics were the most 
important schools of ancient philosophy; his discussion mainly addressed only the 
extremes of the Stoic and Epicurean philosophy.  The Stoics believed the chief good 
was virtue, while the Epicureans believed it was pleasure.  Although they made this 
distinction, the Epicureans did not maintain that all pleasure was equal and could not 
claim virtue was not pleasurable, thereby conceding the positions of the Stoics.  This 
was one point in which the two schools agreed: virtue was pleasurable and virtue 
was „the only secure and true source of enjoyment‟.  Ferguson, however, maintained 
the schools defined the term „virtue‟ differently: 
 Though to both it was a state of tranquillity and exemption from 
fear and sorrow, this exemption was supposed by the one to be 
obtained by a seclusion from care, and by indifference to all the 
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concerns of mankind, whether private or public.  By the other, 
virtue was supposed to consist in the affectionate performance of 
every good office towards their fellow creatures, and in full 
resignation to providence for every thing independent of their own 
choice.
617
   
 
Ferguson demonstrated that the Epicureans reached a tranquil state by removing 
themselves from society, while the Stoics embraced their active role and the truth of 
providence.  These notions also affected their views on religion.  Ferguson admitted 
that the Epicureans, „when urged in argument by their opponents, made some 
concessions in religion, and many more in morality‟.  They believed in the gods, but 
thought that they had no connection to human life.  The Epicureans believed „the 
deity was a retired essence enjoying itself, and far removed from any work of 
creation or providence‟, while the Stoics saw God as a benevolent „intelligent 
principle of existence‟ who brought order to the universe, gave men goodness, free 
will, and the knowledge of providence, which men learn to follow.
618
  
 According to Ferguson, as a result of these principles, the Epicureans 
„recommended seclusion from all the cares of family or state‟, while the Stoics 
„recommended an active part in all the concerns of our fellow-creatures, and the 
steady exertion of a mind, benevolent, courageous, and temperate‟.  Consequently, 
they believed that „All good was private‟ and this focus on solitary, private lives 
rather than any form of society, including family, meant that followers of this 
philosophy thought only of personal pleasure and this was a corruption and 
„licentiousness, both in morality and religion‟.
619
  Ferguson believed this affected 
people‟s choices in life and their conduct.  Because Epicureans withdrew from 
society, Ferguson believed, „The Epicurean was a deserter from the cause of his 
fellow-creatures, and might justly be reckoned a traitor to the community of nature, 
of mankind, and even of his country, to which he owed his protection.‟
620
  
Essentially, the Epicureans denied providence; they reduced all moral questions to 
considerations of pleasure and pain and „Every man‟s pleasure was to himself the 
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supreme rule of estimation and of action‟
621
 and they also believed that the truest 
pleasure was to be found in virtue, a pleasure that could be felt even during physical 
pain.
622
  The problem with this philosophy is that the average person, who might 
adopt it, would be apt to choose physical pleasure over virtue because the basic 
definitions of the Epicurean philosophy focus on pleasure, even if, when pressed, 
they admit pleasure comes from virtue, and this misleading aspect ends in corruption 
and vileness.  Because the Epicureans equate virtue as the best choice of pleasure, 
Ferguson believed they ignore the „specific sentiments of a conscience and elevation 
of mind‟ and allow for vice and criminality to be seen as mere mistakes in choice 
rather than actual evils of human nature.
623
  It is noteworthy that Ferguson attempts 
to find redeeming qualities in this school even though it is so different from his own 
views, demonstrating his commitment to writing an accurate history of philosophy 
for this school that goes beyond his personal bias.  The Stoics, on the other hand, 
acted as a „willing instrument‟ for God and for the good of others.  The activity and 
performance of duties constituted pleasure and defined benevolent actions.  These 
considerations, he thought, are the most important question any person can answer, 
but the effects of misapprehension of good and evil could lead to dire 
consequences.
624
  Therefore, Ferguson needed both schools, set up as a contrast to 
each other, to both define each other and to demonstrate the importance of having 
the correct understanding of the distinctions of good and evil.  
 In the Institutes of Moral Philosophy and The Principles of Moral and 
Political Science, Ferguson constructs a picture of philosophy in which these 
schools are polar opposites and all other philosophical ideas are judged in relation to 
them.  He incorporates this distinction of ideas into his general definition of 
morality, stating that these philosophers teach two different approaches to human 
action.  The Epicureans aim to „refer our actions, and to limit our views, to private 
separate gratifications; to court an exemption from care and solicitude on the 
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concerns of other men; and to fill up the moments of life with the least possible 
trouble or avocation from our own personal state and enjoyments.‟
625
  This view 
goes against man‟s actual nature, which „seems to require that we seek for the 
interesting scenes of human life; that we consider our own, and the cause of 
mankind, as common; that we consider our sociable dispositions as the better part of 
ourselves; and that we willingly seize the occasions which exercise the powers of a 
wise and beneficent mind.‟
626
  Ferguson illustrates his point by comparing men to 
sailors on a ship: if one person does not perform his duties and relies on the work of 
others the ship will not function.
627
 
This does not mean however that Ferguson embraces Stoic moral 
philosophy.  The complex nature of his views of the two schools is evident in the 
section „Of Opinions productive of Misery, or that hinder Improvement‟.
628
  
Although at the outset of this discussion Ferguson references Epictetus and Marcus 
Aurelius as his sources, he is critical of both Stoicism and Epicureanism when 
discussing why people are unhappy.  Ferguson states: 
It is unhappy to lay the pretensions of human nature so low as to 
check its exertions.  It is unhappy to entertain notions of what men 
actually are, so high, as upon trial to incur disappointment, disgust, 
or despair of virtue.  It is unhappy to rest our own choice of good 





One of the common objections to Stoicism is that the ends of its philosophy are 
unattainable by most people; and Ferguson makes this same point.  Ferguson 
believes it is best to have a definition of morality which leads people to improve 
themselves, but that placing the bar too high only leads to unhappiness.  When 
Ferguson considers the causes of misery, he finds that both Stoicism and 
Epicureanism have negative aspects.    
  In his account of Stoicism, Ferguson differentiates specific points where 
Stoics and Epicureans are at greatest odds.  Unlike the Epicureans, the Stoics 
believed in providence and that a correct choice between right and wrong, rather 
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than pleasure, determines human happiness.  He also notes that the Stoics believed 
virtuous qualities were good for the individual as well as the public and „there is no 
private good separate from the public good‟.  Someone who is virtuous in the Stoic 
definition will be happy because the characteristics of virtue are the best of human 
nature.  In his definition of Stoic philosophy, Ferguson makes an explicit 
comparison to the Epicureans when he states:  
the Epicureans mistook human nature when they supposed all its 
principles resolvable into appetites for pleasure, or aversion to 
pain; that honour and dishonour, excellence and defect, were 
considerations which not only led to much nobler ends, but which 
were of much greater power in commanding the human will; the 
love of pleasure was grovelling and vile, was the source of 
dissipation and of sloth; the love of excellence and honour was 
aspiring and noble, and led to the greatest exertions and the highest 
attainments of our nature.
630
     
 
Ferguson, therefore, defined Stoicism as the opposite of Epicureanism.  Yet the 
juxtaposition of these two schools also demonstrates their interconnectedness, 
because Ferguson defined Stoicism and Epicureanism in reference to each other.  
The schools are presented together and this inherent connection means that they are 
intellectually linked in his historical interpretation.  Because Ferguson sees 
Epicureanism as leading to corruption and self-interestedness on the one hand and 
Stoicism as leading to improvement and virtue, he presents them together.  The 
point presenting them as opposites is to give examples of the kind of ideas which 
lead to these two extremes.  Ferguson is not, by this reasoning, choosing Stoicism as 
the correct philosophy, but presenting these two schools as two sides of the great 
coin of philosophy and they cannot be separated from each other. 
 One of Ferguson‟s most explicit examples of this comparison of schools lies 
in his History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic, in which he 
discussed this topic in great detail.  There Ferguson analysed some of the causes 
leading to the end of the republic and the foundation of the empire, specifically the 
moral implications of these philosophical schools for the politics at the end of the 
republic.  He claimed people admire the Roman empire because it appears to have 
been successful and wealthy, „but the greatness we admire in this case, was ruinous 
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to the virtue and the happiness of mankind; it was found to be inconsistent with all 
the advantages which that conquering people had formerly enjoyed in the articles of 
government and manners‟.
631
  Ferguson traced the effects of the Epicurean and Stoic 
schools to Greek and Roman history and claimed that it was the corrupting forces of 
the Epicureans which brought an end to the Roman republic.
632
  Lisa Hill has argued 
that Ferguson believed, like Montesquieu and Rousseau, that corruption can be a 
result of prosperous nations and that the decline of the Roman republic „was 
traceable to the moral corruption engendered by the decline of Stoicism and the 
popularity of Epicureanism‟.
633
   
 In his History, Ferguson traced the fall of the Roman Republic to the 
influence of Epicureanism, which was a problem because it turned virtue into a 
private and a relative issue, and therefore the decline in morals both of state leaders, 
i.e., Julius Caesar, and the people led to the fall of the government.  In the History, 
Ferguson also pits Epicureanism against Stoicism and it is seen as a battle between 
self-interest and public virtue on a grand scale.  Sher identifies this fascination with 
ancient Rome and its decline by Ferguson and many others in the Scottish 
Enlightenment as a reflection of concerns about their own society.
634
 
Ferguson claimed that the philosophy of these ancient schools was 
„communicated‟ to Rome, where philosophy was adopted because philosophies were 
seen as fashionable ornaments and worn like a diamond among the high ranking 
members of society: „Emperors make it their Pastime Men of Business the Rule of 
their Conduct.  And they took their sect as we take our Professions in Religion.‟
635
  
Tracing both Epicurean and Stoic philosophy from their Greek origins and following 
the work of Cicero, he claimed Greek philosophy had become fashionable during 
the end of the republic, as well as being a staple of Roman education.
636
  He claimed 
that Epicureanism was popular at the end of the Roman republic when a high level 
of „National prosperity made people believe there was no occasion for Virtue‟, while 
Stoicism „prevailed with men of Ingenious minds after the Fall of the Roman 
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Republic because men of this disposition became Sensible of the necessity of 
Virtue‟ and these men employed Stoic ideas to counteract the corruption left by the 
Epicureans.
637
  Ferguson claimed the people of Rome, enjoying the rewards of their 
virtuous, Stoic predecessors, had given into a life of pleasure and adopted Epicurean 
philosophy.  Those who followed Stoic philosophy during the republic were 
concerned with justice and the well-being of others.
638
  Even though the empire was 
corrupt it could not diminish the strength of this philosophy from all people because 
some remained concerned with public matters and formal justice.  Augustus himself 
attempted to retain the codes of Roman law which remained intact throughout the 
empire, while all other arts and elements of politics declined.
639
 
  In his History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic, 
Ferguson reasoned that one of the factors leading to the end of the republic was the 
influence of Caesar in particular on the politics of the time.
640
  Ferguson advanced 
the argument that Caesar was influenced by Epicureanism, which was the cause of 
the vice that Caesar brought into the minds of his countrymen and eventually led to 
the end of the republic and the beginning of the empire.  Ferguson laid moral blame 
on Caesar the Epicurean for this historical event - the end of the republic and the 
origin of the empire - and by portraying it as a moral issue he was able to find a 
Stoic champion who fought for the ideals of the republic in the figure of Cato.  
When he used these same schools to discuss the difference between Caesar and 
Cato, he created a philosophical divide between the two men to explain history, thus 
invoking his concept of two schools:  „Caesar is said to have embraced the doctrines 
of Epicurus; Cato those of Zeno.  The first, in compliance with fashion, or from the 
bias of an original temper.  The other, from the force of conviction, as well as from 
the predilection of a warm and ingenuous mind.‟
641
  Ferguson characterised Cato as 
Caesar‟s „opponent‟,
642
 but found that Cato and Caesar had similar qualities.  They 
both were courageous and intelligent; but Caesar used his virtues to attain his 
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personal ambition, while Cato did so to pursue questions of moral philosophy.
643
  
Additionally, although Caesar chose to follow Epicurus, he could have been a Stoic 
because of his „vigorous efforts and active exertions for the attainment of his 
ends‟.
644
  Ferguson continued to characterise them by their sects in discussing their 
actions toward the state, stating that „Cato endeavoured to preserve the order of civil 
government, however desperate, because this was the part it became him to act, and 
in which he chose to live and to die‟, thereby identifying Cato‟s adherence to 
providence and devotion to the civic order.  By contrast, „Caesar proposed to 
overturn it; because he wished to dispose of all the wealth and honours of the state at 
his own pleasure‟,
645
 demonstrating that Caesar was more concerned with his 
personal ambition and pleasure than upholding a just form of government.  One 
further example illustrates Ferguson‟s opinion of ambition: he claimed Cato and 
Antoninus had ambition to emulate God, which he judged as the „highest measures 
of personal worth‟, while Caesar‟s „vile‟ ambition was to „reduce his fellow-citizens 
and equals, to hold their lives and fortunes at his discretion‟.  Although Caesar was 
an Epicurean, he was still an admirable man who led an active and productive life.  
This adoption of Epicureanism led to the ultimate downfall of Rome, corrupting first 
Caesar and eventually the republic.  The Romans lost the Stoic virtues which had 
made them great and replaced them with Epicurean indulgence; Caesar fell prey to 
the fashion of Epicureanism and brought down the whole republic with him.  
 
 
1.4 Conclusion: Further Implications of Ferguson’s Concepts of Ancient 
Philosophy 
 
Ferguson‟s reliance on ancient philosophy in his teaching and writing demonstrates 
an extensive knowledge of the topic as well as a complex relationship with his 
sources.  On the one hand, Ferguson used ancient philosophy to present the history 
of philosophy to his students.  When addressing the three schools which he argues 
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represent all philosophy, his comparison of their definitions of the „Sole Good‟ and 
assessment of their criticism of each other was used to begin his lectures on the topic 
of how to determine what is best and how to make moral choices.  On the other 
hand, in order to teach the basic premises of philosophy, Stoicism and Epicureanism 
are presented as opposite philosophies, where Epicureanism is clearly defined as bad 
and Stoicism is defined as good, the Peripatetics are mainly left out of the discussion 
because they do not prove to be extreme philosophical examples.  To this end, Lisa 
Hill has noted, „Epicureanism taught people prodigality, described a Godless world 
governed by chance, reduced morality to hedonism and taught that “all good was 
private”....Conversely the cures for the ills of modern times lay in the teachings of 
Stoicism.‟
646
  While this appears to be Ferguson‟s motivation in designing this 
construction of a philosophical dichotomy, it actually does not take Ferguson‟s view 
of Stoicism or his individual philosophy into account.  It would be a valid 
assumption to look at his presentation of Stoicism in this context as the solution to 
an Epicurean problem, but this is not the case.  Ferguson was not suggesting that 
Stoicism is the answer; in fact, he proposes his own solution to the problems arising 
from Epicurean ideas.   
In his Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), Ferguson discussed 
human happiness and the effect of self-interest or virtue on appetites.  He states: 
„The division of our appetites into benevolent and selfish, has probably, in some 
degree, helped to mislead our apprehension on the subject of personal enjoyment 
and private good; and our zeal to prove that virtue is disinterested, has not greatly 
promoted the cause.‟
647
  Here, he acknowledges that his discussion has been divided 
into two parts: self-interest (Epicureanism) and beneficence (Stoicism).  Ferguson 
was aware that in his limiting the definition of happiness to either an Epicurean or 
Stoic definition could misrepresent the actual conclusion he was trying to reach.  
The confusion could arise from the fact that in Ferguson‟s opposition to 
Epicureanism, it appeared that he argued that pleasure was evil, which is not the 
case.  He believes pleasure is good, by definition if nothing else; that any 
gratification is pleasurable; and „high-quality‟ pleasures have more value than 
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others.  Furthermore, pleasure is not simply self-interested because one can 
experience pleasure in making others happy, for instance.  If this is the case, that 
pleasure can be good, Ferguson is not agreeing with the Stoics.  He is mindful of the 
fact that his use of the Stoic/Epicurean paradigm may lead people to believe he is a 
Stoic, but he demonstrates that he is not.  As Ferguson stated himself, he does not 
attempt to adopt the ideas of one sect or another.  Ferguson is most interested in 
truth and if one thinker or school, either ancient or modern, writes something 
Ferguson believes himself to be true, Ferguson references it in his writing.  In this 
way, Ferguson was following in the eighteenth-century context of modern 
eclecticism.  Modern eclecticism attempted to create philosophy based on the search 
for truth, used reason to assess ideas, in conjunction with a thinker‟s own ideas.  
They used these ideas in conjunction with the experimental method not only to 
prove the truth of specific principles, but to argue against sectarian philosophy.  This 
is exactly how Ferguson approached philosophy.  He had beliefs about morality, 
human nature and what is best for individuals and used these ideas to assess the 
philosophy of others.   
 Ferguson‟s use of ancient philosophy, be it Stoic, Epicurean or Peripatetic, 
created a foundation for his moral philosophy.  This was employed to teach his 
students about moral philosophy by presenting ancient philosophy as a basic 
framework of philosophical possibilities, either good or bad.  Ferguson did not 
define his own philosophy by the mandates of these schools, but placed himself in 
relation to them.  It then becomes clear that Ferguson did not adopt Stoic 
philosophy, but employed it to place his ideas in the context of the history of 
philosophy.  Ferguson also had a didactic purpose to demonstrate how to spread 




Ferguson‟s division of Stoicism and Epicureanism was also used to 
understand the history of the Roman republic.  Because Ferguson carried the 
argument of the effects of these two philosophies in to his analysis of history, it is 
clear that Ferguson‟s moral philosophy also affected his concept of other topics.  
Equating Cato and Caesar to Stoicism and Epicureanism not only gave an historical 
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example of the effects of these philosophies, it also helped to determine Ferguson‟s 
interpretation of historical events.  Ferguson did this in his eighteenth-century 
context as well in his reaction to the ideas proposed by Bernard Mandeville in the 
Fable of the Bees (1715, followed by numerous editions).  Ferguson criticised 
Bernard Mandeville, whom he identifies as an Epicurean, for presenting misleading 
discussions of morality.  He also believes that Mandeville denies „the reality of 
moral distinctions‟ and ridicules the fact that real morality exists.  He claims 
Mandeville‟s aim is to „pretend to detect the fraud by which moral restraints have 
been imposed‟.
649
  For Ferguson, Mandeville‟s assertion that pride is a virtuous 
quality is derived from an incorrect usage of the word.  Ferguson goes on to criticise 
Mandeville‟s principles in more general terms, through his works which can be seen 
as a general attack on eighteenth-century Epicureanism.  Ferguson believes that 
since man wants to fulfil his desires he can often be fooled into thinking that sensual 
gratification is the most important result:  „It arises from the principles of self-
preservation in the human frame; but it is a corruption, or at least a partial result, of 
those principles, and is upon many accounts very improperly termed self-love.‟
650
  
The pursuit of self-love leads to people forgetting the better qualities of men and 
creates a being completely focused on self-interest.  It is perhaps the worst offence 
to Ferguson to forego completely benevolence and kindness to others.
651
  In this 
condemnation of absolute selfishness, Ferguson is demonstrating that this is how he 
understands eighteenth-century Epicureanism and his absolute opposition to it.  Lisa 
Hill argued that Ferguson‟s objections to Epicureanism are in fact a reaction against 
modern „liberalism‟.  Because this Epicreuanism „celebrated the comforts, political 
calm and softening manners that progress brought with it‟, Ferguson feared the 
effects of Epicureanism on his society and the negative consequences which it 
brought about for the Roman Republic and instead focused on civic virtue.
652
  Here, 
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Ferguson not only employed the dichotomy of the Stoics and the Epicureans to 
understand moral philosophy, or to understand history, but also to understand his 
contemporary society. 
This chapter has attempted to assess Ferguson‟s relationship to ancient 
philosophy and has shown that Ferguson has a complex understanding of the ancient 
schools and their place in his thought.  He offered a discussion of ancient philosophy 
to his students as a tool to teach them about philosophical perspectives.  He created a 
Stoic/Epicurean paradigm to demonstrate the extremes of moral possibilities.  He 
employed this paradigm also to understand history and his contemporary society.  
This wider view of Ferguson‟s relationship to ancient philosophy, and Stoicism 
more specifically, calls into question the claims that have been made by numerous 
scholars attempting to understand this complicated relationship and demonstrates 
that Ferguson cannot be seen as the „Scottish Cato‟.  A further investigation into 
Ferguson‟s moral philosophy will illustrate that Ferguson indeed does not follow the 
Stoic school, but has a moral philosophy which is unique, creative and important in 
































The importance of Stoicism for Ferguson‟s moral philosophy has received much 
attention from a variety of scholars such as Jane Bush Fagg, David Kettler and Lisa 
Hill.  One significant difference between this study and previous explanations of 
Ferguson‟s thought is that close attention has been paid here to Ferguson‟s own, 
very specific, understanding of Stoicism.  In this chapter, Ferguson‟s definition of 
Stoicism will be assessed in relation to his moral philosophy and it is in this way that 
Ferguson‟s actual relationship to Stoicism can better be understood.  Stoicism is 
important in Ferguson‟s political theory and the notion of civic virtue dominates 
much of Ferguson‟s thought as has been demonstrated by J.G.A. Pocock and a 
number of other scholars.  Ferguson‟s moral philosophy is the foundation of his 
wider philosophy and the question of the influence of Stoic ethics on Ferguson‟s 
ideas of morality must be firmly established before proceeding to an evaluation of 
Ferguson‟s debt to ancient authors, especially the Stoics. 
 Ferguson‟s moral philosophy is central in his four main works: The Institutes 
of Moral Philosophy, The Essay on the History of Civil Society, The History of the 
Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic, and the Principles of Moral and 
Political Science Vol. 1 and Vol. 2.  Ferguson had specific reasons for writing each 
book and had a particular readership in mind in each case.  The Institutes and the 
Principles were produced with the express purpose of instructing his students at the 
University of Edinburgh.
653
  They represented printed versions of his lectures and 
therefore document what he taught his students.
654
  Their purpose was practical: they 
were to instruct his students about how to live a virtuous life.  Religion and 
jurisprudence dominated these discussions.   
 In the Essay, on the other hand, Ferguson was writing to publish his research 
about civil society; its history, its foundations, and the proper way to live in a 
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society.  Having civil society as the focus of the book determined how he would 
present ideas about morality and virtue.  In the Essay Ferguson approached moral 
philosophy in a different manner to the way he had done in the lectures, establishing 
its connections to behaviour in society.  Although it did not reflect a change in how 
he defined morality, the tone of his discussions about it was necessarily different 
from that in the Institutes and the Principles.  In the Essay, Ferguson‟s readership 
was intended to be the general public, not his students, and his discussions of 
morality engaged with wider eighteenth-century debates.
655
  In the History, on the 
other hand, the focus was on how morality influenced politics in the Roman 
republic.  Moral philosophy did not dominate Ferguson‟s History, but did play a 
crucial role in his discussion of historical figures, notably Cato and Caesar, and in 
his interpretation of historical events.
656
   
 Ferguson‟s presentation of moral philosophy changed slightly according to 
the readers he was addressing and the particular demands of the work in question.  
Ferguson adapted his presentation according to the role he played: in the case of the 
lectures, his role was of a teacher of moral philosophy, which in the case of the 
History and the Essay his role was that of a participant in Enlightenment discussions 
concerning history and society, not only morality.  Although Ferguson‟s ideas about 
the nature of morality, virtue and society are consistent throughout his works, 
inevitably there are subtle variations of emphasis among them.    
 One element that remains constant through Ferguson‟s works is a discussion 
of Stoic moral philosophy.  His engagement with the Stoic school has intrigued 
scholars and raised many questions about the nature of Ferguson‟s own philosophy.  
Before analysing Ferguson‟s specific relationship to the school, particularly in 
relation to certain characteristics of his moral philosophy, a history of Stoicism and 
the role it played in eighteenth-century thought must be explored. 
 Stoicism itself has a long and distinguished history in European thought and 
it was particularly crucial for philosophical inquiry throughout the eighteenth 
century.  Stoicism was founded in ancient Greece by Zeno of Citium and Cleanthes 
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of Assos in the third century B.C.
657
  The Stoic school later evolved in Rome under 
the influence of authors such as Epictetus (55-135 A.D.), Marcus Aurelius (121-180 
A.D.) and, to a certain extent, Cicero (106-43 B.C.), and scholars have argued 
further that Stoicism in this later form was influential in the foundation of the 
Catholic Church.
658
  In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Stoicism again 
became an influential school of philosophy as thinkers began to reassess morality in 
the post-Reformation context. 
 While the Stoic philosophy changed through time, and thinkers focused 
certain aspects of the philosophy depending on their intellectual context, there are 
several fundamental elements of Stoicism that ground the philosophy.  First, the 
Stoics maintained a belief in providence, which governed the universe as well as 
human fate.  It was the duty of men to resign themselves to this divine providence 
and to live within the laws of nature set out by divine providence.  An aspect of the 
providential laws of nature included the fact that humans have the capacity for 
reason: the element which separates them from other animals.  Furthermore, human 
happiness was only achievable through an acceptance of the role designated by 
providence and living life according to the laws of nature.
659
  Concerning Stoic 
morality, they argued that benevolence was a central virtue and that to make moral 
choices, people should always choose what is „good‟.  These basic aspects of 
Stoicism are central to modern formations of the philosophy. 
 Ingrid Merikoski has argued that in the early modern period, changes in the 
economy, commerce and religion, following from the Reformation, led to 
intellectuals searching for a new, practical system of morals which could 
accommodate these changes within a Christian framework.  Thinkers in northern 
Europe and Scotland, especially, found the answer to these changes in „Neo-
Stoicism‟.
660
  This form of Neo-Stoicism combined fundamental ancient Stoic and 
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Christian ideas to „promote virtue among individuals and order in society‟.
661
  She 
argues further that John Calvin (1509-64) and Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) argued 
that Neo-Stoicism could combine faith and reason „to encourage obedience and 
order in society‟.
662
  Neo-Stoicism took inspiration from both Christian and Stoic 
ethics.  The object of it was to combat the indifference to ethics which these thinkers 
found in their growing commercial society and to combat either self-interest or 
indulgence.  Neo-Stoicism combined Christian morals and a belief in providence 
with the Stoic emphasis on reason, duty and practical morality.  The Roman Stoics 
provided the appropriate model because they focused on morality, particularly the 
concept of virtue, which was useful for everyday-life; maintained providence and 
order in society; all which could be easily reconciled with Christian morals.
663
 
 Debates about Neo-Stoicism continued through the sixteenth and into the 
seventeenth century where thinkers such as Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), 
Guillaume Du Vair (1556-1621), and Ben Jonson (1572-1637) continued to 
formulate their own theories of morals.  Neo-Stoicism did not go unchallenged, 
however, and there was an equally strong growing tradition of Epicureanism and 
Scepticism which countered the philosophy of the Neo-Stoics.
664
  Neo-Stoic 
proponents found this particular philosophy a plausible solution for „the search for 
the best available means to gather elements of knowledge and experience in to a 
coherent but not restrictive form‟.
665
  Two influential seventeenth-century thinkers 
who had a large impact on eighteenth-century Scotland were Hugo Grotius (1583-
1645) and Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694).  Their theories of natural law with its 
increased attention to the concept of duty, which Merikoski identifies as a „kind of 
Christian Stoicism‟, was a foundation for eighteenth-century Scottish moral 
philosophy.
666
  It was Gershom Carmichael (1672-1729) who, in his moral 
philosophy lectures at the University of Glasgow, first incorporated natural 
jurisprudence into discussions of moral philosophy.
667
  Neo-Stoicism, or Christian 
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Stoicism, was not only important in Scotland, it continued to be explored in 
Northern Europe, France, and England, but it is the Scottish context which is most 
important for understanding Ferguson‟s relationship to Stoicism. 
 Several scholars have labelled Neo-Stoicism, in the context of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, as „Christian Stoicism‟.
668
  It has been argued that some members of 
the Scottish Enlightenment, particularly the Moderates of the Scottish Kirk, used 
notions of Christian Stoicism as a solution to the problems they found in their 
growing commercial society because it offered a practical, reasoned, orderly system 
of morals that was in keeping with Presbyterian teachings.
669
  The Scottish thinkers, 
therefore, addressed the problem of maintaining a moral society within an 
economically prosperous and Protestant community with the same model developed 
by the Neo-Stoic thinkers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Northern 
Europe.  Not all members of the Scottish Enlightenment adopted Christian Stoicism; 
David Hume in particular countered the usefulness of Stoicism as a system of 
practical morality with a form of Scepticism.
670
  M. A. Stewart has noted that 
„Neither tradition survives in a pure form, and it would be misleading to suggest that 
these labels capture all that was at issue‟, but it is important to note that the modern 
proponents of Stoicism, Scepticism and Epicureanism were intentionally using 
ancient schools, in part, to develop their philosophy.
671
 
 The Scottish Enlightenment philosopher who is often associated with 
Christian Stoicism is Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), lecturer in moral philosophy 
at Glasgow University.
672
  M. A. Stewart has argued that Hutcheson‟s Christian 
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Stoicism is not an acceptance of all aspects of Stoicism, or that he followed all Stoic 
principles, but that his approach to the subject of virtue, his stress on the importance 
of reason in a person‟s life and arguments for the providential ordering of the world, 
demonstrate the influence on his thought of both the Stoic and the Christian 
tradition.
673
  Christian Maurer has also demonstrated that Hutcheson used Stoic 
concepts of natural benevolence in his moral philosophy to disprove the claims of 
the Epicureans and Augustinians, who argued that people are motivated by self-
interest, but further argues that Hutcheson‟s understanding of the emotions and the 
passions were markedly different from Stoic Philosophy.
674
  James Moore and 
Michael Silverthorne have recently edited Hutcheson‟s translation of Marcus 
Aurelius‟s Meditations in which they clearly differentiate Hutcheson‟s interpretation 
of Stoicism based on his moral philosophy from that of Stoic philosophy throughout 
the translation.
675
   
 Hutcheson‟s engagement with Stoic philosophy has been widely studied and 
the importance of this theme in his work crucially debated.  The importance of 
Hutcheson‟s relationship with Stoicism remains a crucial question for studies of the 
Scottish Enlightenment because Hutcheson, an early Scottish Enlightenment figure, 
has been acknowledged to have influenced many contemporary and later thinkers.  
While figures such as David Hume disagreed with Hutcheson‟s incorporation of 
Stoic principles into his moral philosophy,
676
 others found great inspiration in his 
works and the concepts of Christian Stoicism remained a vital aspect of Scottish 
Enlightenment thought.  Richard Sher‟s Church and University in the Scottish 
Enlightenment explores the pervasive nature of Christian Stoicism among the 
Moderate Literati.  Scholars have noted that some of these figures include George 
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Turnbull, Hugh Blair, William Robertson and Adam Ferguson.
677
  Adam Ferguson‟s 
connection to Christian Stoicism and the influence of Stoicism on his thought has 
followed from these intellectual trends. 
 To get to the bottom of Ferguson‟s notions of Stoicism, modern 
commentators have attempted to identify which Stoic authors influenced Ferguson.  
The approach to Ferguson‟s relationship to the Stoic School has changed as 
scholarship of both ancient philosophy and of the eighteenth century has evolved.  
For instance, in David Kettler‟s and Jane Bush Fagg‟s works, there is no recognition 
that „Stoicism‟ as a school itself might have changed over time.  In these studies of 
Ferguson‟s work and his relationship to Stoicism, the school is presented as broadly 
unchanging.  This overgeneralisation might help to explain the reason why David 
Kettler found it difficult to reconcile Ferguson‟s ideas with those of any of the 
Stoics.  
 In more recent scholarship, it has been asserted that there is in fact a great 
difference between Greek and Roman Stoicism and that this difference is reflected 
in Ferguson‟s thought.  It has been acknowledged that Ferguson‟s „Stoicism‟ is more 
reminiscent of the Roman Stoics than of the Greeks, as Lisa Hill has argued.
678
  This 
reflects the understanding of the opinions of Stoicism in the eighteenth century, as 
well as specifying Ferguson‟s sources for Stoicism: Ferguson read Epictetus, 
Marcus Aurelius and Cicero, who incidentally was not a Stoic, but wrote about Stoic 
philosophy.  This line of thought maintains the conclusions reached by those 
scholars analysing the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth-century developments 
in approaches to the Stoic school.  Ferguson was also significantly influenced by 
Francis Hutcheson‟s concept of Stoicism.  Contrary to Hill‟s view, there was no one, 
pervasive, understanding of Stoicism in the eighteenth century, and Ferguson‟s 
personal use of Stoicism therefore needs to be better understood.  Each thinker who 
engaged with Stoic philosophy adopted aspects which he found most useful and 
appropriate to suit his moral philosophy, as has been demonstrated with Francis 
Hutcheson.  In the same fashion, Ferguson took from Stoicism, using the methods of 
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the modern eclectics, what he found most accurate and useful for discussing moral 
philosophy. 
 Ferguson‟s repeated use of Stoic sources and other similarities of his 
philosophy to Stoicism have led authors since the eighteenth century to interpret him 
as a Stoic.  Adam Ferguson dealt openly with the eighteenth-century perceptions of 
his identity as a Stoic in the Introduction to his Principles of Moral and Political 
Science.  Ferguson‟s commentators have sought to demonstrate that he in fact sees 
himself as a Stoic, but this interpretation does not follow from what he actually 
wrote.  Ferguson clearly rejects any such interpretation: „The Author, in some of the 
statements which follow, may be thought partial to the Stoic philosophy; but is not 
conscious of having warped the truth to suit with any system whatever.‟
679
  Ferguson 
goes on to write that his ideas were created in the search for truth and that, when he 
read the Stoic view of human life as a „game‟, it only supported the opinions he had 
formed by looking at the world with his own eyes.  The fact that he agrees with 
Stoicism on some points only serves to increase his confidence in his ideas, even at 
the risk of his own reputation, since „the name of this sect has become, in the 
gentility of modern times, proverbial for stupidity‟.
680
  He goes on to prove that 
Stoicism actually remains a valid philosophy when based on Cicero‟s having 
adopted Stoic ethics to teach his son in his De Officiis and on the idea that the best 
parts of Roman law were founded on it as well.  Furthermore, some of his near 
contemporaries have adopted Stoic philosophy, including Lord Shaftesbury, 
Montesquieu and Francis Hutcheson to name but a few.  He concludes this section 
with the admonition that one of the things everyone learns as a youth is „neither to 
admire nor to contemn what they do not know‟.
681
   
 Several conclusions can be drawn from this passage.  First, Ferguson accepts 
that his philosophy included aspects that resemble Stoicism, but denies that he is 
trying to be a Stoic in the strictest sense.  He privileges Stoicism and thinks that it is 
worthy of emulation – in both its ancient and modern forms.  Second, by having this 
discussion in the introduction to his work Ferguson shows that he is aware that his 
contemporaries might classify his philosophy as „Stoic‟ and he argues against this 
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interpretation.  Third, Ferguson recognises the conflicted nature of eighteenth-
century Stoicism and indicates his intention to resolve it for himself.  He knows that 
there are a variety of claims about Stoicism and he identifies himself as someone 
who finds truth in their ideas, but does not adopt the philosophy without reservation.  
Ferguson intentionally hopes to distance himself from the label of „Stoic‟ and 
declares that he does not subscribe to it uncritically.  This further demonstrates 
Ferguson‟s implementation of eclectic methodology and furthers his commitment to 
anti-sectarianism.  Ferguson formulated philosophical principles based on 
experience and concluded and observed that Stoic philosophy ultimately reflected 
some of his ideas.  This is a critical point because this is how Ferguson perceives his 
own ideas: he sees himself as an independent thinker who could critically analyse 
Stoic philosophy, which is indicative of Ferguson‟s overall methodology and 
approach to his ancient and modern sources.  Moreover, this stance echoes the 
position of the Ancients in the Quarrel because Ferguson establishes the role of 
ancient philosophy in his modern thought; he maintains the importance of this 
ancient school, but does not do so without having first established its value through 
reason and experience.  
 In the chapter that follows, Ferguson‟s definition of Stoicism will be 
analysed.  Identifying the key Stoic concepts Ferguson himself discussed will allow 
for a better understanding of his conception of their philosophy.  From this 
foundation, Ferguson‟s moral philosophy and his philosophical principles will be 
compared to those he claimed to be Stoic, so that Ferguson‟s ideas can be set apart 
or paralleled with those of the Stoics.  This chapter will answer the question: would 










1.1 Ferguson’s Definition of Stoicism 
 
Adam Ferguson‟s concept of Stoicism was based on his sources, both ancient and 
modern, and his relationship to the school was affected by his overall approach to 
philosophy.  Because Ferguson‟s understanding of the Stoic school was original, to 
understand his engagement with it, and how he understood the Stoic school, this 
must first be considered.  Ferguson focused mainly on Stoic ethics, ignoring 
metaphysics and their discussions of logic.  This is due in part to the nature of the 
curriculum at the university, where he did not teach metaphysics, but ethics, and it is 
also due to his personal approach to philosophy, in the study of which he did not 
include discussions of metaphysics or logic in any great detail. 
 First, according to Ferguson, the Stoics believe in providence created by God 
to promote His goodness and justice and which affects all rational creatures.  They 
believe that there is a wide variety of sources for individual moral choice, but that it 
is the freedom of having a choice rather than the result of that choice that leads to 
happiness.  To make proper choices people rely on their concept of right and wrong, 
and this is the most fundamental consideration in making a moral choice.  According 
to Ferguson, the Stoics believe that what is good and right is virtuous and that what 
is wrong and evil is vicious.  They promote the goals of excellence and honour as 
the most appropriate for human beings rather than the attainment of pleasure and 
ease.  They maintain that the good personal qualities of wisdom, benevolence and 
courage, are equally good for society in general.  All can possess these virtues, 
despite their circumstances, and these virtues further lead to personal happiness.  
They also believe that people should be content in their station in life, which was 
dictated by God‟s providence, and should not wish for things which are beyond their 
control.  Because people both live in the universe created by God and the society of 
men, they should always act for the good of mankind which in turn produces the 
most happiness attainable by an individual.  The possession and maintenance of 
these qualities leads to the perfection that should be the aim for everyone, although 
it can never be fully achieved.
682
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 With this definition of Stoicism, it is clear that Ferguson narrows his focus to 
a consideration that is limited to ethics.  Due to Ferguson‟s various intentions, 
depending on which readership he is addressing, his engagement with Stoicism 
reflected his practical objectives.  The particular topics he addressed in his works, he 
examined in a characteristically Fergusonian, practical way.  Ferguson referred to 
Stoic philosophy and Stoic thinkers repeatedly throughout his texts, but his direct 
engagement with the school varied to a greater or lesser extent.  In some instances 
Ferguson assesses Stoic ideas, either agreeing with them or being critical of them.  
In others, Ferguson uses Stoic authors to support his already determined position, 
and thus relies on their authority to give weight to or support for his philosophical 
propositions.  And finally, in some instances, he simply uses them as examples to 
help prove his point.  This engagement with Stoic philosophy, as with ancient 
philosophy in general, illustrates his didactic approach.  In Ferguson‟s moral 
philosophy there are several opportunities to assess and engage with Stoic 
philosophy: virtue, the passions, moral choice, happiness, and religion.  A detailed 
analysis of these topics will demonstrate Ferguson‟s use of and relationship to Stoic 





Defining virtue is one of the fundamental tasks of the moral philosopher and a 
crucial one for Ferguson.  Ferguson is most concerned with a practical moral 
philosophy that helps guide people in making correct moral choices.  The underlying 
theme of Ferguson‟s moral philosophy, especially that seen in the Institutes and the 
Principles, is how we can determine what is the guiding factor that helps people 
make their choices in a life filled with a variety of conflicting demands.  When 
considering the nature of virtue, Ferguson does not neglect the question of choice.  
On this topic Ferguson relies heavily on Stoic authors.  Stoic virtue was discussed 
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extensively in the eighteenth century by Ferguson and many others
683
 and a broader 
understanding of Stoicism has affected several of the scholars writing on Ferguson, 
who understand his thought through other ancient or modern concepts of the 
school.
684
  Although Ferguson referred to Stoic authors on numerous occasions, he 
did not simply adopt their ideas.  He only incorporated Stoic authors because they 
happened to agree with his ideas.   
 According to Ferguson, the Stoics held that the virtues of wisdom, 
benevolence and courage were beneficial both for individuals as well as for society 
as a whole and that public and private good converged.  All people can possess these 
virtues, despite differences in fortune or the influence of other people and once these 
virtues are realised people will only experience „satisfaction and joy‟.  Stoics believe 
that people should perform the duties assigned to them as beings created by God, as 
members of society, and in their particular station in life, and so ultimately „act for 
the good of mankind‟.  Performing this part will lead them to true happiness.
685
   
 Ferguson sees that the most important virtues for the Stoics are benevolence, 
wisdom and courage.  More specifically Ferguson believes that virtue consists of the 
qualities of probity, wisdom, temperance and fortitude and „These personal qualities 
constituted the virtue or excellency of a man; and are in fact his state of greatest 
enjoyment or least suffering.‟
686
  Ferguson concludes that benevolence is actually 
the most important of all qualities and it is therefore the true foundation of virtue.  
Because Ferguson is also concerned not just with moral choice, but also the moral 
choice made within a society, benevolence as a virtue is most important because it is 
for the greatest good of the individual as well as for society as a whole. 
 Ferguson maintains that the four main virtues of wisdom or prudence, justice 
or probity, temperance and fortitude are the foundation of beneficence and the 
ultimate virtues that people should follow.
687
  This is the quality which guides 
people in performing tasks that are to the benefit of themselves and for the greater 
good of humanity, for individuals or groups: „The greatest good competent to man‟s 
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nature, is the love of mankind‟.  The end result of the love of mankind is that the 
good of the individual is the same as the good of the whole; that „in the works of 
God the whole is preserved by that which constitutes the good of the part, and that 
there is no happiness of the part consistent with what is hurtful to the whole‟; that 
the best thing a benevolent person can do for another is to „promote 
disinterestedness and candour‟; and „That things are to be estimated, independently 
of opinion, or temporary fashion, by their tendency to the good of mankind.‟
688
  
Ferguson maintains that beneficence is the highest good for the individual and for 
society as a whole.
 689
  It gives people the most satisfaction and happiness in both 
their personal and public life: „The mere attempts of a virtuous man to serve his 
friend, or his country, is an object of moral esteem; not only where he may have 




 A danger exists in the idea that beneficence is the most important quality 
because it might be misconstrued as meaning that benevolence results in self-denial 
and obligation, which will cause pain to the benevolent person when giving pleasure 
to another.  Also, if someone demonstrates kindness to another, this may form some 
system of obligation where the good deeds would have to be repaid.
691
  Ferguson 
argues that this is not the case at all and again uses Stoic writings to support his 
argument.
692
  Ferguson, citing Antoninus, believes that benevolent actions benefit 
both parties.  It is pleasurable for both to give and receive – these are the effects of 
beneficence.  Also, because virtue is a natural quality of the human mind, 
benevolence is also natural.  Ferguson, therefore, removes the obligation to repay 
benevolence because it is as natural as breathing.
693
 
 Although this definition of virtue embraces some of the same elements as 
that of the Stoics, Ferguson does not concede that this is a purely Stoic definition of 
virtue.  These virtues have been presented by many other thinkers as the most 
important one: „This division is so natural, that it has always presented itself when 
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we have treated of the felicity or excellence competent to man‟s nature.‟
694
  
Therefore, Ferguson is not adopting what he considers to be the Stoic concept of the 
principal virtues, he is purporting to adopt what he has determined to be the best 
virtues independently.  By incorporating Stoic notions of virtue that match his own, 
Ferguson is not simply adopting their system, but relying on their authority to 
support his general point.  Moreover, Ferguson believes that people cannot argue 
with his concept of virtue: 
The value of virtue, as we have endeavoured to define it, will not 
be questioned: For who can doubt the value of a wisdom, which 
cannot err; of a temper, which is ever joyful and serene, in its 
exertions for the good of mankind; of a temperance, which no 
allurement of false pleasure can mislead; or, of a fortitude, which 
no difficulty or danger can embarrass or appal?  This, we may be 
told, is first to imagine perfect happiness, and then to give it the 
name of virtue; whilst the whole is ideal, and never realized in the 




This concept of virtue embodies the best qualities that people can possess.  This is 
also connected to his concept of human universals which he learned from those 
taking the position of the Ancients in the Quarrel.  Although it may be an ideal that 
all people cannot attain, it is the goal that people should attempt to achieve if they 
want to be happy. 
 From this position, that the virtues which Ferguson singles out are natural, 
that they are the most proper and appropriate, that people throughout time have 
acknowledged their intrinsic values, Ferguson concluded that virtue itself is natural 
and intrinsically valuable.  Man, who is an intelligent being created by God, is best 
when he is virtuous and a virtuous man is also best liked in society.
696
  People who 
exhibit virtuous qualities are best suited to join others in society as well as take their 
place in the world created by God.  These virtuous people lead the kind of life most 
admired by others.
697
  When people act virtuously they are liked by others because 
they exhibit the good qualities which people appreciate most.  
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 Moreover, Ferguson believes, like the Stoics, that virtuous behaviour breeds 
virtue; that if a person acts virtuously then others will be affected by that behaviour.  
Furthermore, any person acting in a pleasant way, exhibiting qualities that 
demonstrate personal virtue will have a positive affect on others.  Ferguson again 




Virtue is so far from being valuable, merely on account of its 
external effects, that the greatest and most beneficial effect it can 
produce is the communication and propagation of virtue itself; 
“You will serve your country more,” says Epictetus, “by raising 
the souls, than by enlarging the habitations of your fellow 
citizens.”
699
 And this is the greatest benefit which any man can 
receive from his virtuous neighbour, that he become, like him, 




Here, Ferguson suggests that the Stoics were correct, by accepting when Epictetus‟ 
claim that the greatest gift that a person can give to another is promoting and 
diffusing virtue.   
 Yet Ferguson does not agree with all Stoic conceptions of virtue.  Although 
Ferguson finds that wisdom is an important quality for the acquisition of virtue,
701
 
he is critical of philosophers, who base their definition of virtue on having already 
achieved a state of virtue,  who separate everything that could be considered good or 
virtuous into the category of „wisdom‟ and all vice and evil into the category of 
„folly‟.  Ferguson is not specific as to which philosophers he is referring, but it is 
probably the Stoics, who he describes as placing importance on wisdom.
702
  
Ferguson believes that it is far too limiting to confine all morality to this 
construction because it fails to allow for progress towards the improvement and 
enjoyment of benevolence.  Also, wisdom is not a quality which leads to affection, a 
fundamental quality for a happy human life.  Ferguson believes that benevolence 
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must exist so that people can use their wisdom to improve themselves, but not that it 
is a quality which will sufficiently equip people to live in society:   
Philosophers have thought, that every subject of commendation, to 
which human nature is competent; every virtue and every 
constituent of happiness, might be comprised under the title of 
wisdom, or the excellence of intelligent being; that, on the contrary 
every subject of dispraise or contempt, every vice and every 
character of misery, might be comprised under the title of folly: 
But, it is not necessary, nor perhaps even expedient, thus to force 
the attributes of human nature, under single appellations, however 
comprehensive or general.  Although it is both wise and profitable 
to love our fellow creatures, we can no more become affectionate 
to our friend, in the mere search of wisdom, than we can in search 
of our interest. Our constitution must have the ingredient of 
benevolence, in order that a mind well informed may improve 




Wisdom is important for virtue, but it does not lead to the proper human affections 
that breed true virtue.  Wisdom alone, as well as the knowledge of nature, is 
important, but is not the source of virtue.  Here, Ferguson disputes the Stoic 





Another topic on which Ferguson and the Stoics seem to hold similar ideas is that of 
the judgement of external actions.  Ferguson thinks that virtue is a quality of the 
mind and can exist only in the individual.  He believes that the perception of virtue 
should not only depend on either external circumstances or external conditions.  
People know what is right and wrong by „observation and experience‟ and 
accordingly make their choices.  It is not the effect of that choice which should be 
judged, but the choice itself.  This judgement should be true for the individual: the 
individual should be happy with the choice itself, not the success or failure of it.
704
  
Ferguson found similar ideas in Stoic philosophy: 
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They allow, that in the nature of things there are many grounds 
upon which we prefer or reject objects that present themselves to 
us, but that the choice which we make, not the event of our efforts, 
decides our happiness or our misery; that right and wrong are the 
most important and the only grounds upon which we can at all 
times safely proceed in our choice, and that, in comparison to this 
difference, everything else is of no account;  that a just man will 
ever act  as if there was nothing good but what is right, and nothing 




In Ferguson‟s account, when the Stoics discuss moral choice, they recognise that it 
is the choice rather than the effect of that choice that leads to happiness and that 
when making these choices a person invokes his concept of right and wrong to 
assess whether to choose good over evil. 
 For Ferguson too, external action is important notably for both moral choice 
and moral approbation, but virtue, being a quality of the mind, is not dependent on 
external actions.
706
  Ferguson believes that the means of action are more important 
than the ends because he believes that virtue originates in the mind and that people 
do not necessarily have control over the outcome of their good intentions.  Thus, 
Ferguson believes that external circumstances, actions or effects should not 
constitute the criteria to judge morality.
707
  
 Although the similarities of Ferguson‟s position to that of the Stoics has led 
scholars to conclude that he adopted Stoic ideas, Ferguson rejects some fundamental 
aspects of Stoic ethics.  In looking at Ferguson‟s ideas about Stoicism it is clear that 
he diverges from them in several instances.  First, he denies the importance of 
wisdom in defining moral choices – he believes that affection for others should be 
the determining factor.  He also does not believe that all external situations are the 
same; that situations do not determine a person‟s happiness and virtue.  The question 
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of whether Ferguson‟s concept of virtue is indebted to that of the Stoics is not 
quickly resolved.  By carefully examining his actual words, however, Ferguson‟s 
departure from their position emerges.  Certainly he is writing a definition of virtue 
which he thinks conforms to what is natural.  He is not, however, merely following 
in the steps of the Stoics, but has independently developed this position and only 
uses the authority of the Stoics for support.  Virtue is the topic in which Ferguson 
most clearly resembles the Stoics because he is using ideas and terms similar to 




1.3 The Passions and the Nature of Pleasure 
 
Ferguson believes that the passions are a result of man‟s natural instinct for self-
preservation and from which man‟s concepts of pain and pleasure originate through 
experience.
708
  From this starting point, man then decides how to fulfil this basic 
need of survival through choice
709
 and eventually man developed arts and sciences, 
industry and production.
710
  Man learns to make these choices according to 
experience and observation.  Man learns to distinguish between good and evil from 
his appetites and pleasures.
711
 
 For Ferguson, it is necessary to formulate a rule to guide the understanding 
of the passions.  It therefore is necessary to „judge of what is admirable in the 
capacities of men, or fortunate in the application of their faculties, before we venture 
to pass a judgement on this branch of their merits, or pretend to measure the degree 
of respect they may claim by their different attainments.‟
712
  For rational creatures, 
the powers of intelligence help them to decide between pain and pleasure as well as 
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 People begin their assessment of pleasure and pain by a combination of their 
intelligence and their physical senses.  Although people begin life only with the 
basic instincts of self-preservation and a natural instinct to be in society, they 
eventually use their experiences and reason to evaluate their experiences.
714
  People 
then fulfil their appetites based on the experience and observation they have 
acquired by combining the use of their senses and reason, and here Ferguson further 
continues to incorporate the experimental method into his moral philosophy: „A 
discernment acquired by experience, becomes a faculty of his mind; and the 
inferences of thought are sometimes not to be distinguished from the perceptions of 
sense.‟
715
  It is from this basic starting point that men decide their ideas of good and 
bad, right and wrong. 
 For Ferguson, pleasure should not be substituted for happiness because this 
results in mere sensuality and, eventually, a corruption of virtue.  Pleasure, however, 
is not intrinsically evil or vicious and there are many pleasurable activities which are 
virtuous.  As long as pleasure is not the ultimate goal, but an effect of an activity, 
then that is a good pleasure.
716
  Pleasure is „enjoyment considered abstractly‟
717
 and 
there are both animal and intellectual pleasures.
718
  Ferguson however maintains that 
animal enjoyments must be „subordinate‟ to intellectual enjoyments.
719
  
 Ferguson‟s conception of the passions can further clarify his relationship to 
the Stoic school.  Ferguson assesses the problematic nature of the passions in 
relation to „the schools of antient philosophy‟.  When discussing the term „passion‟, 
Ferguson writes, this usually refers to extremes of emotion and thus people are 
„commonly admonished to beware its effects‟.
720
  The ancient schools prohibited the 
passions for this reason and also because the passions did not fit in with the concept 
of perfection based on the elevated quality of wisdom:  
This character consisted in the choice of virtue, considered as the 
sole good; and in the rejection of vice, as the sole evil.  A good 
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consisting in choice alone, and therefore ever present to the wise 
who has made that choice, is an object of uniform satisfaction, not 
of fluctuating emotion to joy from grief, or from hope to fear.  The 
question was not, how far this state of the affections was realized 
in any instance, but how far it was a fit model of perfection, to 
which the efforts of men should be directed.
721
   
 
This description of the Stoics‟ assessment of the passions is consistent with 
Ferguson‟s concept of Stoic virtue, as we have seen in the previous section.  For 
Ferguson, the Stoics forbid the passions as an excess of emotions and therefore 
expect that people, in attempting to reach perfection through the use of wisdom, will 
make choices about the passions based on this ideal.
722
  Because virtue is a matter of 
choosing right over wrong, the same rule applies to the passions.  The Stoics 
believed that self-control was the best means to reject the passions. 
 Ferguson also believes that it is right to have self-control over animal 
pleasures, and it is the quality of temperance that should guide these choices.
723
  
This consideration is connected to Ferguson‟s concept of virtue.  Virtuous people 
will realise that excesses of pleasure and sensuality lead to actions and choices that 
have little value.  This is also connected to his consideration of the importance of 
choice in people‟s lives.
724
  Because man is „voluntary in every choice, and is the 
master of his own actions‟,
725
 control over the passions is a matter of informed 
choice.  Ferguson believes that moral questions are left to the individual to decide 
and those who have grasped his definition of virtue will realise that there are higher 
pursuits than mere pleasures.
726
   
 Controlling the passions based on a concept of virtue and vice alone is not, 
however, how Ferguson understands the true role of passions in human life: simple 
self-control is not enough to determine this moral choice.  It is through a 
combination of temperance and choices informed by observation that people should 
decide how to follow their passions.   Significantly, Ferguson does not believe that 
all passions are equally vicious: there are vices much worse than sensuality.  
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We err, in deriving the corruptions, which are imputed to great 
cities and courts, from the love of pleasure, and from the profusion 
of wealth, with which the love of pleasure is gratified.  The mere 
voluptuary is innocent, compared to those who are deeply infected 
with malice, envy, and pride; a generation of evils begot upon 
emulation, competition, or the apprehension of comparative 




In addition, a total denial of pleasure and acceptance of physical pain can be taken to 
negative extremes.  Ferguson sees this as a folly of ancient customs,
728
 in which he 
notes the problem of extreme self-denial and acceptance of pain.  Ferguson holds 
that moderation in all things is the best policy.  Since he believes that there should 
not be excesses of virtue and vice, he therefore maintains that there should be 
moderation in relation to passion.  Ferguson does not deny that some pleasure is 
necessary for human life.  Ferguson distinguishes the types of pleasure which should 
be chosen and therefore does not believe that all pleasure should be shunned.  
Although this position of moderation in relation to the passions can be recognised as 
a Stoic position, for Ferguson there remains an important distinction.  He maintains 
that the Stoics „proscribed‟ the passions as they were not an acceptable means to 
perfection, but Ferguson does not hold this view.   
 Ferguson believes that certain kinds of passions are not only acceptable, but 
vital for human happiness.  Some pleasures and appetites nevertheless are better 
than others.  Ferguson knows that the sensual pleasures are gratifying to people but 
he believes that business, or the duties which people ought to follow actually create 
more pleasure than fleeting sensual pleasures.  Ferguson believes that it is activity 
combined with experience that guides the choices among pleasures.  If people 
follow the proper path of an active life and a virtuous mind then the passions are not 
a problem: „Sensuality is easily overcome by any of the habits of pursuit which 
usually engage an active mind.‟
729
  Moderation of the passions occurs naturally as 
we pursue an active life.  In order to understand this relationship between activity 
and the passions we must first look at Ferguson‟s concept of activity itself as this is 
a central element of his overall moral philosophy. 
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Activity, Society and the Passions 
  
Ferguson solves one problem of the passions by noting that „affections, and active 
engagements‟ decrease sensual pleasures in the light of proper enjoyment.
730
  The 
question of activity is central to Ferguson‟s concept of human nature as well as in all 
aspects of human life and morality.
731
  It is part of man‟s nature to be active as both 
an animal and an intelligent being
732
 and Ferguson related virtue to activity and 
happiness.  He argued that all circumstances demonstrate the active part that man 
plays in the natural world, and man has of necessity to discover the laws of nature to 
fulfil this active role, which in turn determines the role which people play in  
society.
733
  People must actively engage with other members of their society in order 
to be happy because that is their natural role.
734
  
 Ferguson notes the importance which the Stoics placed on the concept of 
action.
735
  Ferguson writes of the Stoics that „virtue was supposed to consist in the 
affectionate performance of every good office towards their fellow creatures, and in 
full resignation to providence for every thing independent of their own choice‟.
736
  
Furthermore, they „recommended an active part in all the concerns of our fellow-
creatures, and the steady exertion of a mind benevolent, courageous, and 
temperate….  For himself, the cares and attentions which his object required, were 
his pleasures; and the continued exertion of a beneficent affection, his welfare and 
his prosperity.‟
737
  According to Ferguson, the Stoics maintained that to be virtuous, 
people should actively attempt to be benevolent and care for others by performing 
the duties assigned to them by providence through their station in life.  Furthermore, 
the fulfilment of benevolent actions and the performance of duties led this 
benevolence and activity to the greatest pleasures that people can achieve.   
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 According to Ferguson, one of the fundamental characteristics of man is his 
natural instinct to live in society.  Because it is so vital to man‟s existence and 
subsistence, there are obviously moral consequences to living in society.  Yet, man‟s 
association with others goes far beyond mere necessity and involves the relations 
between men and women and families; and such activities as friendship; citizenship; 
concern for others, and sympathy and humanity.
738
 
 Being in society obliges men to be active and have concerns for that society; 
public justice and public disorder are matters of interest to every person‟s concept of 
good and evil.
739
  Notions of good and evil that an individual would want for himself 
are applied to others in his society and from this he learns to differentiate between 
social and selfish desires.
740
  Ferguson also equates the natural place of man in 
society with virtue.  From his definition of virtue, that beneficence and the greatest 
good for the greatest number of people are the highest good, Ferguson concludes 
that the proper role of people in society is necessarily virtuous.  People act best 
when acting in society virtuously; others reward them for it and, better still, learn to 
emulate it.  This is Ferguson‟s ideal concept of human virtue even though people did 
not always follow this model. 
 Ferguson also argued that in „rude ages‟ morality was determined by external 
signs and therefore virtue became a practice of self-denial, controlling the passions 
and withholding their positive effects on other members of society.
741
  This idea of 
morality is unsatisfying to the „inquisitive mind‟ because virtue should be upheld 
since it is good.  The means by which it is determined is through the system of 
rewards and punishments in society, with the end result that virtue is acknowledged 
as being good for both the individual and society.
742
 
 Ferguson‟s concept of civic virtue, derives from this observation, but this 
concept of social activity and responsibility extends beyond the realm of the political 
into purely moral considerations.  In relation to Stoic ideas, we have seen that 
Ferguson believes that the Stoics advocate active participation in society which 
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obviously includes the practice of beneficence towards others.  Ferguson therefore 
links activity, society and benevolence as follows:  
Benevolence is an active principle, and an agreeable state of the 
mind, rendering the presence and welfare of other men an occasion 
of pleasure, and fitting the individual to his relation in fraternity of 
natures like his own.  The pleasures of society are the exercises of 
a social nature.  They mix with the functions of animal life, and 
are, in reality, the principal cause of many enjoyments which are 
supposed to result from the gratifications of sense.  The pleasures 
of the table, for instance, are more those of society than of gratified 
appetite.  Whence it is else that the meal, when taken alone is a 
mere supply of necessity; but in company, and in the gaiety of 





Furthermore, Ferguson links the ideas of activity, society and pleasure joined 
together as the building blocks of affection.   
 Ferguson believes that there is a hierarchy of pleasures.  Although sensual 
pleasures have their place in people‟s live, these pleasures are best taken in 
moderation.  Moreover, these pleasures are not as satisfying as others.  Ferguson 
notes: „It has been well observed, that every exercise of the human faculties, into 
which malice or fear do not enter as motives, and every exercise which is not carried 
to some pernicious extreme of fatigue, is in its own nature agreeable.‟
744
  Ferguson 
believes that people can only truly be happy when they are active members of 
society because this kind of activity is itself pleasurable. 
 People need to be employed, but there are a variety of means to do this:  „To 
be employed is agreeable; but employments differ no less than sensations.  The 
employments of a mind and benevolent affection are placid and happy.  Those of a 
rancorous and malicious temper are convulsive and wretched.‟
745
  For Ferguson, 
however, it is not any activity that produces actual happiness, but „business‟ that 
works in relation to a person‟s duties: 
The distinction between business and amusement is perhaps not 
easily settled, or consists intirely in this, that business is prescribed 
by some consideration of interest or duty; and amusement is taken 
up, in the beginning at least, without any such serious concern.
746
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We can therefore derive Ferguson‟s main points about the relationship between 
virtue, happiness, pleasure and activity.  Ferguson believes that, „It is a wretched 
opinion, that happiness consists in a freedom from trouble, or in having nothing to 
do‟.  As a result of holding such a view, people will neglect the true sources of their 
enjoyments: their duties and their active engagements.  From this neglect people 
actually complain more because life becomes a „burden‟.  Therefore, „By preferring 
amusement to business, they reject what is fitted to occupy them, and search in vain 
for something else to remove their languor‟.  Furthermore, people are mistaken 
when they believe that „beneficence is an effort in self-denial, or that we lay our 
fellow creatures under great obligations by the kindness we do them‟.  As happiness 
is caused by virtue and the performance of both active business and duties, it is a 
mistake to believe that we should chose anything other than these things as a source 
of pleasure.  People often make this mistake:  „The vulgar, as well as the learned, 
have their paradoxes: They frequently prefer interest, fame, and power, to 
acknowledged happiness‟.  Worst of all people rely on what is out of their control 
for happiness, such as „the imputation of worth, to worth itself‟.  In regards to the 
passions, Ferguson argued that „It is wretched to have an opinion of good in things 
which we might forgo with indifference, or of evil in things which we might endure 
with patience‟.  External circumstances should not affect people‟s opinions of 
other‟s happiness and pleasure.  The effects of fortune and the external conditions in 
which people live do not determine their happiness.
747
  Thus, we can trace 
Ferguson‟s notions of activity and pleasure to his wider definitions of virtue and 
happiness.  Ferguson believes that actively engaging in the correct passions leads to 
happiness.  Activity is also related to happiness and enjoyment.  Man is not happy 




  Ferguson believes that the Stoics want to deny all pleasures by controlling 
the passions with reason.  Ferguson, on the other hand, does not believe that self-
control through reason is enough of a guiding principle to help people make choices 
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about which passions to follow.  Instead, Ferguson finds that it is temperance and 
affection that should help guide people in making their choices.  Furthermore, the 
Stoics wanted to forbid all passions while Ferguson found that the pleasures of an 
active role in society lead to the best kind of pleasure.   
 Ferguson has a wide-ranging understanding of the passions.  He also 
concedes that his interpretation may be misleading: „The division of our appetites 
into benevolent and selfish, has probably, in some degree, helped to mislead our 
apprehension on the subject of personal enjoyment and private good; and our zeal to 
prove that virtue is disinterested, has not greatly promoted the cause‟.  Although 
some believe that pleasure comes from fulfilling selfish desires and that benevolence 
only benefits the receiver.  In fact, „the gratification of every desire is a personal 
enjoyment, and its value being proportioned to the particular quality or force of the 
sentiment, it may happen that the same person may reap a greater advantage from 
the good fortune he has procured to another, than from that he has obtained for 
himself‟.  Ultimately the pleasure received from benevolent actions incurs more 
happiness than any other pleasure.
749
   
 Ferguson interprets the Stoic philosopher Epictetus as supporting this 
position:  „And this, according to Epictetus, was the blessing of God conferred on 
man: That whoever knew, and chose, his true good, could not be hindered or 
disappointed.‟  Ferguson believes that this „true good‟ is making correct choices 
based on affection and virtue:  „It appears, upon the whole, that just opinion, 
benevolent affections, and serious engagements, are the preferable enjoyments of 
human nature.‟
750
  Again, virtue and pleasure are connected.
751
  Furthermore, 
Ferguson is concerned with helping to guide people in their moral choices.  With 
regard to the passions, Ferguson does not believe that it is reason alone which can 
guide people in choosing one pleasure over another, rather it is temperance and 
affection.  Moreover, because he believes that there are some pleasures which are 
better than others, people should follow their active engagements and live a virtuous 
life in order to experience the most pleasure.  People will discover that these 
methods result in the most pleasure through their own experience and observation.  
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There are more elements that need to be considered when assessing moral choice 
including the definitions of moral approbation, moral excellence, and good and evil.  
With these considerations in mind people will be more equipped to make better 




1.4 Moral Choice: or How Should One Make Moral Judgements? 
 
 Ferguson believed that beneficence was the key to a moral life; that people should 
act with the good of others in mind at all times.  This should be the driving force 
behind people‟s actions.  Ferguson, however, was not unaware that individuals have 
needs as well and it is in the discussion of the passions and pleasure that Ferguson 
addresses this issue.  He believed that there are many passions to be chosen from but 
that benevolence and activity lead to the greatest satisfaction.  Although Ferguson 
set this out as his basic idea of morality, he acknowledged that this conclusion is not 
necessarily easy to reach for all people.  Due to the large number of options 
available to people, both physical and intellectual, Ferguson believed that one of his 
main duties to his readers was to demonstrate how to make the best moral choices.  
With this task in mind, Ferguson sets out to define the methods of moral choice 
under the heading of moral approbation.  Ferguson wants to set out moral laws by 
which people can apprehend the nature of the choices presented to them and thus 
proceed from an informed position.  With regard to this, Ferguson lays out 
distinctions of good and evil as well as the means of determining the difference 
between moral excellence and defects, a topic also raised by Stoic authors.
752
  When 
looking at these topics in relation to Ferguson‟s engagement with the Stoics, it 
becomes clear that Ferguson‟s ideas on these topics again do not completely align 
with that philosophy.  It is important to look first at Ferguson‟s general ideas of 
moral approbation before discussing his ideas on good and evil and moral excellence 
in greater detail. 
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The relationship between reason and choice was one which was important to ancient 
and moderns thinkers, not merely to Adam Ferguson.  Ferguson states that „The 
term equivalent to wisdom, among the antients, was employed by them to 
comprehend every article of praise, and enabled them also to comprise the laws of 
morality in the single recommendation of this quality.‟  Here, it seems that the 
„antients‟ to whom he refers are the Stoics.  Ferguson claims that the Stoics believed 
that wisdom was the guiding principle behind moral choice.  Ferguson does not 
agree with this assessment.  He believes that following wisdom alone is too limited 
because it „substitutes a prudent choice of our interests for what ought to be a matter 
of affection, and the effusion of a benevolent heart‟.  Prudence may be a quality of 
the understanding and intellect, but virtue is not; virtue „includes, as a preferable 
consideration, the energy and direction of an amiable and happy disposition‟.  
Ferguson believes that in order to make good choices people must have a 
combination of both good judgement and affection.
753
 
 Moral approbation is „the judgement formed of characters and actions, as 
being excellent or just‟.  Determining „excellence or defect in ourselves, is 
accompanied with elation of mind, shame, and remorse; in others, with 
complacency, veneration, love, pity, indignation, and scorn.‟
754
  Unlike other 
judgements, which may relate to physical objects or circumstances, questions of 
morals relate to more emotional and analytical considerations.  Furthermore, probity 




 Moral approbation is determined by the „law of estimation‟ and „According 
to this law, men refer the qualities and exertions of their own nature, together with 
many other particulars, to the opposite predicaments of excellency and defect.‟
756
  
There is, however, no „instinctive or invariable rule‟ by which people chose what is 
excellent.  People‟s judgements are determined by their affections and desires.
757
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 For moral approbation more generally people judge external actions based on 
their perceived influence on the general good or on other individuals, that is, by their 
effect.
758
  External actions, however, must always be considered in relation to the 
judgement behind the action.  External actions on their own, without a greater 
consideration of motivation, are mere physical behaviours, but, if an action proceeds 
from an evil motive, for example, that action should be forbidden.
759
  Conversely, 
„The law which requires the love of mankind, supported by wisdom, courage, and 
temperance, likewise requires every external action that is suited to this affection, 
and to these qualifications.  The law that prohibits malice, remissness, cowardice, or 
intemperance, prohibits likewise every external effect of these characters.‟
760
  
External actions are therefore, „like mechanical causes of any other sort‟, produce 
effects, but a moral judgement cannot be made on these actions until the emotion or 
thought which produced it is known.
761
  Moral distinctions, therefore, are decided by 
each person, which demonstrate Ferguson‟s rational and eclectic model of 
philosophy that leaves the choice up to the individual person.  Although people may 
have different ideas about morality, in reality, virtue is the excellence which people 
will recognise as the foundation of moral approbation.
762
 
 Ferguson held that what helps guide moral approbation is not reason or 
beneficence alone, but a moral sense or an innate sense which guides people in their 
choice of right and wrong.
763
  He argued that for men „over and above the powers 
cognitive and active, the Maker has given a power judicative, respecting the merit or 
demerit of character, and approving or disapproving even the dispositions, from 
which the moral conduct proceeds.‟
764
  Since this sense is part of man‟s nature, it is 
„nugatory‟ to debate the nature or definition of it because there is no real means to 
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  The law of moral sense is similar to other laws of nature 
which have no explainable origins, like gravity or electricity, but are known facts 
and are ultimately useful and good.
766
   
 The Stoics, on the other hand, do not believe in a moral sense.  They believe 
that it is through wisdom that people make choices not through an innate moral 
sense.  This is another example of how Ferguson‟s philosophy differs from that of 
the Stoics. 
 Ferguson believed that the ability to distinguish between excellence and 
defect was an essential faculty of intelligent beings.  It was important to individuals 
because they are concerned with the nature of good and evil.  Moreover, because 
people were created by God, who also has this faculty, people will want to attempt 
to emulate this aspect to become more like the divine creator.
767
  The reason that the 
difference between excellence and defect exists is because it results from a choice of 
the individual based on their experiences and observations of a variety of subjects 
and occasions.
768
  Although Ferguson differs from the Stoics in his assessment of 
moral approbation, he continued to use their examples in his conception of moral 
philosophy more generally: 
A person of an affectionate mind, possessed of a maxim, That he 
himself, as an individual, is no more than a part of the whole that 
demands his regard, has found, in that principle, a sufficient 
foundation for all the virtues; for a contempt of animal pleasures, 
that would supplant his principal enjoyment; for an equal contempt 
of danger or pain, that come to stop his pursuits of public good.  
“A vehement and steady affection magnifies its object, and lessens 
every difficulty or danger that stands in the way.”  “Ask those who 





                                                 
765
„If moral sense, therefore, be no more than a figurative expression, by which to distinguish the 
discernment of right and wrong, admitting this to be an ultimate fact in the constitution of our nature; 
it may appear nugatory to dispute about words, or to require any other form of expression than is fit 
to point out that fact in question.  And if this fact, though no way susceptible of explanation or proof, 
being uniform to a great extent in the operations or nature, is itself a law, not a phenomenon; it may 
no doubt serve as a principle of science, to account for appearances that result from itself, and to 
direct the practice or arts throughout the departments in which it prevails.‟ Ibid., 128. 
766
 P.II., 128.  
767
 Ibid., 129.  
768




Here again Ferguson cited Epictetus to support his conclusions, rather than adopting 
Stoic thought.   
 Another method by which people create their moral judgements is through 
the law of estimation.  This law is natural and is understood without any explanation 
and its application is similar to that of a natural law when analysing the „judgement 
of manners‟.  This law can „enable the moralist, in particular instances, to ascertain 
what is good for mankind; and to form a regular system of moral estimation and 
precept, throughout all the subdivisions of law, of manners, or political 
institutions.‟
770
  Although this law is central to people‟s concept of moral judgement 
there are no specific rules which determine its definition.  A system of morals will 
therefore proceed from any foundation of morality which the person chooses: „This 
standard, it is the object of moral philosophy to ascertain, and to apply, in estimating 
the reason of different men, their sympathies and their antipathies, the good or the 




 To help make these difficult distinctions, Ferguson believes that looking at 
merit and demerit will lead to the proper discernment of actions.  For Ferguson, 
„Merit is the presence of that quality which, whatever it be, is the object of moral 
approbation; demerit, on the contrary, is the absence of such quality; or the presence 
of any quality which is the object of disapprobation.‟
772
  These concepts are then 
understood under the heading of moral excellence or defect. 
 Ferguson has a very different conception to the Stoics of how to make moral 
choices.  Ferguson noted that the Stoics want wisdom to be the basis of moral 
choices, but Ferguson knew that this is insufficient for people who are not dedicated 
to philosophy to follow.  Instead, Ferguson believed that moral choices should be 
made by experience and sentiment.  This basic definition of moral approbation can 
also be seen in Ferguson‟s discussions of moral excellence and good and evil when 
demonstrating guiding principles for his readers.  
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According to Ferguson, the Stoics believed that the concept of excellence and 
defects „not only led to much nobler ends, but which were of much greater power in 
commanding the human will; the love of pleasure was grovelling and vile, was the 
source of dissipation and of sloth; the love of excellence and honour was aspiring 
and noble, and led to the greatest exertions and the highest attainments of our 
nature.‟
773
  Thus, for the Stoics, attempting to attain the qualities seen as excellent, 
rather than attaining pleasures of a different nature, results in a person leading a 
better and happier life.  Ferguson agrees with this concept that excellence 
demonstrates good qualities. 
 Ferguson believes that excellence is the result of people exhibiting the 
personal qualities of virtue.
774
  Furthermore, Ferguson believes that these qualities 
are naturally the best guide to attaining and judging excellence.  It is providence 
which has „intended‟ that people know „that this distinction, which is the source of 
elevation, integrity and goodness, in the mind of man, should be the guide, by which 
he is most securely led to the highest enjoyments, to which his nature is competent.  
The excellence and beauty he admires may become an attribute of his own mind; 
and, whether in reflection or action, constitute the most agreeable state of his 
nature.‟
 775
  This concept of excellence is the best for rational creatures that hold 
these virtuous qualities in mind.  When others are observed, without the knowledge 
of their inner virtuous qualities, those who are perceived as the best will all exhibit 
wisdom, courage, temperance and benevolence and these people are those who 
accept „the providence and moral government of God, or to settle religion itself on 
its best foundations of integrity and goodness‟.
776
 
 One difficulty arising from following the excellence in others is that people 
can be easily led in the wrong direction by having an incorrect concept of what 
should be esteemed.  Because acceptance of the passions is both an individual 
choice and susceptible to individual interpretation of the correct path, people can be 
misled.  The acceptance of passions is related to the estimation of others.  Whether 
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people want to emulate others or live by their example, the path that the people who 
are esteemed lead can be easily followed.  This can be a problem when, for example, 
the person who is esteemed wants wealth rather than virtue.  The passions of greed 
and ambition can have some of the worst effects and Ferguson is concerned with 
making sure that people do not value wealth over other considerations.
777
  Moral 
estimation is incredibly important when people judge the conduct of others, but it 
can also be misunderstood.  Sometimes, people can think that to combine passions, 
such as „pride, vanity, emulation, magnanimity, or elevation of mind‟, with the 
judgement of excellence can have various consequences.  The desire to excel is a 
natural and „powerful motive to action‟, but only leads to excellence when properly 
applied.
778
  The „Theory of Emulation‟ also has specifically important connotations 
for questions concerning following the passions.
779
 
 It is in the realm of moral excellence that Ferguson agrees with the Stoics.  
They both argue that people should strive for personal excellence because that is the 
only way in which they can strive for perfection.  The attainment of personal 
excellence is a function of a virtuous person attempting to reach perfection.  
Ferguson, however, disagrees with the Stoics in their assessment of moral 
approbation.  The Stoics maintain that it is through wisdom and reason alone that 
moral choices are made, while Ferguson argued that moral sense and sentiment are 
central for making moral choices.   
 
 
Good versus Evil: the Ultimate Moral Judgement 
 
Obviously, when considering questions of morality and virtue the distinctions and 
explanations of good and evil are a central theme and this is true for Ferguson.
780
  
As in so much of Ferguson‟s works, he discusses the Stoic concepts of good and evil 
in some detail. 
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 According to Ferguson, the Stoic definition of good and evil exists only in 
relation to moral choice.  What is good is what should be chosen, while what is evil 
is what should be avoided: 
The Stoics maintained, that nothing was to be classed under the 
predicament of good, but what was at all times invariably to be 
chosen.  That nothing was to be classed under the predicament of 
evil, but was at all times invariable to be shunned, or rejected: That 
to all that good which ought at any time to be rejected, or that evil 
which ought any time to be chose, was not only absurd in terms, 
but tended to weaken the resolution with which a man ought 




Ferguson therefore argued that the Stoics believed that good and evil were again 
understood by reason alone.  Ferguson, on the other hand, had a broader concept of 
how to make the distinction between good and evil.  For Ferguson, things can be 
good or evil, but they can also be indifferent.
782
  The distinctions of good and evil 
are not so strong for Ferguson as they are for the Stoics and Ferguson‟s notions of 
good and evil are related to his ideas about the passions rather than to rational virtue.  
For Ferguson: 
Good and evil imply enjoyment and suffering, consequently have 
an exclusive reference to sentient and intelligent beings.  The 
supposed cause of enjoyment is an object of desire.  The supposed 
cause of suffering is an object of aversion.  What is not supposed 
to be the cause of either is indifferent.
783
   
 
According to Ferguson, defining the distinctions of good and evil is crucial in 
establishing moral philosophy.  Furthermore, he states that the ancient philosophers 
argued among each other about the distinctions of good and evil, thereby drawing 
inspiration from Cicero‟s De Finibus.
784
 
 Ferguson believes that the search for good and evil is one of the most 
important and natural pursuits that humans have attempted: „Men are deeply 
concerned to ascertain, and to apply the distinction of good and evil; and in this have 
a progress no less than in the pursuits of physical knowledge, or the practice of 
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  In all nations at all times people have attempted to discern right from 
wrong, although people have different opinions of what constitutes these 
definitions.
786
  This distinction of good and evil has been addressed by people who 
consider questions of morality and who are „qualified‟ by knowing the difference 
between reason and folly, who do not follow superstitious passions, and who know 
man‟s place in nature.
787
  It is not only philosophers who consider questions of 
moral good and evil, it is an activity taken up by all people and this discernment is a 
fundamental element of human nature.  Furthermore, because men exist together in a 
society, they observe the qualities of good and evil in the behaviour of others.  The 
assessment of these qualities is dependent on the individual because there are a 
variety of considerations and it is then demonstrated in moral approbation, 
estimation, honour, love, hate, etc.  The consideration of good and evil helps 
determine how people judge the world at large and inform moral choice and 
judgement of the actions of others.  It also affects people‟s manners and the 
perception of the esteem or contempt experienced by the observer.
788
 
 Good and evil are founded in the experience of „enjoyment or suffering‟ 
because at the most basic level people perceive what is good as what is enjoyable 
and leads to happiness, while evil is what causes pain and misery.
789
  Therefore, 
good and evil are related to the passions because it is through fundamental 
experiences with suffering that people are able to define what is good and bad.  
Furthermore, good and evil, like virtue, is a quality of the mind.  Notions of good 
exist for each person as an idea, a judgement which they place on what they observe 
and experience.  Therefore, like most of Ferguson‟s morality, these judgements 
should not be based on external circumstances: 
The difference of moral good and evil cannot be ascertained in the 
description of mere external actions.  Actions materially the same 
are in one case morally good, in another case morally evil.  Men 
are not universally agreed concerning the actions which they 
require or prohibit in any case whatever.
790
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Good or evil is determined by the particular circumstances of an action and by the 
people who both participate in and observe the actions.
791
  Moral good and evil only 
exist in the mind of both the person who is observing and the person observed when 
making a moral judgement.  The merit of the action which is under assessment 
demonstrates the qualities of mind behind that action which proves the excellence or 
defect of those qualities.
792
  This understanding of good and evil eventually becomes 
part of the moral sentiment which allows people to make moral choices.
793
 
 The distinction between good and evil exists in the mind and thus the moral 
judgements of people‟s actions cannot be determined by external actions.  The 
problem with this is that people cannot judge others without taking their motivations 
into consideration.
794
  This is one of the great questions of moral philosophy and had 
been debated by ancient thinkers.
 795
  Notions of good and evil are dependent on the 
circumstances in which the individual develops his moral approbation: 
The distinction of good and evil originates in the sensibility of 
intelligent beings to the circumstances in which they are placed, or 
to the qualities of their own nature.  But the application of this 
distinction, and the course of life to proceed from it will, depend 
on the associations men have formed, and even on the epithets of 
good and evil, they are used to bestow on the subjects that occur to 
their choice.  They covet what is reputed profitable, beautiful, or 





 Ferguson is taking a position similar to what he claimed the Stoics to believe.  
He too finds that people choose what is good and avoid what is bad, but it is clear 
the foundation for this position is quite different from that in Stoicism.  The Stoics 
put their focus on the origin of choice on reason and wisdom.  In this case, Ferguson 
is resting the choices that people make on both their personal qualities and their 
judgements based on their experience in their circumstances and their moral 
sentiment.  People do not decide what is good based on a purely rational 
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consideration, but on personal considerations made through their lives based on their 
varied experiences. 
 This notion that morality is dependent on independent perspectives can cause 
problems, however, when these choices are based on a wrong conception: 
Where wealth is conceived as honourable, poverty as shameful, the 
very desire of excellence, or ambition itself, will take the direction 
of avarice.  Where merit is limited to arbitrary forms of behaviour, 
virtue itself will become a principle of formality or superstitious 
observance.
797
   
 
When people misunderstand what should be the basis of good and evil, they build 
their whole systems of judgement on false pretences and do not have the best 
conception of morality.  For Ferguson, there is no one definition of good and evil, it 
is left to individual understanding based on experience, observation, and personality: 
 
To whatever object we incline, or however we may have classed 
individual things in our conception of what is good or evil, it is 
proper to remember in this place, that every effort of the mind is 
also individual and particular, relating to an object in some 
particular and individual situation.  The object is either agreeable 
and desired, or disagreeable and avoided.  It is secure in 
possession, or precarious and imminent; hence our active 
dispositions are either the joy of the successful, the grief of the 
disappointed, the hope of those who have good in prospect, the 
fear of those to whom evil is imminent, or who are threatened with 
the privation of good.  Thus, every sentiment of the feeling mind is 
particular; and the term, affection, which is neither the joy of the 
successful, the grief of the disappointed, the hope of those to 
whom success appears probable, nor the fear of those who distrust 
an event, is a mere abstraction, no where existing in nature; but 
convenient, like other abstractions, in the statement of a subject, as 




Ferguson would claim that his standards of beneficence and virtue, of the 
considerations about playing an active role in society, would guide people to the best 
understanding of good and evil.  Because Ferguson does not attempt to prescribe this 
choice, however, but only sets out certain questions about it, he leaves the 
interpretation to the individual person. 
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 Lisa Hill is correct when she argued that neither Ferguson nor the Stoics 
defined good and evil as existing in complete opposition.
799
   From the analysis here, 
however, it is also evident that Ferguson has a very different concept from that of 
the Stoics.  Ferguson himself believes that the Stoics would use reason to make 
moral judgements about good and evil.  Although Ferguson acknowledges the 
importance of an intelligent nature, reason alone cannot make these judgements; it is 
instead dependent on personal qualities and personal experiences.  There is no 
absolute answer to what is good or evil because this judgment is completely 
dependent upon an individual‟s personal circumstances and one that is based on 
sentiment and observation rather than wisdom.  Ferguson did not want to dictate a 
code of conduct of good and evil to his students, because he was attempting to leave 
the choice up to them.  Ferguson did not believe that moral distinctions were 
completely arbitrary or that they were completely relative to the person.  According 
to Ferguson the virtues of benevolence, fortitude, temperance and prudence are 
natural, and anyone who thought at all about morality would know that those were 
the best qualities in people, based on reasoned and emotional considerations, and 
then their moral choices would be similarly determined by this basic concept of 
virtue.  Moreover, people have an innate moral sense which helps them to formulate 
moral judgements, judgements which conform to this definition of virtue.  Ferguson 
therefore did not need to dictate to his students or readers what moral choices to 
make or how to determine good and evil.  The natural knowledge of virtue and the 
inborn moral sense are all people need to make proper choices and although there 
are certain pitfalls to this arrangement, i.e., that people could mistakenly follow the 
wrong model or make mistakes in their judgement, it is his role to instruct them 
about this basic foundation to prevent them from making bad choices. 
 In this section on moral choice, we have seen that Ferguson takes into 
consideration moral approbation, moral excellence and definitions of good and evil 
when helping people make their judgements.  In all of these areas Ferguson has 
addressed Stoic thinking.  In relation to moral approbation, Ferguson has disagreed 
with the Stoic school that the source of individual choice is wisdom, while he finds 
that it is experience and sentiment which should guide moral choices.  He makes 
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similar claims when he discusses the definitions of good and evil.  Therefore, in this 
case, Ferguson cannot be seen as following the Stoic school as there are clear 
differences between their ideas and his.  He uses them as examples, in these 
instances to argue against them.  In relation to moral excellence, Ferguson uses them 
as an example of a school which also believes that the pursuit of excellence is a 






When Ferguson discusses happiness he engages with Stoic thought more explicitly 
than with other topics.  Craig Smith discusses the importance of choice in 
Ferguson‟s moral philosophy: „Having made a practical judgement as to the 
superiority of serious “business” as an area for the exercise of man‟s active nature, 
Ferguson then returns to the well-known Stoic theme of the identity of happiness 
and virtue.‟
800
  Happiness lies in active virtue and virtue itself is therefore active.  
From this „we see a typically Stoic argument that activity and the true happiness it 
brings are to be found in the exercise of virtue‟.
801
  Here, Smith claims that 
Ferguson‟s idea of happiness follows from that of the Stoics.  Ferguson focuses on 
the definition of Stoic happiness in great detail and believes that their view of 
happiness is that it is synonymous with virtue.  Ferguson sees the relevant question 
of happiness in relation to external circumstances and regards future successes as 
central to the Stoic idea of happiness.  According to Ferguson, the Stoics believed 
that „As a material on which virtue may operate; as an instrument of beneficence; as 
a stake, for which men are to play, and become gainers or losers for themselves or 
others in the game of human life‟.  Under these circumstances, possessions are 
useful.  Although possessions have their uses in people‟s lives, with the correct 
understanding of their purpose, they should not determine personal happiness.  
Hence, „they would not prostitute the denomination of good to any thing that was 
not virtue; nor permit any thing to be called evil that was not vice; and would not 
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have a man set his heart, or rely for happiness, upon any thing beyond his own 
province of responsibility or conduct‟.  For the Stoics, people should not consider 
external circumstances that are not under their personal control as a source of 
happiness: „In this manner they strove to cultivate an elevation of mind which would 
not owe its good to any contingent circumstance, nor any will but its own‟.  They 
believe that a person‟s individual happiness should not be affected by „fortune‟ or 
result from the opinions of others.  For the Stoics, all that people need to do to be 
happy is to be virtuous: „They would not be in fear of any adversity which could not 
hinder their acting a virtuous part; nor be flattered with a prosperity which could add 
nothing to the merit of a virtuous life‟.
802
  Ultimately, a virtuous life is the key to 
happiness, no other consideration matters. 
 Ferguson goes further in his discussion of Stoic happiness and analyses 
Epictetus‟s views on the role of choice and the fact that happiness should only be 
considered when in relation to personal power: 
Epictetus seems to rest the foundations of virtue and happiness on 
the proper discernment and choice of objects, which are in our own 
power, in contradiction to the things which are not in our power.  
Among the things in our own power, he reckons “our opinions, our 
pursuits, our desires, and aversions; and, in a word, whatever are 
our own actions.”  Among the things not in our own power, he 
reckons “body, property, reputation, command, and, in a word, 
whatever are not our own actions.”  Attachment to the first, and 
indifference to the second, are, according to him, the essence of 
wisdom and happiness.  It is surely happy for any one to be 




Ferguson claims that Epictetus believes that in order to be happy people should only 
choose what is under their control, not what is a result of luck or the influence of 
others.  For Epictetus, these things are qualities of the mind.   
 Ferguson found that this position was highly problematic for people 
attempting to find for themselves a means to reconcile happiness and pleasure 
because, „in this, the vulgar are frequently deceived; and recur to fortune, as more in 
their power, than the attainments of a happy mind.‟
804
  People generally look for 
happiness in external circumstances because that is what they believe they have 
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control over and place a high value on them rather than elevated personal qualities 
and contentment and hence this approach to perfection is unattainable: „This may 
well be considered as a degree of perfection, far raised above the ordinary state of 
human nature: It is, nevertheless, that, for which it was given, a noble idea, upon 
which the ingenuous mind cannot too nearly form itself.‟
805
  Although this system is 
what should guide people towards perfection, Ferguson realised that this is not 
accessible to most people.  As one of Ferguson‟s main goals is to create a practical 
moral system, he then proposes a solution to this problem: 
To this ground of distinction, which is laid by Epictetus, we may 
subjoin another, relating to the same subjects; but taken from a 
different consideration of them, that is, from the consideration of 
their value, whether real or supposed, which is in some instances 
absolute, in other instances merely comparative.  Among things of 
absolute value, are to be reckoned chiefly the habits of a virtuous 
life, intelligence, benevolence, temperance, and fortitude; or, in 
short, the good qualities which form the best condition of human 
nature; and which they, who possess them, enjoy the more that 
others partake of the same blessings. Among advantages merely 
comparative, on the contrary, we may reckon precedence, and 
superiority, whether of riches or power; and, in a word, all the 





Ferguson‟s solution was to conceive of the means of happiness differently from the 
Stoics.  Ferguson believed in assigning a higher value to moral considerations, or 
qualities of the mind, and comparative values to other considerations, such as those 
which are not under a person‟s control, but are the result of external conditions.  
When he uses the word „comparative‟, he means that these things are not the same 
for every person; that these are the aspects of people‟s lives which are unequal.  
Wealth or power is something which is not held equally by all people.  To be happy 
people need to place less emphasis on external considerations and more on virtuous 
characteristics.  Ferguson therefore is not following the Stoic school at all because 
their philosophy was not a sufficient guide for most people to live their lives 
properly and thus he created his own system which would lead people to a virtuous 
and happy life. 
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 From these considerations of Ferguson‟s response to Stoic ideas we can see 
the influence of their thought on him more fully.  First, Ferguson believes that 
happiness, like virtue, exists in the mind and is not dependent on external 
considerations.  To be happy, people should assess their virtuous qualities and try to 
see those things as the basis of happiness.
807
 
 Ultimately, Ferguson thinks that happiness is based on benevolence because 
the greatest good for any man is the love of mankind and will ultimately bring him 
the most happiness of any endeavour:  
If we are, therefore, to contract our description of happiness, or 
reduce it to a point, around which the most valuable qualities of 
human nature are likely to be collected, we may venture to select 
that of goodness, or benevolence, as the most likely to serve our 
purpose; and, by way of principal or fundamental law of moral 
wisdom, may assume, that the greatest good incident to human 




Ferguson maintains that „It appears, that the definitions of virtue and of happiness 
are the same; and it follows, that happiness is a personal quality, not an attribute of 
external condition.  Mere life constitutes neither happiness nor misery, but is the 
supposition on which men are susceptible of either.‟
809
  Ferguson believes that 
happiness, like virtue is a quality of the mind and that happiness is only the result of 
„his enjoyments are habitual, lasting, and conceived to be secure.‟
810
  Ferguson 
continued:  
To the second proposition, then, we may subjoin, as its application 
and its comment, That happiness is constituted in the mind, by the 
continued habits of wisdom, benevolence, fortitude, and 
temperance: And the reader may be addressed, nearly in the same 
terms which the emperor Antoninus addressed to himself; “If you 
discharge your present duty with diligence, resolution, and 
benignity, without any bye views; if you adhere to this, without 
any farther desires or  aversions; completely satisfied in 
discharging your present offices, according to nature, and in the 
heroic sincerity of all your professions, you will live happily. Now, 
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Here, Ferguson equates happiness with virtue and then calls on the authority of 
Marcus Aurelius, who believes that happiness consists in performing duties.  This 
question of a person performing duties has been widely discussed in the commentary 
on Ferguson‟s thought.  Lisa Hill and David Kettler believe that Ferguson‟s use of 
the word „duty‟ is the same as the use made of it by the Stoics.
812
  Because the 
Stoics place a strong emphasis on the performance of a person‟s duties required of 
them in their station and Ferguson often uses the term „duty‟, commentators have 
seen this as evidence of Ferguson‟s acceptance of Stoic ideas.
813
  Although this 
question of duty is evidently important to the Stoics, Ferguson does not conceive 
duties as being limited to the obligations created by a person‟s station. 
 Ferguson, however, does not use „duty‟ in the same way that the Stoics 
conceived of it.  The Stoics think of duties as actions, obligations, prescriptions, but 
Ferguson here uses the word duty in reference to morality alone as an example of 
the choice to perform virtuous acts.  For Ferguson: 
A law of duty is an expression of what a person ought to do from 
choice; and in doing which, he is said to have merit; or in doing the 
contrary, to have demerit.  The first application of the fundamental 
law of morality is prohibitory, forbidding the commission of 
wrongs.  The second is positive, requiring every external effect of 
virtue, or of good-will to mankind.  But acts of good-will or 
beneficence cannot be extorted by force….The object of morality, 





Because beneficence is composed of these four aspects, and beneficence is the basis 
of morality, it is people‟s duty to pursue these virtues.
815
  The „habits of wisdom, 
benevolence, fortitude, and temperance‟ are not restricted to those in any particular 
station; they are the components of a virtuous mind which could be attainable by all 
people.  Thus, when Ferguson asserts that the „reader may be addressed, nearly in 
the same terms which the emperor Antoninus addressed to himself‟, he is not 
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claiming that his readers should do exactly what Antoninus prescribed, but what 
Ferguson is prescribing: that is, virtue, not social obligation. 
 Ferguson later used Marcus Aurelius to support this position: „Antoninus 
was happy, not wearing the purple, nor in possessing the throne of Caesar; but in the 
attainments of a steady and beneficent mind.  In these he was no man‟s rival, and 
was ready to share every blessing, even with those who attempted to supplant him in 
the empire.‟
816
  Here, he uses Marcus Aurelius as an example of a virtuous man who 
prefers virtue to material or social gain.  Marcus Aurelius did not care if he was 
emperor, but only cared about his virtuous mind.  Virtue is therefore more important 
for happiness than any other quality: 
If a mind, benevolent, wise, and courageous, have the highest 
enjoyments and least suffering, this alone is to be accounted happy.  
These qualities contain in themselves the use and the value for 
which they are desirable.  Men who have them not, may entertain 
different opinions concerning them; but they who have them, must 
know that they are happy.  They are to be chosen in preference to 
pleasure of any other kind, and at the hazard of any suffering, from 
which they are not exempt.  This is what Epictetus and Antoninus 
meant, by saying, “That virtue is the sole good.”  Unhappy is he 




Here, Ferguson again calls upon the Stoics in support of his position that true 
happiness is the result of virtue.  The virtuous person will know that this is the true 
path to happiness.  Others, who do not yet possess the highest of virtuous qualities, 
misapprehend the true nature of happiness. 
 Ferguson maintains that „It is happy to value personal qualities above every 
other consideration.‟
818
  Ferguson finds that this idea is crucial to man‟s overall 
happiness and that it occurs in Stoic writings: 
It is happy to rely only on what is in our own power, to value the 
engagements of a worthy and strenuous mind as our sole good, and 
the debasement of a malicious and cowardly nature as our sole 
evil.  It is happy to have continually in view, that we are members 
of society, and of the community of mankind; that we are the 
instruments in the hand of God for the good of his creatures; that if 
we are ill members of society, or unwilling instruments in the 
hands of God, we do our utmost to counteract our nature, to quit 
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our stations, and to undo ourselves.  I am in the station which God 
has assigned me, says Epictetus.  With this reflection, a man may 
be happy in every station; without it, he cannot be happy in any.  Is 
not the appointment of God sufficient to outweigh every other 
consideration?  This rendered the condition of a slave agreeable to 
Epictetus, and that of a monarch to Antoninus.  This consideration 
renders any situation agreeable to a rational nature, which delights 
not in partial interests, but in universal good.  Whoever possesses 
good personal qualities, holds them in dependence only upon God: 
but the circumstances in which men are placed; the policy or 
government of their country; their education, knowledge, and 




Unlike the Stoics, here Ferguson acknowledges that it is not simply fulfilling the 
expectations of the station that people are placed in by God, which creates good 
personal qualities, but the specific and individual circumstances in which they live 
that has a great effect on their morals and happiness.  He also thinks that this way of 
thinking about happiness is in fact the best definition of it, but also finds that it only 
removes the idea of chance from a person‟s mind.
820
  Ferguson, like Epictetus, 
believes that it is right only to rely on what is in people‟s own power for happiness 
and furthermore they should not be concerned with what will happen in the future; 




 People have a misconception that they can live without present happiness 
because they will be able to be happy in the future, but things that come in the future 
are not the actual things that make people happy.  Ferguson argues that a person‟s 
happiness should not be dependent on possessions or comparisons with what others 
possess.  Furthermore, as we have seen, external situations and circumstances should 
have no real effect on personal happiness: „The Stoics, proceeding upon one or other 




 From this starting point, the Stoics advanced a „famous paradox‟ which 
stated that „that pain is no evil, and the gift of fortune indifferent‟.  Ferguson 
interprets this as meaning that pain should not be avoided, that what is not under the 
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control of the individual has no affect on virtue, and that this is a „consolation‟ to 
people who experience pain or work in harsh external circumstances:
823
 
[I]f men were to form their opinions, not on the evidence of fact, 
but on the grounds of experience; nothing can be more evident, 
than that a conception of happiness, in things out of our own 
power, or in things of which others are in haste to prevent our 
enjoyment, by stepping before us must be attended with fruitless 
longings, heart burnings, jealousy and malice.  But, if such be the 
nature of good, relating to us, philosophers, it will be said, may 
dispose of names as they may think proper, and all any gift of 
fortune indifferent; but they themselves will not be the less 
desirous to possess it.  Nor can man be required to have any other 
conception of good and evil, than what the real aspect of things in 




Ferguson asks if people‟s happiness is dependent upon their fortune or their external 
circumstances.  He claims that it is not, basing on considerations of „fact and 
experience‟: 
Let the fact therefore decide!  Are men happy or miserable, in the 
precise degree of their good or ill fortune; or of their precedence to 
others?  If so, fortune and precedence are the sole good.  But, if 
men are found equally happy, or equally miserable, under great 
varieties of rank and fortune, it is evident that the measure of 
happiness or misery is not to be taken from thence; and that a wise 
man will not adopt an opinion, nor countenance a form of 




People can be happy or miserable in any circumstance.  They have different ideas of 
what makes them happy.  He believes there is no standard for judging individual 
happiness, only the knowledge of good and evil can influence people‟s choices.
826
  
For Ferguson, happiness is intrinsically related to virtue.  Some people would argue 
that a man is happy when his desires are fulfilled, but Ferguson believes that people 
should not be seen as happy because of this gratification, but unhappy for having the 
desire in the first place.
827
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 Ferguson believes that there are certain things that produce misery and 
Ferguson attempts to dispel them.  People should not have expectations of human 
nature that are too high or too low as both will prevent them from fulfilling their best 
potential and run the risk of encouraging inactivity.  People should not expect to find 
good qualities in other men, but should just have the goodness in themselves.  
Happiness does not come from a lack of concerns and an abundance of free time, of 
neglecting duty and activity, nor of preferring pleasure and amusement to fulfilling 
the „duties of our station‟.  People are unhappy who think that beneficence requires 
self-denial or obligation.  People should prefer happiness to everything else.
828
  But 
happiness is not easily found and people often make mistakes: 
The vulgar, as well as the learned, have their paradoxes: They 
frequently prefer interest, fame, and power, to acknowledged 
happiness.  They prefer considerations, or the imputation of worth, 
to worth itself.  It is wretched to rely for happiness on what we 
cannot command.  It is wretched to have an opinion of good in 
things which we might forego with indifference, or of evil in things 
which we might endure with patience.  It is an error to employ 





Happiness should be understood as being related to activity.  It is not dependent on a 
future state, it is not gained by reaching goals, and it is the pursuit of these goals that 
make him happy.
830
  Even the rich and ambitious see this as their means to 
happiness, rather than free time or attainment of property; it is the activity that 
makes them happy rather than the leisure time they have.
831
 
 Ferguson‟s notions of happiness are therefore similar to Stoic ideas of 
happiness.  It is clear that when Ferguson thinks about the nature of happiness he 
finds that the Stoics have a mostly correct understanding.  They are right in thinking 
that real happiness is the result of virtue, that they are both personal qualities of the 
mind, and that the fulfilment of a virtuous mind leads to the most steady and long-
lasting happiness.  Also, the Stoics note that happiness is not reliant upon any 
external situation or future position.  Happiness does not result from property or 
position, either in the present or in the future.  Ferguson argued, on the other hand, 
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that the Stoic definition of happiness is insufficient for the majority of people.  
Because the Stoics focus on a perfection of character as their guiding principle, 
people may attempt to reach that perfection, although they can never fully attain it.  
Unfortunately, most people cannot follow this kind of perfection and Ferguson sets 
out to create a notion of happiness which can be understood and achieved more 
easily.  Ferguson believes that assigning a value to certain things, placing a higher 
value on moral considerations, and a comparative value on external things, will 
eventually show people that they should be more concerned with virtue and 
benevolence than any external circumstance.  Ferguson is more realistic than he 
thinks the Stoics were: he recognises that external needs are important to people.  
Although he believes that these external cares and the cares of future attainments do 
not realise true happiness, he knows that people believe that they are important.  In 
his pedagogical role, therefore, he provides the correct way of thinking to redirect 
the emphasis people place on the main concerns of their life.  Ferguson does not 
dismiss day-to-day life, as he would claim the Stoics do, but attempts to instruct 
people on how to best live their lives in the modern world.  It is clear that Ferguson, 
while perhaps using some Stoic examples to prove his points about happiness, does 
not see this philosophy as adequately guiding people in their moral choices. 
 
 
1.6 Religion and the Role of Providence 
 
For Ferguson one of the most important factors in a person‟s life is providence and 
the role of religion and God and this is also something which the Stoics discuss.  
Authors writing about Ferguson have also made this connection.  Lisa Hill finds that 
„Ferguson‟s theology is noteworthy in the sense that it is a well developed blending 
of Stoic and Christian thought, but it offers few critical or groundbreaking insights 
such as Hume advanced.‟
832
  According to David Kettler, „of all the non-theological 
Western schools of moral philosophy, the one which has most systematically taught 
the duty of joyously acquiescing in the divinely established order is the Stoic.‟
833
   
 Lisa Hill interprets this as a sign of Ferguson‟s Christian Stoicism.  Hill 
believes that although Ferguson‟s thought can be seen as secular there is a strong 
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religious character to it.  She argues that Ferguson united religion and science 
through God‟s will as found in the laws of both scientific and human nature and 
through the agency of divine providence.
834
  She notes that Ferguson only discusses 
Christianity and Christian ideas when they coincide with those of the Stoic‟s „natural 
religion‟.  As evidence of this she cites Ferguson‟s participation in several 
discussions that are similar to both Stoicism and Christianity.  Hill cites his belief in 
benevolent providence, the limits of human control over external circumstances, 
„objective ethical standards‟, and that benevolence is the best virtue as well as the 
greatest good for both individuals and others.  She finds that the one exception to the 




 Ferguson indeed addressed the Stoic notion of religion in his texts.  Ferguson 
wrote that the Stoics: 
considered the deity as the intelligent principle of existence and of 
order in the universe, from whom all intelligence proceeds, and to 
whom all intelligence will return; whose power is the irresistible 
energy of goodness and wisdom, ever present and ever active; 
bestowing on man the faculty of intelligence, and the freedom of 
choice, that he may learn, in acting for the general good, to imitate 
the divine nature; and that, in respect to events independent of his 
will, he may acquiesce in the determinations of providence.  “How 
great is the privilege of man,” says Antoninus, “to have it in his 
power to do what God will approve, and to receive with 




The Stoics, according to Ferguson, believed that the „deity‟ was the intelligent 
designer who gifted mankind with intelligence and who is both good and wise.  
Ferguson maintains that the Stoics believed that people have free will, given by 
God, when performing their actions so that they can attempt to be as wise, 
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benevolent and good as God.  As far as external circumstances are concerned the 
Stoics believed that people should be resigned to the will of providence.   
 Ferguson argued strongly for the existence of a benevolent, wise and just 
God who created all in existence and whose existence can be known through the 
discovery of natural laws.
837
  Ferguson maintained that the belief in God is 
„universal‟:  „The cavils of sceptics do not derogate from the universality of this 
belief, no more than like cavils derogate from the universality of the perception men 
have of the existence of matter; for this likewise has been questioned.‟
838
  He 
believes that religion is itself a fundamental characteristic of humanity and notes: 
„No tribe is so brutish, says Cicero, as not to know that there is a God, although they 
may not know what conception to form of his character.‟
839
  It is natural for all 
peoples to have some sense of religion
840
 and he believes that this is easily 
explicable:   
In the nature of man, there is a perception of causes from the 
appearance of effects, and of design from the concurrence of 
means to an end…But natural perceptions are the foundations of 
all our knowledge.  This is the foundation of what we know from 
sensation, from testimony, and from interpretation.  In any of these 
cases, we can assign no reason for our belief, but that we are so 
disposed by our nature.
841
   
 
Because people can see a design in the natural world, because they can understand 
the laws which it follows, this proves that there must be a designer of that system of 
nature.
842
  This is true for the entirety of the universe, whether it be the design of 
individual organs, or the processes by which a variety of elements work together, all 
of the elements were created to fill their purpose.  From this understanding, that God 
created existence, men therefore understand that they should act in the place that 
God has designed for them.  Man is „enabled to become a conscious and a willing 
instrument in the hand of his Maker for the completion of his work‟.
843
  Ferguson is 
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therefore following in the tradition of Boyle and Newton who argued along similar 
lines. 
 Ferguson believed that this knowledge can have an effect on morality.  He 
states that some believe that what God has determined as being right or wrong 
should be followed as the sole guide to making moral choices.
844
  People search for 
a higher standard to determine what is right in order to know that God exists and 
through His will is known by the observation of his „works‟ which are the absolute 
proof of His existence.
845
  This is not an end point, but a starting point.  People can 
aim to reach the perfection of God in their lives, however, they are not expected to 
attain it already, „it may be considered as one of the rude materials on which he 
himself is to exert his talent for art and improvement.‟
846
  Although people have 
mistaken the true nature of God in the past, particularly in the practice of 
polytheism, if they understand this conception of God and recognise the truth of 
providence, then they will be able to improve themselves because they have the 
correct understanding of God.
847
 
 Ferguson believed that piety is natural to human nature and argued that it is 
the basis of religion:  
This affection [piety] constitutes religion in the human mind, and 
has its external expressions and effects also.  It is naturally 
expressed in terms, and in rites of adoration.  “What else can I, 
says Epictetus, a lame old man do, but sing hymns to God. If I 
were a nightingale, I would act the part of a nightingale: If I were a 
swan, the part of a swan.  But since I am a reasonable creature, it is 
my duty to praise God.  This is my business, I do it.  Nor will I 
ever defer this post as long as it is vouchsafed me; and I exhort you 




This sentiment which Epictetus has expressed, of the necessity and duty of piety to 
God, has far greater reaching consequences for Ferguson.  It is this love of God and 
the expression of that love that leads men to behave for the greater good of those 
others who have been created by the same being and who are connected with them 
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  Ferguson, therefore, has similar ideas to those he claims the Stoics 
believe about the topic of religion generally.  It is under the topic of providence that 
Ferguson‟s theology and Stoicism are most important.
850
 
 According to Ferguson, the Stoics „maintained the reality of providence, and 
of common interest of goodness and of justice, for which providence was exerted, 
and in which all rational creatures were deeply concerned‟.
851
  Ferguson referred to 
Epictetus to demonstrate that the knowledge of providence is related to virtue.  He 
states: 
If man be a worthy actor in this order of things, the scene is 
prepared for the part it behoves him to act: And from his case, as 
well as from the general aspect of things, we may venture to 
conclude with Epictetus, that to those who are qualified with 
intelligence and a grateful mind, every circumstance or event in the 
order of nature may serve to manifest, and to extol the supreme 




Ferguson openly agrees with Epictetus in regard to the fact that to know God one 
must have both knowledge of natural philosophy and possess a „grateful mind‟.
853
  
He believes that men acting their part in a world, that was set up by God, are aware 
of their part, and will see the goodness of providence in their lives. 
  Ferguson has his own concerns about providence and aims to prove its 
existence in the face of opposition.  Ferguson found the need to demonstrate that 
choice is possible, even in a world where God‟s providence determines, at the very 
least, the station in which men are born.  In his understanding of providence 
Ferguson must allow for moral choice.  He believes that this is a Stoic conception as 
well, but he is not attempting to prove that in his specific discussions about 
providence.  Although he mentioned that the Stoics believe in free will, Ferguson is 
not following them on this point, but argues that humans have a will that determines 
choice, not by necessity, but because of being an active, rational creature.
854
  Since 
the notion of providence would claim that God has predetermined all events and 
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actions, Ferguson raises the question of how humans can believe that they have any 
freedom of choice if their choices seem to be predetermined.  Ferguson believes that 
people cannot actually know what providence has or is, but, because it was created 
by God, it is inherently perfect.  Furthermore, because intelligence was a quality 
bestowed on men, it is obvious the choice is a function of that intelligence.
855
  
Although God has given men freedom of choice and thought, He controls the 
outcome, so that, for example, evil does not take over the world.
856
  Ferguson goes 
on to argue that:  
To have moral agents in nature, the choice of their actions must be 
free; or at most, subject to a discipline that may furnish the mind 
with sufficient occasion of observation and experience, to correct 
its own errors, and to reform what is wrong in its dispositions or 
actions.  The question, therefore, respecting the wisdom and 
goodness of Providence, is How far such a moral discipline is 
perceivable in the present order of things? Is there enough, in this 
order, to lead intelligence in the discernment of good and evil? Are 
the admonitions, on the side of morality, sufficient to point out the 
choice, and to with the affections?  To this questions we may 




Ferguson believed that moral actions can only be determined by their will.  For 
Ferguson, „man is his own master‟.
858
  The effects of this control that people have 
over their own will are left to the individual and can be either positive or negative.
859
 
 According to Ferguson, the „philosopher‟ acknowledges his station and sees 
that he is both part of his immediate human community, but also that his station is 
within the entire universe created and governed by God.
860
  Ferguson goes on to 
write that existing in this station of a man in the general community of the Godly 
universe will lead people to act for the benefit of all mankind and claims that this 
idea is not only found in moral philosophy generally, but also in the natural 
philosophy of Newton, as follows:   
“If I have done a good office,” says the emperor Aurelius, “let me 
not forget that this itself is my good; and let me never cease to do 
such things.”  In recognizing his station, he does not limit his view 
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to any particular division of mankind; but considers himself as a 
part in the great system of nature, excellent in being fitted to his 
place, and happy in the contributing to the general good.  
“Whatever is agreeable to thee, shall also be agreeable to me, O 
beautiful order of nature!  Whatever thy seasons bring, shall be 
fruit, neither too early nor too late for me.”  Such sentiments of 
sublime religion, may be justly considered as the highest 
attainment of created intelligence.  Its foundations are laid in the 
genuine lessons whether of physical or moral science; and are to be 
met with in the concluding observations of Newton‟s Principia, no 
less than in the remains of Socrates or Epictetus, [or] of Marcus 
Aurelius. In the one, is the suggestion of final causes, or of an 
arrangement in the works of nature, for which mechanism alone 
will not account.  In other words, it is the resort of minds devoted 
to the government  of wisdom and the sentiments of benevolence, 
and who receive, with some degree of a congenial spirit, the 
indications of supreme intelligence and goodness, as they are 




This quote is telling of Ferguson‟s views of Stoicism.  First, when a philosopher 
considers his position in the world, he will come to the conclusion that he is in the 
world created by God and thus both a citizen of the race of men and all things 
created by God.  From there he makes recourse to a Stoic thinker not as the origin of 
this idea, but as someone who exemplifies Ferguson‟s ideas.  Marcus Aurelius 
acknowledged that he should act for the benefit of all, as he himself is part of the 
„great system of nature‟.  This realisation is not limited to the Stoics because it is 
actually a function of natural religion and can be learned from considerations of both 
natural and moral philosophy.  Even when discussing which moral philosophers 
have conceived this theory, Ferguson includes Socrates, not just the Stoics, as well 
as Newton as representative natural philosophers.  This conclusion would be reached 
by all, including himself, who look for answers about the constituent parts of the 
universe.  Even though Ferguson acknowledges that the Stoics participated in the 
discourse about providence, they are only a part of his discussion, not even the main 
focus of it.   
 The Stoics believe that all people are born into their station in life.  They 
believe that people can be happy in whatever is their station.  According to 
Ferguson, people can improve their situation, both personally and physically.  This 
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contradicts the Stoic view of providence because the Stoics see positions in life as 
being fixed and Ferguson does not.  Ferguson‟s point about people being happy in 
their station is related to the moral problems of emulation and ambition, whereas 
people seem unhappy with their lives because they observe that other people‟s lives 
are externally better than theirs.  Ferguson believed that people‟s happiness is not 
related to their external circumstances, although that is what they may believe, and 
also that, while their station is dictated by providence, there is the possibility for 
improvement.  Because this station in life is not actually productive of either 
happiness or virtue the knowledge that providence has destined a particular place in 
the world for any individual does not need to limit him to that place.   
 Ultimately, Ferguson‟s concepts of religion are related to all of his other 
ideas about the constituents of morality.  Ferguson believed that men are created by 
God and are given the „gifts of intelligence and free will, a personage and character 
to be ascribed to himself.  In respect to either, he is distinguished in nothing so much 
as in this power and disposition to perceive, with delight, an intelligent and 
beneficent Author in the system of things around him‟.  When man looks at the 
world, he cannot help but see the work of God and this „admiration‟ of God‟s world 
means that men are fit to engage in the „godlike principles of beneficence and 
wisdom‟.  Men are part of the world that God has designed, where providence 
exists, and where men are meant to act.  This world can be difficult to comprehend 
and men may turn to a passive rather than active life.
862
  Thus, man, because he is 
living in the world of God, and attempts to emulate the godlike virtues of 
beneficence and wisdom, is basically good.  Man‟s desire and active engagement in 
the greater good of his fellow men also is a „pious resignation to the will of God; or, 
at most in perfect good will to mankind, in every instance in which the active power 
of an individual can apply.‟
863
  When man acts for the good of others „there occurs, 
an occasion to practice and promote that mutual affection, fidelity, justice, and 
humanity, which in fact are a common blessing to mankind; insomuch, that for him 
to adopt and to communicate the effect of these characters, is to act for the good of 
his fellow-creatures; and, so far he becomes an able and [willing instrument] in the 
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hand of God for the beneficent ends of his providence.‟
864
  Here, Ferguson is 
connecting the ideas of providence and virtue.  The origin of virtue comes from the 
emulation of God and the knowledge that behaving virtuously benefits society and 
aids in God‟s providence.  Ferguson‟s ideas about religion are connected, but not 
dependent on Stoic principles. 
 It is also important that Ferguson argued that the laws of nature could prove 
the existence of God and in discovering the laws of nature God‟s design is known.  
This concept draws equally upon the Stoics and upon natural philosophers.  Robert 
Boyle and Isaac Newton both promoted a natural philosophy which implemented a 
mechanistic method that proved God‟s design,
865
  Epictetus also argued that 
understanding natural laws led to a greater understanding of God‟s laws and 





Ferguson‟s engagement with Stoicism is not straightforward and he has several 
methods for dealing with Stoic authors.  In some cases, Ferguson discusses Stoic 
ideas, in others he merely uses them as examples in his broader argument.  At 
specific instances he is critical of Stoic philosophy and attempts his own answers to 
their questions.  Ferguson did not simply adopt Stoic philosophy and he was often 
very critical of many of their ideas.   
 The discussion in this chapter has been limited to an assessment of 
Ferguson‟s relationship to the Stoic school, demonstrating his specific engagement 
with and reaction to this one school, yet Ferguson‟s relationship with Stoicism is 
also connected to his understanding of the history of philosophy and his eighteenth-
century methodology more broadly.  Ferguson‟s historicism resulting from the 
Ancients and Moderns debate, Ferguson‟s use of natural law and natural religion in 
relation to morality following from the experimental method, and Ferguson‟s 
eclectic method can all be traced throughout his engagement with Stoicism.  
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Ferguson does not follow the philosophy of the Stoics, but uses them as a source 
when they agree with his ideas.  Ferguson‟s concept of moral philosophy remains 
central in all his works.  While it may appear that Ferguson adopted Stoic ideas in 
his philosophy, in fact he was adapting Stoic philosophy so that it complied with his 
ideas.  Ferguson‟s conclusions were often different from those of the Stoics, with 
happiness being the main exception, and his use of them in his philosophy mirrors 
the use of them in his lectures.  Ferguson needs to have evidence for his 
philosophical principles.  Following from the experimental method, which relies on 
experience and observation as evidence, as well as the methods of the modern 
eclectics, who promote the use of analytical reason to assess evidence, Ferguson 
uses Stoic philosophy as his empirical evidence when explaining his philosophy.  
Moving beyond his observations of human nature and behaviour and the nature of 
morality, the Stoics provide a well-established source of evidence which supports 
and legitimises Ferguson‟s thought.  This is not to say that Ferguson is uncritical of 





























As we have seen, many scholars who have written about Adam Ferguson have 
focused on his use of elements of Stoic philosophy.  Several, particularly Jane Bush 
Fagg, Lisa Hill, David Kettler and Vincenzo Merolle, in attempting to understand 
and clarify Ferguson‟s relationship to Stoicism have concluded that Ferguson no 
more than echoed Stoic morality.  They claimed that he adopted major elements of 
their philosophy into his own.  This stance is untenable and represents an 
oversimplification of Ferguson‟s complex relationship with ancient philosophy.  The 
question of Ferguson‟s engagement with his ancient sources, his approach to ancient 
philosophy and his supposed adherence to Stoicism thus remained unresolved.  
Nevertheless, this study is crucial not only to Ferguson scholarship, but also to our 
understanding of the role of Stoicism in the Enlightenment. 
 In the Introduction to his Principles of Moral and Political Science, 
Ferguson stated:  
The Author, in some of the statements which follow, may be thought 
partial to the Stoic philosophy; but is not conscious of having warped 
the truth to suit with any system whatever.  His notions were taken up, 
where certainly Truth might be learned, however little it were formed 




This is perhaps the most telling statement in Ferguson‟s work that helps us 
understand his methods.  Ferguson informs his readers what his priorities, methods 
and intentions were when writing his philosophy.  Ferguson did not want to be 
perceived as following any school, especially the Stoics, but was concerned about 
„Truth‟.  Although Ferguson was aware he was being closely associated with 
Stoicism, he denies that he changed his way of thinking to fit the philosophy of that 
specific school.   
 This statement also speaks to Ferguson‟s overall methodology, as this thesis 
has attempted to establish.  Ferguson‟s methods are connected to wider intellectual 
and cultural trends across Europe in the eighteenth century.  Following from the 
Quarrel between the Ancients and Moderns, not only did new techniques of 
historicism and hermeneutics develop, but also a widespread anti-sectarian 
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sentiment and an aversion toward being perceived as following a particular system 
of philosophy.  To achieve a non- sectarian philosophy, one method that emerged 
was that of the modern eclectics.  The eclectics appealed to a combination of reason, 
observation and experience to find true philosophical principles.  They relied on the 
„experimental‟ methods to aid them in choosing the evidence for their philosophy 
and in avoiding and combating sectarianism.  While Ferguson was not a self-
conscious eclectic, he did participate in this movement.  As can be seen in the quote 
above, Ferguson did not want to be seen as a sectarian adopting the thought of 
others; he was attempting to establish a true philosophy in which he drew selectively 
on the thought of both ancient and modern authors according to their value as 
evidence for his ideas.  Understanding Ferguson‟s context and methods as well as 
accepting his words, should help us to begin to cast doubt on the assumption that he 
adopted Stoic philosophy, successfully or not. 
 When investigating Ferguson‟s recourse to ancient philosophy in his lectures 
and printed material, what also becomes apparent is his didactic purposes in 
discussing ancient schools.  Ferguson was a lecturer of moral philosophy and as a 
result he presented the ancient schools of philosophy to his students in order to 
display the principles of their moral philosophical systems.  This was a tool used to 
teach his students, and a common practice in the eighteenth century.  When 
Ferguson demonstrated moral principles to his students in this fashion, he was not 
suggesting that this was his philosophy, but that these ancient principles constitute 
the foundation of modern philosophy.  Because Ferguson‟s Institutes and Principles 
were printed editions of these lecture notes, his repeated appeal to these ancient 
schools and their ideas therefore plays a prominent role in his discussions of 
philosophy, and consequently have influenced later interpretations of Ferguson‟s 
work.  By carefully examining Ferguson‟s texts and the context in which he wrote, 
as well as considering his philosophical goals, it becomes clear, however, that 
Ferguson did not merely adopt any of these ancient philosophies, but rather used 
them as examples for his students as part of his educational programme and in 
accordance with eighteenth-century pedagogical practices. 
 The further analysis of Ferguson‟s engagement with Stoic philosophy, 
investigating specific aspects of moral philosophy, reveals Ferguson‟s true 
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relationship to Stoicism.  Ferguson believed that the Stoics had some valid 
principles in their philosophy, but he was critical of others.  There is no occasion in 
which Ferguson adopted Stoic principles without his having already conducted a 
close and detached analysis of their thought.  Ferguson may have used Stoic ideas as 
supporting evidence, but it was to support ideas he had formed independently of the 
school.  Ferguson argued that their concept of virtue was the best among the ancient 
schools, not because it was they that argued it, but because it was natural to human 
beings and therefore must be universal.  He often criticised Stoic philosophy, 
however, because he believed that it did not actually solve the problem of how to 
live a moral life in his society.  Ferguson presented his students with a practical 
moral philosophy that could guide them in making moral choices in their modern 
commercial society and therefore taught them principles which he believed would 
help them do so.  When Ferguson invoked the Stoic authors, it was not to follow 
their thought, but to present his students with what he believed was a good example 
of moral thought, or at least a close approximation.  Ferguson was not dependent 
upon Stoic thought, but produced his own philosophy. 
 The notion of Ferguson‟s Stoicism therefore does not seem to be 
substantiated by his own writings.  While Ferguson‟s debt to the Stoic school is 
undeniable, he was not trying to re-write Stoic philosophy, but wanted to develop a 
unique philosophy based on a consciously anti-sectarian commitment to experience, 
observation and what he considered to be the truth.   
 One issue that this consideration raises is the usefulness of the label „Stoic‟ 
for understanding and explaining the thought of the eighteenth century.  The 
questions that have preoccupied scholars range from whether Ferguson was a Greek 
or Roman Stoics, did he favour early, middle or late Stoicism, and which 
Enlightenment version did he follow?  Scholars dispute which version of Stoicism 
Ferguson followed before they accept that he was a Stoic in the first place.  It can be 
argued that classifying Ferguson as some kind of Stoic has hindered progress in the 
study of his actual moral philosophy because trying to interpret Ferguson‟s works as 
Stoic has led scholars to view his ideas as derivative, or eclectic (in the negative 
sense), so that he is seen as unsystematic or incoherent, and his writing as a 
„patchwork‟.  Thinking of Ferguson as a Stoic is not only inaccurate, but it can be 
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argued that it misrepresents the important character and intention of his very modern 
system of thought. 
 Questioning the usefulness of labelling Ferguson a Stoic has wider 
implications for scholarship on the importance of the intellectual heritage of 
classical antiquity in the eighteenth century.  The use of a label is, in one way, an 
intellectual short-cut.  Labels can also help organise our understanding of an 
individual thinker.  In recent scholarship, terms such as „Stoicism‟ or 
„Epicureanism‟ have been used as a convenient way of understanding the thought of 
eighteenth century thinkers, or placing them in context.  
 For example, James Moore and Michael Silverthorne have recently 
published Francis Hutcheson‟s translation of Marcus Aurelius‟s Meditations and in 
the Introduction give a detailed analysis of the role of Stoicism in early Scottish 
Enlightenment thought.
867
  John Robertson
868
 has explained Enlightenment thought 
through the debates about ancient schools, particularly the role of Epicureanism.  
While he has made a very convincing argument, in the light of this new 
interpretation of Ferguson‟s works, the entire discussion about the influence of 
ancient philosophy needs to be re-examined.  Stoicism for Ferguson was not as 
influential as has been assumed by previous scholars.  The notion of Enlightenment 
Stoicism itself needs to be better understood before interpretations of its influence 
on specific thinkers can be accurately assessed.  Epicureanism in the Enlightenment 
equally needs to be re-evaluated.  What Epicureanism meant in the eighteenth 
century and how it was understood by individual thinkers need further investigation 
to determine accurately the influence it had on the wider thought of the 
Enlightenment.  Neven Leddy and Avi Lifschitz have published a collected volume 
of essays reinterpreting the role of Epicureanism and the engagement with it by 
individual eighteenth-century thinkers, which is a solid beginning to this kind of 
new study of the reception of ancient philosophy in the Enlightenment.
869
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 The use of labels, however, becomes problematic if it conceals more than it 
reveals about a given thinker‟s writings.  If it is acknowledged that the use of the 
term Stoicism in the past is problematic and can produce a biased interpretation of a 
thinker‟s ideas, the question arises: why do scholars perpetuate this practice?  The 
application of the labels „Stoic‟ and „Epicurean‟ to the thought of those writing in 
the eighteenth century creates more problems than it solves and is not a useful way 
to enhance our understanding of the philosophical positions and goals of these 
writers.  As we pursue research into the eighteenth century, these labels will 
continue to impede our understanding if they bias the interpretation of an individual 
thinker‟s writing. 
 One of the implications of this study and the revised interpretation of 
Ferguson‟s relationship to Stoicism and ancient philosophy in general is that more 
research needs to be done on Ferguson‟s moral philosophy.  Many scholars have 
called attention to the importance of moral philosophy in Ferguson‟s thought, but 
these studies have often been flawed because they have relied on the assumption that 
Ferguson was, at heart, a Stoic.  Further research on Ferguson‟s personal 
contribution to eighteenth-century moral philosophy is needed.  In addition, 
Ferguson is representative of many of the trends in eighteenth-century thought and a 
closer examination of his writings can lead to a greater understanding of 
Enlightenment philosophy.  One issue which has been greatly understudied is 
Ferguson‟s relationship to natural religion.  From the discussion of Ferguson‟s 
concepts of providence and religion in this dissertation, the influence of eighteenth-
century ideas about natural religion were readily apparent, particularly the parallels 
to Robert Boyle, but these have not been researched in great detail.  While some 
scholars have categorised Ferguson as a „Christian Stoic‟,
870
 it seems that a closer 
examination of Ferguson‟s relationship to eighteenth-century ideas of natural 
religion might bring to light more interesting interpretations of his thought.  
Ferguson‟s connection to the natural law tradition may also shed some light on his 
philosophy and is also a subject which is highly neglected.  Connections between the 
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discipline of natural law and the methods of the modern eclectics have been drawn 
by such thinkers as T. J. Hochstrasser,
871
 with insightful conclusions which advance 
research into the intellectual history of the Enlightenment.  Judging by Ferguson‟s 
footnotes and references, he had carefully read numerous thinkers who wrote about 
natural law, and further investigation into this connection may produce fruitful 
results, particularly when thinking about Ferguson‟s method in relationship to 
eclecticism. 
 The purpose of this dissertation, however, has been to show that a new 
interpretation of Ferguson‟s thought and its relationship to ancient philosophy, 
Stoicism in particular, is needed, as well as a reassessment of the role of classical 
antiquity in the eighteenth-century more generally.  The label of „Stoic‟ should no 
longer apply to Ferguson‟s moral philosophy and a more nuanced interpretation of 
his work needs to be undertaken as here.  This study has begun this new 
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